Vaidik, J.
Duston Nielson appeals his convictions for Level 1 felony child molesting and Level 4 felony child molesting and his designation as a credit-restricted felon, raising several issues. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. In doing so, however, we reject the State’s argument that Nielson invited error regarding a jury instruction. The invited-error doctrine applies only when a party challenging a trial-court action affirmatively requested the action as part of a deliberate, well-informed trial strategy. Here, Nielson’s attorney didn’t ask the trial court to give the challenged jury instruction; he only explained why he believed he didn’t have a meritorious objection.
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Nielson contends that the trial court shouldn’t have instructed the jury that “[t]he ‘slightest penetration’ of the female sex organ, including penetration of the external genitalia, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for child molestation.” He acknowledges that he didn’t object to this instruction, that he therefore waived the issue for appeal, and that he must show fundamental error.
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We first address the State’s argument that Nielson invited any error in this regard and is therefore barred from claiming fundamental error. It is true that “[t]he invited-error doctrine generally precludes a party from obtaining appellate relief for his own errors, even if those errors were fundamental.” Miller v. State, 188 N.E.3d 871, 874-75 (Ind. 2022). But the doctrine is narrow…
Here, when the State asked for the challenged instruction and another instruction, Nielson’s attorney said, “I agree that those are nonpattern instructions that seem to be standard in every sexual assault case that I have been on. So I think that they’re de facto patterns that the Indiana Supreme Court has approved of.” Tr. Vol. III p. 62. This wasn’t a strategic request for the instruction. This was counsel explaining why he believed he didn’t have a meritorious objection. Because Nielson didn’t invite the alleged error, we will address his fundamental-error argument.
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The jury only had to decide whether it believed D.N. While giving the instruction was unnecessary, its inclusion wasn’t fundamental error.
Next, Nielson argues that the trial court shouldn’t have given the jury the “Specific Findings” form, which addressed facts that would make a person a credit-restricted felon. He cites Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.8(a), which provides, “At the time of sentencing, a court shall determine whether a person is a credit restricted felon (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-72).” By giving the jury the “Specific Findings” form, Nielson claims, the court “abdicated” this responsibility and improperly left the determination to the jury. Appellant’s Br. pp. 16-17. Nielson didn’t make this argument to the trial court and therefore waived it for purposes of appeal. See, e.g., Means v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1158, 1168 (Ind. 2023).
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Finally, Nielson contends the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. He doesn’t dispute that D.N.’s testimony, if believed, would prove the charges. Rather, he asks us to disregard D.N.’s testimony under the doctrine of incredible dubiosity. Under this doctrine, we can impinge upon a fact-finder’s responsibility to judge the credibility of the witnesses when “the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.” Hampton v. State, 921 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh’g denied, trans. denied. The doctrine “requires that there be: 1) a sole testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.” Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 756 (Ind. 2015). Application of this rule is rare. Leyva v. State, 971 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
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In any event, application of the incredible-dubiosity doctrine also requires “a complete absence of circumstantial evidence,” which didn’t exist here. D.N.’s mother testified that D.N. was sick, scared, and nervous when she had to go to Nielson’s house; that D.N. would vomit, have diarrhea, and pick her nails until they bled and that she struggled at school; that D.N. was crying and shaking when she disclosed the abuse; and that after D.N. disclosed the abuse and stopped going to Nielson’s house, both her health and her grades improved. All this is circumstantial evidence supporting Nielson’s convictions.
For these reasons, Nielson’s incredible-dubiosity argument fails.
Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.