Goff, J.
The Grandparent Visitation Act (or GVA) allows a paternal grandparent to petition for visitation with their grandchild if the “child was born out of wedlock,” but only if the child’s father has “established paternity in relation to the child.”1 The question here is whether a custodial mother’s stipulations to the father’s paternity in an agreed visitation order preclude her from asserting otherwise in an effort to dismiss that order. In line with well-established principles of equitable estoppel, we answer that question in the affirmative. We thus affirm the trial court and hold that the grandmother here had standing under the GVA to petition for visitation with her grandchild.
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II. The doctrine of paternity by estoppel precludes Mother from asserting Grandmother’s lack of standing
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Because Mother and Father were never married, Grandmother sets forth her theory of visitation rights under subsection (a)(3). See Appellee’s Br. at 11. 6 But because Father failed to establish paternity through the proper statutory channels, Mother insists that “there is no evidence that [Grandmother] is anything but an unrelated stranger without standing to assert any right to grandparent visitation.” Appellant’s Br. at 15–16, 19 (citing I.C. § 31-14-2-1). Grandmother acknowledges that it would have been preferable for Father to have established paternity in the Child before his death. But she argues that Mother’s actions—admitting Father’s paternity in writing and in open court, failing to dispute the DNA test results, and allowing the Grandmother and Child to maintain their relationship—effectively amounted to a request for the court to find that Father was the biological father of Child and “thus gave standing to Grandmother” to petition for visitation. Pet. to Trans. at 6, 7.
We pause here to acknowledge that, because the Agreed Order was a final judgment resolving Grandmother’s visitation petition, the proper vehicle for Mother’s standing challenge would have been a motion for relief from a void judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6) rather than a motion to dismiss. See T.D. v. State, 219 N.E.3d 719, 725–26 (Ind. 2023). But even if Mother had filed the appropriate motion, the trial court would have been justified in denying it for the reasons that follow.
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The decision in Russell embodies the doctrine of paternity by estoppel— an equitable remedy long applied by Indiana courts to prevent a man from denying paternity of a child he has accepted as his own or to prevent a mother from denying the paternity of a man she formerly asserted was the father. [Footnote omitted.] To be sure, paternity by estoppel has its limits in Indiana, given the state’s equally important policy concern with “identifying correctly parents and their offspring.” Russell, 682 N.E.2d at 517 n.7. Such proper identification, the Russell Court emphasized, “should prove to be in the best interests of the child for medical or psychological reasons” and “also plays a role in the just determination of child support.” Id. (quoting In re S.R.I., 602 N.E.2d 1014, 1016 (Ind. 1992)). See also Sheetz v. Sheetz, 63 N.E.3d 1077, 1085–86 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (Najam, J., dissenting) (stressing that Indiana’s appellate courts “have rejected equitable estoppel as an attempt to circumvent the statutory requirement that support orders be entered only against biological or adoptive fathers”). But, like in dissolution proceedings, we see no reason to preclude the doctrine’s application in cases brought under the GVA. [Footnote omitted.]
Here, Mother agreed to change the Child’s name to reflect Father’s surname, she agreed to add Father’s name to the Child’s birth certificate, and she acknowledged “in open Court and on the record” that Father was Child’s father. App. Vol. 2, p. 26. What’s more, Mother’s receipt of Social Security survivor’s benefits, which she conceded at oral argument, would have required her to acknowledge and prove that Father was the Child’s biological father. Under these circumstances, we hold that the trial court’s acceptance of Mother’s stipulations in the Agreed Order “is the legal equivalent of a paternity determination.” It would be inequitable now to deprive Grandmother of the relationship she has fostered with the Child based on Mother’s stipulation to Father’s paternity and the terms of visitation under the Agreed Order. Thus, while Mother may petition for modification of visitation in the future, see I.C. § 31-17-5-7, she is estopped from asserting Grandmother’s lack of standing to petition for visitation, see Russell, 682 N.E.2d at 518–19; see also Crowl v. Berryhill, 678 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting mother’s argument that a trial court’s provisional GVA order was void ab initio given her prior stipulation to that order).
Finally, having established Grandmother’s standing to petition for visitation, we briefly address—and dispose of—Mother’s remaining appeal issues. Mother argues the Agreed Order rested on inadmissible evidence of Father’s paternity and violated her constitutional right to care, custody, and control of her children. Appellant’s Br. at 17, 24. But the merits of the trial court’s approval of the Agreed Order back in 2018 are no longer appealable. Mother also asserts Grandmother misrepresented that Father “had established paternity prior to his death” by attaching a purported DNA test report to her petition. Id. at 18. But Mother has offered no evidence suggesting the report contains any misrepresentation.
Conclusion
For the reasons above, we exercise our appellate jurisdiction to hold that, because Mother is estopped from denying Father’s paternity, Grandmother has standing under the GVA to petition for visitation with the Child. Affirmed.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, J., concur.
Molter, J., concurs in part and in the judgment with separate opinion in which Slaughter, J., joins.
Molter, J., concurring in part and in the judgment.
As the Court explains, Mother’s standing argument is not properly before us because she has not filed a motion to set aside the 2018 Agreed Order. Ante, at 8 (“We pause here to acknowledge that, because the Agreed Order was a final judgment resolving Grandmother’s visitation petition, the proper vehicle for Mother’s standing challenge would have been a motion for relief from a void judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6) . . . .”). I agree, so I concur with the Court’s decision to affirm the judgment.
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