Foley, J.
Thomas F. Noons (“Noons”) and Raymond W. Sanders (“Sanders”) (together, “Guarantors”) appeal the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of First Merchants Bank (“First Merchants”) in its foreclosure action. Guarantors argue that the trial court erred in prematurely granting First Merchants’ motion for summary judgment and in denying Guarantors’ motion to correct error because the timeframe in which to respond to the motion for summary judgment had not yet expired. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
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Generally, the removal of a case to federal court divests the state court of jurisdiction. Peoples Trust & Sav. Bank v. Humphrey, 451 N.E.2d 1104, 1108 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). An order remanding an action to federal court suspends or holds the state court jurisdiction in abeyance either until the action is terminated in federal court or until the action is remanded to the state court. Id. “[I]n the event of a remand, the state court’s continuous, though dormant, jurisdiction is revived[.]” Id. (quoting Doerr v. Warner, 247 Minn. 98, 76 N.W.2d 505, 512 (1956)).
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…However, the Appellees do not cite to any authority in support of their position that the deadline under Trial Rule 56 should be treated differently than other trial rules and not be tolled when a case is removed to federal court and the trial court’s jurisdiction is stayed. While neither Humphrey nor Arkla dealt with the deadline under Trial Rule 56(C), we find the underlying reasoning in those cases to be applicable to the present case. Upon a petition to remove a case to federal court, the trial court’s jurisdiction is suspended or held in abeyance either until the action is terminated in federal court or until the action is remanded to the state court. Therefore, while the case is under the jurisdiction of the federal court, the trial court does not have jurisdiction over the case to rule upon motions or perform other functions relating to the case. This suspension of jurisdiction in the trial court can create uncertainty in deadlines for filings, especially in light of the unknown timeframe that a case will be removed to federal court. It follows that the correct procedure to apply is that, as in Humphrey and Arkla, when a case is removed to federal court, all applicable filing deadlines under our trial rules are tolled until the case is remanded to the state court’s jurisdiction, including the timeframe in which to file a response to a motion for summary judgment under Trial Rule 56(C). By tolling any applicable period, uncertainty is eliminated, the status quo is preserved, and the rule is easily applied, thereby avoiding subjecting the parties to the “game of chance” referenced by the Humphrey court. Humphrey, 451 N.E.2d at 1109.
Moreover, allowing the time period to be tolled does not affect the fact that Trial Rule 56’s thirty-day response time is considered a bright-line rule such that when a non-moving party fails to respond within thirty days, the trial court cannot consider summary judgment filings of that party subsequent to the thirty-day period. See HomeEq Servicing, 883 N.E.2d at 98–99. Tolling the time to respond to a summary judgment motion does not change this bright-line nature; it only tolls the time to respond while the case is removed to federal court and then allows the time period to respond to resume where it left off once the case is remanded to the state court again. Allowing the tolling of the time does not extend or enlarge the time to respond, and instead, as stated above, it preserves the status quo and eliminates uncertainty when a case is removed to federal court.
Here, First Merchants filed its motion for partial summary judgment against Guarantors on October 23, 2024. Therefore, under Trial Rule 56(C), Guarantors had until November 22, 2024, to file a response to the summary judgment motion. On October 29, 2024, the entire case was removed to the federal court, and, thereafter, on November 13, 2024, the case was remanded to the trial court as to Guarantors only. Therefore, with the tolling of the timeframe to respond to the summary judgment, the response was due by December 9, 2024, because the response date, December 7, fell on a Saturday. On December 2, 2024, First Merchants filed a motion requesting that summary judgment be granted against Guarantors for failing to respond, and then on December 6, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of First Merchants. As Guarantors had until December 9, 2024 to either file a response, request a continuance or extension of time under Trial Rule 56(I), or file an affidavit under Trial Rule 56(F), the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on December 6 was premature. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of First Merchants and in denying Guarantors’ motion to correct error. We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
Kenworthy, J. and Scheele, J., concur