DeBoer, .J.
Case Summary
Believing it was the rightful owner of a grassy, thirty-foot by fifty-foot parcel of land behind its building in Tipton, the Charles Sturdevant Post of the American Legion Post #46 (“the Legion”) built a fence around it in 2013. It later added a patio to the area and used the space to host its members for different activities. In July 2024, almost three years after acquiring a property behind the Legion, Philip and Therese Brown sued the Legion and its Commander, Timothy Ehman, for ejectment and trespass on the basis that they legally owned the fenced in area. The Legion filed a counterclaim to quiet title by adverse possession.
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The Browns also filed a motion to strike Ehman’s affidavit that the Legion offered in support of summary judgment. The trial court denied the Browns’ motions and granted the Legion’s motion for summary judgment, finding the Legion acquired the parcel by adverse possession. The Browns appeal, asserting the trial court erred in granting the Legion’s motion for summary judgment and abused its discretion in denying their motion to strike. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
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To successfully quiet title on a claim of adverse possession, the adversely possessing party must prove the following elements by clear and convincing evidence:
(1) Control – The claimant must exercise a degree of use and control over the parcel that is normal and customary considering the characteristics of the land . . .;
(2) Intent – The claimant must demonstrate intent to claim full ownership of the tract superior to the rights of all others, particularly the legal owner . . .;
(3) Notice – The claimant’s actions with respect to the land must be sufficient to give actual or constructive notice to the legal owner of the claimant’s intent and exclusive control . . .; and
(4) Duration – [T]he claimant must satisfy each of these elements continuously for the required period of time[.]
Fraley v. Minger, 829 N.E.2d 476, 486 (Ind. 2005). The possessor must satisfy each element continuously for ten years. Id. at 484; Ind. Code § 34-11-2-11. Additionally, under Indiana Code section 32-21-7-1(a), the adverse possessor must “pay[] all taxes and special assessments that the adverse possessor reasonably believes in good faith to be due on the real property” during the relevant period..
The Legion, through its exhibits accompanying its summary judgment motion, proved that there was no genuine question of fact that it satisfied the elements above. In 2013, the Legion constructed a fence on the disputed property, which demonstrated its intent to claim full ownership of the property, sufficiently provided constructive notice to the legal owner, and showed the Legion’s control of the disputed property was exclusive to all others. The Legion’s continued use of the property after 2013 up to the initiation of this suit in July 2024—building a patio, adding patio furniture, and opening up the space to its members for activities—further proves such elements. Furthermore, the Legion is a tax-exempt organization under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code and thus, was not required to prove a good faith belief that it was paying property taxes on the disputed property. I.C. § 32-21-7-1(b). Even so, the Legion did present evidence—and the Browns do not contest on appeal—that it paid the assessments owed on its property from 2013 up to the time of this suit and had a good faith belief that the payment of those assessments included the disputed property. See Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 104.
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The Browns only challenge the duration requirement. They assert that “the Legion’s possession of the disputed area was not continuous from December 31, 2013 to December 31, 2023 because the Browns’ property was conveyed on numerous occasions from 2013 to 2023 and the Legion was unable to meet the ten-year statutory requirement against any one owner.” Id. at 12. The Browns’ primary assertion is not one related to a dispute of material fact but rather what the law requires to prove adverse possession—namely, whether the ten-year durational period for a successful claim of adverse possession requires that the ten-year period be proven as to one legal owner. It is only upon clarification of what the law requires that a genuine issue of material fact could arise in this case. Thus, we turn to the question of whether the duration requirement for adverse possession must be met against one legal owner.
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As discussed above, we are bound by neither Downing nor Wetherald. However, we find Wetherald more persuasive, particularly in light of the context in which the Downing footnote was offered, the established elements of adverse possession, and the Fraley decision. We are therefore persuaded that Indiana law does not require the ten-year durational element of adverse possession to be met as against one legal owner and reject the Browns’ argument otherwise.
Having come to a conclusion on the law, we turn to the facts. The Browns do not challenge the fact that the Legion proved the other elements of adverse possession, at the latest, beginning in 2013. As noted above, the Browns admit that “[s]ince completion of the fence, a patio was constructed inside the fence and has been under the exclusive possession and control of the Legion.” Appellant’s Br. at 8. The Legion sought and obtained the permit to build the fence around the disputed property, completed the fence that same year, and continued to use the space for its patrons through 2023. Thus, the ten-year period was satisfied.
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Conclusion
Finding the trial court did not err in granting the Legion’s motion for summary judgment and any error in denying the Browns’ motion to strike to be harmless, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Altice, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.