Brown, J.
Jeremiah R. Mitchell appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to modify the terms of his probation. We affirm.
…
Mitchell asserts that the trial court “erred as a matter of law by concluding it lacked authority under Indiana Code § 35-38-2-1.8 to modify a no-contact order that was imposed as a condition of probation.” Appellant’s Brief at 4. He further argues that the court’s refusal to modify the no contact orders “when modification was knowingly and voluntarily requested by both the protected adult and the appellant, constituted a violation of due process or an abuse of discretion.” Id.
…
Regarding the modification of conditions of probation, Ind. Code § 35-38-21.8(b) provides that the trial court “may hold a new probation hearing at any time during a probationer’s probationary period: (1) upon motion of the probation department or upon the court’s motion; and (2) after giving notice to the probationer.” At such hearing, “the court may modify the probationer’s conditions of probation.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1.8(c).
As found by the trial court, neither the probation department nor the court sought to modify Mitchell’s probation and thus, the plain language of Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1.8 is inapplicable to the case at bar. In other words, contrary to Mitchell’s assertion, the plain language of Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1.8 does not grant (or even address) the trial court’s authority to modify the conditions of probation upon a defendant’s motion. See Wilson v. State, 189 N.E.3d 231, 234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (noting that “it is just as important to recognize what the statute does not say as to recognize what it does say” and “[w]e assume the legislature chose the words it did for a reason”); Murphy v. State, 113 N.E.3d 776, 781 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (observing that “[a] statute must be held to mean what is clearly and plainly expressed therein”). Accordingly, we conclude that Mitchell’s reliance on Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1.8 is misplaced and does not provide him with a procedural mechanism to challenge the continuation of the no contact orders as a term of his probation.
Moreover, even assuming the above statutory language permitted the court, upon Mitchell’s motion, to consider his request for modification, the court lacked the authority, absent the State’s consent, to grant Mitchell’s request to remove the no contact orders because the continuation of the orders was specifically required by the parties’ plea agreement. Ind. Code § 35-35-3-3(e) provides that “[i]f the court accepts a plea agreement, it shall be bound by its terms.” Additionally, Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17(e) specifically provides that “if the convicted person was sentenced under the terms of a plea agreement,” the trial court “may not, without the consent of the prosecuting attorney, reduce or suspend the sentence and impose a sentence not authorized by the plea agreement.” Mitchell cites no authority, and we are unaware of any, that would permit the trial court, absent the consent of the prosecutor, to alter the punitive terms of his probationary sentence as provided by his plea agreement, which in this case includes the continuation of the no contact orders.
…
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
Felix, J., and Scheele, J., concur.