Tavitas, J.
Case Summary
This is the latest appeal related to contentious paternity and adoption proceedings in multiple counties concerning G.S. (“Child”). A.T. (“Stepfather”) and J.T. (“Mother”) appeal the trial court’s order in the paternity action filed by J.S. (“Father”) and contend that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to preside over the paternity petition. [Footnote omitted.] According to Stepfather and Mother, the trial court was required to transfer the paternity action to Hamilton County after Stepfather and Mother voluntarily dismissed their adoption petition in Fulton County and quickly refiled in Hamilton County. Mother and Stepfather also argue that the trial court erred by ordering them to pay Father’s attorney fees.
We conclude that the trial court properly denied Mother’s and Stepfather’s petition to transfer the paternity petition to Hamilton County. Further, the trial court’s findings that Mother’s and Stepfather’s conduct amounted to bad faith and that Father is entitled to attorney fees are not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm.
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Stepfather and Mother first argue that Fulton County lacked jurisdiction over the paternity action because Fulton County was required to consolidate the paternity matter with the pending second adoption petition in Hamilton County. In support of their argument, Stepfather and Mother rely upon Indiana Code Section 31-19-2-14(a),…
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Stepfather and Mother challenge Fulton County’s “jurisdiction” over the paternity matter because they contend that the only adoption pending was in Hamilton County and, thus, pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-19-2-14(a), Fulton County was required to consolidate the paternity action with the second adoption petition in Hamilton County. Stepfather and Mother are incorrect.
… Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-19-2-14(c), following the denial/dismissal of Stepfather’s first adoption petition, Fulton County could retain jurisdiction and determine the custody of Child.
Stepfather and Mother argue that the paternity proceeding was required to be transferred to Hamilton County, but we disagree. [Footnote: This case reveals a significant issue with Indiana Code Section 31-19-2-2. On July 1, 2021, the statute was amended to allow an adoption petition to be filed in the county where “the attorney maintains an office.” Ind. Code § 31-19-2-2(a)(3). This revision allows parties, as is evident in this case, to forum shop by dismissing adoption petitions without prejudice, retaining different attorneys in other counties, and refiling petitions until the party gets the desired result. This statute merely invites more litigation and allows parties to game the system. And lawyers who engage in such practices risk violating the Code of Professional Conduct.] The Hamilton County second adoption petition was stayed pending Fulton County’s resolution of the first adoption petition. In December 2024, Hamilton County transferred the second adoption petition back to Fulton County. At the time Fulton County decided the paternity matter, the Hamilton County second adoption petition had already been transferred to and consolidated in Fulton County. We, thus, conclude that Fulton County properly presided over the paternity matter.
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Given that Fulton County presided over the first adoption petition (a decision that this Court affirmed in G.S., 254 N.E.3d 1071) and the second adoption petition was transferred to Fulton County (a decision that this Court also affirmed in G.S., No. 25A-AD-90), we conclude that Fulton County properly presided over the paternity matter pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-19-2- 14(c). We find no basis to conclude that Hamilton County was required to preside over the paternity matter because of the second adoption petition. Accordingly, we affirm Fulton County’s denial of Stepfather’s and Mother’s petition to transfer the paternity action to Hamilton County.
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The litigation tactics Stepfather and Mother have engaged in are astounding and clearly were designed to delay resolution of the matter and force Father to expend substantial attorney fees. The trial court’s findings regarding bad faith are not clearly erroneous, and the trial court did not err by awarding Father attorney fees pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-52-1-1(b).
Given our determination that Stepfather’s and Mother’s conduct evidences bad faith pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-52-1-1(b), we need not address the trial court’s determination that Father is entitled to attorney fees under Indiana Code Section 31-14-18-2 and Trial Rule 37. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s award of attorney fees to Father.
Conclusion
We conclude that the trial court properly denied Stepfather’s and Mother’s motion to transfer the paternity action to Hamilton County. And the trial court did not clearly err by ordering Stepfather and Mother to be responsible for Father’s attorney fees. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Vaidik, J., and Felix, J., concur