Massa, J.
The State initiated delinquency proceedings against a juvenile for child molestation and dissemination of material harmful to minors. During the initial hearing, the juvenile court permitted the juvenile’s counsel to waive a formal advisement of rights without first conducting a personal interrogation of the juvenile to confirm he wished to join counsel’s waiver. After a fact-finding hearing, during which the juvenile exercised his constitutional rights and held the State to its burden of proof, he was ultimately adjudicated a delinquent. On appeal, the juvenile argues (1) the juvenile court erred as a matter of law by failing to provide the formal advisement of rights and (2) his counsel’s waiver of the formal advisement was invalid for failure to ensure the juvenile knowingly and voluntarily joined with the waiver. For the reasons below, we agree that the juvenile court erred in failing to formally advise the juvenile of his rights and that the waiver was invalid. However, because we find the error was harmless under these particular facts, we affirm.
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D.W. presents two issues for our review: (1) whether the juvenile court sufficiently complied with the Advisement Statute despite not issuing a formal advisement of D.W.’s rights, and (2) whether D.W.’s counsel’s waiver of the advisement was valid under the conditions prescribed by the Juvenile Waiver Statute. First, we find that under a plain reading of the Advisement Statute, the juvenile court erred by failing to provide a formal reading of D.W.’s rights. Second, we find that based on a plain reading of the Juvenile Waiver Statute, counsel’s waiver was invalid because the juvenile court did not personally confirm the waiver with D.W., and thus he did not waive his right to a formal advisement. However, because we find the juvenile court’s failure to advise was harmless under these particular facts, we affirm the juvenile court’s delinquency adjudication.
We first address the sufficiency of the juvenile court’s advisement and whether this deprived D.W. of a fair proceeding. For the following reasons, we find the juvenile court erred by failing to ensure that D.W. was aware of the rights and dispositional alternatives available to him in the juvenile proceeding.
The Advisement Statute provides as follows:
The juvenile court shall inform the child and the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian, if the person is present, of the following:
(1) The nature of the allegations against the child.
(2) The child’s right to the following:
(A) Be represented by counsel.
(B) Have a speedy trial.
(C) Confront witnesses against the child.
(D) Cross-examine witnesses against the child.
(E) Obtain witnesses or tangible evidence by compulsory process.
(F) Introduce evidence on the child’s own behalf.
(G) Refrain from testifying against himself or herself.
(H) Have the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the child committed the delinquent act charged.
(3) The possibility of waiver to a court having criminal jurisdiction.
(4) The dispositional alternatives available to the juvenile court if the child is adjudicated a delinquent child.
Ind. Code § 31-37-12-5 (emphasis added).
Here, the juvenile court’s advisement covered the information listed in Subsections (1) and (3)—the nature of the allegations and the possibility of transferring jurisdiction to the adult court. However, the juvenile court did not discuss the rights and dispositional alternatives afforded to D.W. under Subsections (2) and (4). D.W. argues that the Advisement Statute’s inclusion of “shall” rendered a mandatory obligation upon the juvenile court to issue a full and formal advisement, and thus its failure to do so constituted error. We agree.
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Based on this reading, the juvenile court has a mandatory obligation to inform the juvenile of the information located within Subsections (1)–(4) of the statute. In fact, as recently as two years ago, we reiterated this obligation in T.D. v. State, in which we stated that “Indiana law requires the court to ‘inform the child’ of certain rights” at “the initial hearing.” 219 N.E.3d 719, 728 (Ind. 2023) (emphasis added) (citing I.C. § 31-37-12-5(2)). Moreover, there is no indication that the Legislature intended this duty to be merely permissive. While the juvenile court’s reading of the advisement may be considered permissive as far as it concerns a juvenile’s parent, guardian, or custodian—i.e., the requirement being conditioned upon whether “the person is present”—the same cannot be said as to the juvenile himself. Further, not only does the plain language render the juvenile court’s obligation to the juvenile mandatory, but as discussed below, the heightened protections afforded to those in the juvenile system would be undermined should the court’s obligation not be met. Thus, it is clear that based on these considerations the juvenile court erred by failing to provide D.W. with a full and formal advisement of his rights and dispositional alternatives.
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Because of this, we pay special heed to statutes governing the juvenile court system. When the legislature includes certain language, particularly language such as “shall” that instills a duty or obligation upon the trial court, it is intended that this language be followed as written. Not only is this a fundamental tenet of statutory construction, but it is crucial for the inner workings of the juvenile system that the trial court conduct, perform, and otherwise execute whatever statutory instructions are given to ensure the statute’s ultimate purpose is served.
Finally, we draw comparison to our decision in J.M. v. State, where the juvenile—like D.W. today—argued that “he was not properly advised of his rights as required by [the Advisement Statute].” 727 N.E.2d 703, 703 (Ind. 2000). There, the trial court noted the filing of the advisement of rights to the juvenile and his parents during the initial hearing, the record contained the court’s written “Advisement of Rights” as signed by the juvenile’s mother, and the court ascertained that the juvenile and his parents understood the statutory and constitutional rights described in the advisement. Id. at 704. We concluded that “J.M. ha[d] not established that the trial court failed to provide the statutory advisement[.]” Id. In contrast to J.M., though, here the record does not reflect that D.W. ever received a written advisement of rights despite being promised that he would by the juvenile court. Nor is it shown that the court ascertained D.W. understood the rights prescribed by the advisement; the court only mentioned that someone from the Public Defender Agency would go over the advisement form with him. And although the court noted that D.W. likely signed the aforementioned advisement form, the court explicitly stated on the record that the form had not yet been ordered or brought into the court’s electronic database system. Thus, unlike in J.M., we cannot say that D.W. failed to establish a lack of advisement.
For these reasons, we find that the juvenile court erred by failing to adhere to the requirements set forth in the Advisement Statute.
Having confirmed the mandatory nature of the Advisement Statute, we now turn to the State’s reply that the issue was waived in the juvenile court. Did the juvenile court sufficiently comply with the procedural requirements set forth in the Juvenile Waiver Statute? Specifically, was there a valid waiver when the court accepted counsel’s decision to waive the formal advisement on D.W.’s behalf without also personally confirming the waiver with D.W.? Answering both in the negative, we hold that D.W. did not waive his right to a formal advisement.
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Based on a plain reading of the Juvenile Waiver Statute and the record before us, it is clear that the juvenile court’s acceptance of counsel’s waiver on D.W.’s behalf was invalid. For the waiver to comply with the requirements of Subsection (1) of the Juvenile Waiver Statute, the juvenile court needed to ensure that D.W. “knowingly and voluntarily join[ed] with the waiver” of appointed counsel. See I.C. § 31-32-5-1(1) (emphasis added). Generally, a juvenile court would assess the “knowing and voluntary” requirement by analyzing the circumstances of the waiver in light of statutorily provided factors. See Ind. Code § 31-32-5-4. However, to do so would first require a “personal interrogation” of the juvenile by the trial judge to determine whether the juvenile understood the rights they were giving up, and further, whether they agreed to proceed with the waiver. See Patton, 588 N.E.2d at 496 (“[B]oth the adult and child must knowingly and voluntarily waive the child’s rights.”); T.D., 219 N.E.3d at 729 (citing N.M. v. State, 791 N.E.2d 802, 806–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)) (“[T]he court must also personally question the juvenile and his parent, if present, on the record as to whether both understand and voluntarily waive the juvenile’s rights.”). While the juvenile court’s discussion with counsel may have reflected counsel’s decision to waive the reading of rights, the court failed to personally interrogate D.W. as to whether D.W. wished to do the same. Without first assessing D.W., it was impossible for the juvenile court to reach the “knowing and voluntary” analysis as it pertained to him. Thus, because the procedural safeguards surrounding juvenile waiver require “strict compliance,” we cannot permit the waiver to stand. See T.D., 219 N.E.3d at 724 (citing Hickman, 654 N.E.2d at 281); Tingle v. State, 632 N.E.2d 345, 351 (Ind. 1994).
Finally, we take this time to offer guidance regarding the interplay between the Advisement and Juvenile Waiver Statutes. Because the juvenile court is mandatorily obligated to inform the juvenile of the contents prescribed by the Advisement Statute, the court is, at a minimum, required to inform the juvenile that he has a right to receive the formal advisement. It is at this point that the juvenile may decide to waive the full and formal advisement, and, if so, the court must then proceed with ensuring that the procedural requirements for a valid waiver under the Juvenile Waiver Statute are satisfied. And to emphasize once more, the court’s assurance that these requirements have been met must be done through personal interrogation of the juvenile and without regard for whether the juvenile had the benefit of representation by counsel. See T.D., 219 N.E.3d at 729 (citing D.D.B. v. State, 691 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)) (“Finally, we acknowledge, as the trial court pointed out, that T.D. was represented by counsel ‘at every stage of the juvenile proceedings.’ But, under the statute, simply being represented by counsel does not establish that T.D. knowingly and voluntarily waived each of the rights conferred on him through state or federal law.”).
In many cases, the time it would take a juvenile court to secure a waiver of advisement might exceed the time it would take to simply provide the juvenile with the formal advisement of rights. We thus encourage trial courts to err toward providing a formal advisement as required by the Advisement Statute. And we hold a juvenile court may only accept a waiver of a formal advisement when the procedural requirements of the Juvenile Waiver Statute are met. Therefore, based on the considerations described above, we find that D.W. did not waive his right to a formal advisement.
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Given the particular facts presented to us in this matter, the juvenile court’s failure to advise—while no less a violation of its statutory duty— was ultimately harmless.
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…While D.W. argues the failure to formally read him his rights impacted his overall defense strategy, it is not clear what more D.W. could or would have done differently. As we are ultimately bound to the facts before us, and because it is not shown how the end result would have changed if a formal advisement had been given, we simply cannot find that any substantial rights were affected. The error was therefore harmless.
Our holding today clarifies two points. First, a juvenile court has a mandatory obligation to offer a formal advisement of rights under the Advisement Statute. Second, waiver of a juvenile’s constitutional, statutory, or otherwise afforded rights must be done through personal interrogation of the juvenile himself by the court to ensure the waiver was knowing and voluntary. Through these clarifications, we find that the juvenile court erred by failing to provide D.W. with a formal reading of rights and dispositional alternatives. Moreover, we find that D.W. did not waive his formal advisement of rights given the juvenile court’s failure to conduct a personal interrogation of D.W. However, because D.W.’s substantial rights were not prejudiced under these particular facts, we find the juvenile court’s error was harmless. Therefore, we affirm the juvenile court’s delinquency adjudication.
Rush, C.J., and Slaughter, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.