DeBoer, J.
Case Summary
As a result of circumstances arising in one of her child’s Juvenile Problem-Solving Court (JPSC) cases, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) filed a petition against R.C. (Mother) alleging E.K. (Child) to be a child in need of services (CHINS). At the fact-finding hearing, the trial court took judicial notice of the Chronological Case Summaries (CCSs) and orders issued in Child’s previous probation cases, including the most recent JPSC case. The court then issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it determined that Child was a CHINS. Mother appeals, asserting that the court exceeded the proper scope of judicial notice when it considered substantive facts within the JPSC orders rather than merely noticing the existence of those orders. Finding reversible error, we reverse.
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We first note that the parameters of judicial notice have not been clearly drawn, making our case law somewhat murky about that which a court may or may not judicially notice. Nonetheless, there are some consistent principles our appellate courts observe when analyzing whether the court’s taking judicial notice was proper. Critically, “the ultimate purpose of judicial notice is efficient consideration of uncontroversial facts[.]” Horton, 51 N.E.3d at 1161 (citing Baran v. State, 639 N.E.2d 642, 647 (Ind. 1994)) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, even when court records are judicially noticed, “facts recited within the pleadings and filings that are not capable of ready and accurate determination are not suitable for judicial notice.” In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 796-97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting D.P., 72 N.E.3d at 983), reh’g denied, trans. denied. “Unless principles of claim preclusion apply, judicial notice should be limited to the fact of the record’s existence, rather than to any facts found or alleged within the record of another case.” Id. at 797 (quoting D.P., 72 N.E.3d at 983). However, “[j]udicial notice ‘encompasses facts ascertainable from sources that cannot reasonably be questioned, and presumably court records are such sources,’ in the absence of evidence tending to rebut that presumption.” Horton, 51 N.E.3d at 1161 (quoting Brown v. Jones, 804 N.E.2d 1197, 1202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied). [Footnote omitted.]
At the fact-finding hearing, DCS requested that the court judicially notice “that [Child] does have two . . . juvenile probation cases[.]” Tr. Vol. 3 at 119. The court then said it would “take judicial notice of the CCS and any orders issued in those cases.” Id. Mother argues that judicial notice should have been limited to these records’ existence, but that the court’s findings and conclusions show it went beyond their existence and instead relied on substantive facts within those records.
Mother directs us to the following findings and conclusions as evidence of the court’s reliance upon the content of the records…
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…We agree with Mother that the court’s findings show that it improperly took judicial notice of substantive facts within the JPSC orders, specifically that Mother had positive drug screens.
First, we are not persuaded by the trial court’s attempt to distinguish what it included in its findings from the substantive facts in the JPSC orders. Simply because the court did not copy and paste the findings from the JPSC orders into its CHINS findings of fact does not mean it did not “use the substance of the findings of those orders” in its decision in the CHINS case. Tr. Vol. 3 at 196. Finding 25 in the fact-finding order states “[t]he Court issued Orders after JPSC status hearings with findings that Mother was noncompliant due to results of Mother’s random drug screens[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 16 (emphasis added). Finding 50 says that “[w]hile there were no positive drug screen results admitted in the fact-finding to show Mother has tested positive for methamphetamine . . . , the Court has taken judicial notice of [Child’s] juvenile delinquent cases that note via court orders Mother’s noncompliance due to substance use.” Id. at 18 (emphasis added). We find no real distinction between the JPSC’s finding that Mother had a “positive drug screen for” drugs and the trial court’s finding in its CHINS order that the JPSC found Mother was “noncompliant due to results of [her] random drug screens[.]” Id. at 16, 60. Thus, it is not clear to us how the court could have entered Findings 25 and 50 without taking substantive findings from the JPSC orders. Again, while the trial court may not have quoted the JPSC findings, the CHINS order contained references to the JPSC findings. And those findings—made in separate proceedings in Child’s JPSC case—were used to establish Mother’s drug use in the CHINS case.
Second, as is clear in Rule 201, a court can judicially notice facts. See Evid. R. 201. However, those facts must be “‘ascertainable from sources that cannot reasonably be questioned[.]’” Horton, 51 N.E.3d at 1161 (quoting Brown, 804 N.E.2d at 1202). And while the substantive facts challenged here came from court orders, which are presumably “sources that cannot reasonably be questioned,” we find this case to be a unique circumstance in which the presumption should not apply. Id. (quoting Brown, 804 N.E.2d at 1202).
The substantive facts considered by the trial court were derived from orders issued by the JPSC, a court in which many typical due process protections are not observed. Problem-Solving Courts are purposefully non-adversarial, as the “review hearings occur as informal proceedings in which witnesses are not sworn and private counsel are not present.” In re K.W., 247 N.E.3d 1250, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). Even here, the trial court acknowledged that “the rules of evidence [are] applied differently in review hearings in delinquency[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 163.
Furthermore, Mother’s drug screens were not filed or admitted into evidence in Child’s JPSC case, meaning they are not part of the court’s record of the case. A problem-solving court team will often take a parent’s positive drug screens into consideration when determining whether to implement additional services for the child, parent, or family unit. However, the advisement of a parent’s positive drug screen to the problem-solving court team often does not carry the due process protections that justify its use of that information in a completely separate hearing at which a parent’s access to her child may be compromised. The only support in the JPSC’s record for the results of Mother’s drug screens came from the discussions had during the JPSC review hearings, without Mother being placed under oath, having her own attorney present, or allowing her a meaningful opportunity to challenge the very screens she contested. At the CHINS fact-finding hearing, DCS did not introduce evidence of Mother’s JPSC drug screen results, yet the court considered and seemingly relied upon the exact same evidence through the orders of which it took judicial notice. Given that the JPSC orders rely on findings made in JPSC hearings where important procedural protections were not afforded to Mother, we conclude this is a limited circumstance in which the court’s JPSC orders are sources that can reasonably be questioned specifically as to substantive facts regarding Mother’s drug screens.
Third, while we recognize that the purpose of judicial notice is the “efficient consideration of uncontroversial facts,” Mother’s alleged substance use and Mother’s drug screen results are not uncontroversial facts. Horton, 51 N.E.3d at 1161 (citing Baran, 639 N.E.2d at 647) (emphasis in original). In fact, Mother maintained throughout the CHINS proceeding that she had not used anything other than THC since 2019 and that she had not had a positive test since then. See Tr. Vol. 3 at 116 (where DCS asked Mother, “If you had a positive screen since [2019], do you have an explanation?” and Mother responded, “No. ‘Cause [sic] there’s not.”). Furthermore, efficiency cannot be a substitute for ensuring parents are afforded due process and the State is held to its burden of proof. See In re A.C., 198 N.E.3d 1, 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (“A parent has a fundamental right to raise his or her child without undue influence by the state.”), reh’g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied.
DCS never attempted to introduce Mother’s drug screens into evidence, and every time a witness began to discuss the results of those drug screens, the trial court sustained Mother’s objections. See Tr. Vol. 3 at 109, 120, 122, 123, 125, 134; see also D.P., 72 N.E.3d at 982 (finding judicial notice of preliminary reports and filings in the CHINS proceeding referencing Father’s drug use to be improper in part because “[d]uring the fact-finding hearing, DCS’s attempts to present evidence of Father’s continued drug use were objected to, and the trial court sustained those objections”). For these reasons, we conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to judicially notice the substantive findings from the JPSC orders. Thus, any findings and conclusions relying on such information are clearly erroneous.
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…Thus, our review of the entire record leads us to the conclusion that the court’s reliance on the substantive facts from the JPSC orders was not “sufficiently minor” or harmless; it was reversible error. [Footnote omitted.] Hayko, 211 N.E.3d at 492.
Conclusion
We conclude the trial court committed reversible error by considering and relying on the substantive facts contained in the JPSC’s orders. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s finding that Child is a CHINS.
Reversed.
Altice, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.