Per curiam
Just weeks ago, we reiterated that temporary involuntary civil commitment proceedings have a dual purpose: protecting the public and ensuring the rights of the person whose liberty is at stake. J.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. and Health Care Ctr., Inc., 256 N.E.3d 1260, 1264 (Ind. 2025) (quoting T.K. v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 27 N.E.3d 271, 273 (Ind. 2015)). To that end, our legislature has expressly authorized the use of outpatient therapy programs during involuntary commitments when such programs are likely to be a safe and beneficial alternative to inpatient treatment. Here, the trial court recognized the need for precisely this approach. [Footnote omitted.] And while the Court of Appeals reversed the commitment, we issued an order on June 18, 2025, granting transfer and affirming the trial court. We now explain our reason for doing so.
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Here, J.W. concedes he has a mental illness. Community no longer argues it offered clear and convincing evidence that J.W. is gravely disabled, and it has never argued that J.W. is at a substantial risk of harming others. So the only question remaining is whether Community offered clear and convincing evidence that J.W. poses a danger to himself. We agree with Judge Tavitas that the Court of Appeals reweighed evidence to find Community’s showing was insufficient.
We find persuasive Community’s argument that the Court of Appeals “credited” J.W.’s testimony and “dismissed” Dr. Shah’s. Pet. at 4. The Court of Appeals noted that “J.W. exhibited behavior consistent with reducing risks [at the time of the commitment hearing], a mindset we should encourage others with mental health issues to achieve.” J.W., No. 25A-MH-912 at *4. But this conclusion ignores Dr. Shah’s testimony that J.W. contemplated suicide as recently as two days before the commitment hearing and admitted he would lie about his suicidal thoughts to be released earlier. She also testified that the commitment was necessary to ensure J.W. complied with outpatient treatment. The trial court cited this testimony at the end of the hearing and in its commitment order. While we acknowledge J.W.’s perspective that commitment proceedings “encourage[ ] dishonesty” due to their “potential ramifications[,]” Tr. at 40, it remains the trial court’s province to assess witness credibility, not ours. And whatever mindset we hope to encourage in patients does not alter that standard.
III. Community’s plan to discharge J.W. to outpatient treatment was not inconsistent with the trial court’s judgment.
The Court of Appeals determined Community’s plan to discharge J.W. to outpatient treatment two days after the hearing was irreconcilable with a finding that J.W. was dangerous. J.W., No. 25A-MH-912 at *4. At least under these facts, we disagree.
A court may order an individual who is mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled to enter an outpatient therapy program. I.C. § 12-26-14-1. The court must make certain findings, including that the individual is likely to benefit from the program and not likely to be dangerous or gravely disabled while in compliance with the program. Id. § -1(2), (3). The individual’s examining physician must also recommend outpatient programming. Id. § -1(4). An outpatient commitment is not without teeth, as the court can order the committed individual to attend appointments, reside at a certain location, and comply with other conditions, id. § -3, the failure of which may result in the individual’s return to inpatient treatment, id. § -4(b).
Thus, outpatient treatment is a viable option for involuntary commitments. And all treatment options must be considered…
While we do not foreclose the possibility that a patient’s planned imminent release from inpatient treatment may be evidence that a commitment is inappropriate, that is not the case here. First, Dr. Shah hoped to discharge J.W. two days after the commitment hearing, so long as there were no “ongoing safety concerns[.]” Tr. at 26. She was still uncertain how long J.W. would need to remain at Community at the time of the hearing. Second, J.W. had a history of failing to comply with outpatient treatment. And he minimized and “dismissed … therapeutic interventions and alternative treatment options” during his current hospitalization. Id. at 11. Dr. Shah believed a commitment was necessary to ensure J.W. adhered to an outpatient treatment plan, as it would not be “clinically safe” for J.W. to stop taking his medications once he felt better. Id. at 25, 31. Although J.W. testified that he was willing to participate in outpatient treatment, the trial court “[chose] to believe [Dr. Shah’s] expert psychiatric insights[,]” id. at 47, a decision we will not second guess.
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We agree with J.W. that appellate courts cannot merely “rubber stamp” a trial court’s civil commitment decision. Certainly, the clear-and-convincing burden of proof “communicates the relative importance our legal system attaches to a decision ordering an involuntary commitment[.]” Commitment of J.B.v. Midtown Mental Health Ctr., 581 N.E.2d 448, 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). But we afford “considerable deference to the manner in which the legislature has balanced the competing interests involved” in civil commitments. Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind. 1994). And it has encouraged trial courts to consider— when safe and beneficial—outpatient treatment. Here, the trial court faithfully adhered to that directive.
IV. The trial court’s empathetic statements did not conflate the statutory requirements.
Lastly, the trial court’s statements did not conflate the requirements found in I.C. § 12-26-6-1. At the hearing’s conclusion, the trial court explained its decision for committing J.W. The judge spoke at length to J.W., “one father and husband to another[.]” Tr. at 47. The judge observed, “This matter is placed in front of me today because of the danger, not that you’ve posed to yourself, but that bipolar disorder has posed to you.” Id.
Viewed in the broader context of the judge’s soliloquy, we take this statement to mean that J.W. is not to be blamed or feel shame for his mental health condition. And while J.W. is not defined by his diagnosis, he must appreciate its seriousness, its effects on his health, and the need for continuing care from mental health professionals. The trial judge provided examples of the disorder’s “lies,” which cause patients to believe they do not need follow-up care or medication. The trial judge advised J.W., “[B]ipolar disorder wants to take everything from you.” Id.
In other words, this trial judge expressed empathy for J.W. and wished to establish a personal connection with him, endeavors we should encourage in these sensitive proceedings.
Conclusion
Having granted transfer and affirmed the trial court through our June 18, 2025 order, this opinion terminates the proceedings in this Court. Because this case is part of the Marion County Expedited Mental Health Appeals Project, the Clerk shall certify this opinion immediately.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.