Bailey, J.
Case Summary
The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed in Hamilton Circuit Court a request for authorization to file a petition alleging that three minor children of T.R. (“Father”) are children in need of services (“CHINS”). A circuit court magistrate presided at the initial hearing and authorized the filing of the petition and for DCS to take custody of the children, P.R., E.R., and R.R. (collectively, “the Children”). [Footnote omitted.] Father then filed a motion for change of judge. The circuit court judge granted the motion and transferred the case to a Hamilton Superior Court judge.
The superior court judge was unavailable to preside at a review hearing and appointed a superior court magistrate—who was also the abovementioned circuit court magistrate—to preside in his place. Father objected to this arrangement, and the magistrate overruled the objection. The same thing happened with the CHINS fact-finding hearing, and the magistrate again overruled Father’s objection. Afterward, the magistrate found the Children to be CHINS and issued a dispositional order.
On appeal, Father argues that the magistrate should not have presided at the review hearing and the fact-finding hearing after his motion for change of judge was granted. We agree and therefore reverse and remand.
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At bottom, Judge Casati’s appointment of Magistrate Hahn to preside over the review hearing and the fact-finding hearing, and Magistrate Hahn’s overruling of Father’s objections to that appointment, are based on the judicial officers’ interpretation of Trial Rule 79(I)….
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Father concedes that “Trial Rule 79(I) did allow Judge Casati to have a magistrate cover a hearing in a special judge case[,]” but he contends that the rule “does not allow for it to be the same magistrate that previously heard the merits of the case.” Appellant’s Br. at 19. We agree. To hold otherwise would frustrate the purpose of the change-of-judge provisions of Trial Rule 76(B) and disregard the express language of Trial Rule 79(I).
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Aside from the power of judicial mandate, “a magistrate has the same powers as a judge.” I.C. § 33-23-5-8.5. 4 When Father filed his motion for change of judge in Hamilton Circuit Court, Magistrate Hahn was the only judicial officer who had had any involvement with his case; she had authorized the filing of the CHINS petition and for DCS to take custody of the Children. Accordingly, we must conclude that in transferring the case to Judge Casati, Judge Bloch removed “jurisdiction of the case” from Magistrate Hahn (and, of course, himself) for purposes of Trial Rule 79(I). [Footnote omitted.] And in appointing Magistrate Hahn to preside over the review hearing and the fact-finding hearing, Judge Casati nullified Judge Bloch’s order granting Father’s motion for change of judge and violated both the letter and the spirit of Trial Rule 79(I)(2)(a). [Footnote: For its part, DCS asserts that Father was “on notice that Magistrate Hahn was not exclusively assigned to Hamilton Circuit Court” and that Father’s motion for change of judge “made no request for an additional change of magistrate.” Appellee’s Br. at 9. In response, Father observes that a magistrate’s authority “is an extension of the elected judge’s constitutional [authority]” and that “[t]here is not now, and never has been, a required ‘change in magistrate’ motion in rule or case law.” Reply Br. at 7. Father suggests, and we agree, that requiring a party to “list the presiding judge and all the magistrates from which a change is requested” is “contrary to the language of” Trial Rule 76. Id. We note that in some counties, magistrates are appointed separately by the circuit and superior court judges to serve their respective courts. See I.C. §§ 33-33-2-3, -14 (Allen); 33-33-45-2, -10, -11 (Lake); 33-33-49-2, -31, -32 (Marion); 33-33-64-23 (Porter); 33-33-71-3, -69 (St. Joseph); 33-33-82-3, -6 (Vanderburgh).]
As a remedy for this violation, Father asks that we “vacate all orders in this case issued after September 6, 2024 [i.e., when Judge Bloch granted his motion for change of judge] and reverse the dispositional order.” Appellant’s Br. at 21. DCS contends that “if Father is entitled to any relief, he is only entitled to have orders issued after November 4, 2024, vacated.” Appellee’s Br. at 13. We agree with DCS. No ultra vires action occurred until Judge Casati issued a notice on that date that Magistrate Hahn would preside at the November 6 review hearing. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate all orders issued after November 4, 2024. See Asher v. Coomler, 994 N.E.2d 1283, 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that order issued by magistrate was “without legal effect[,]” where appellant was improperly “denied a special judge to preside over the proceedings”).
Reversed and remanded.
Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur