Foley, J.
Monty Dale Maze (“Maze”) appeals his conviction of Class B misdemeanor harboring a non-immunized dog.1 We address the dispositive issue of whether the conviction must be reversed because—as the State agrees—the trial court failed to conduct a proper indigency hearing when denying Maze’s request to appoint him trial counsel. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
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Maze argues the trial court erred by denying him appointed counsel without conducting a proper indigency hearing. The State agrees that we “should reverse Maze’s conviction and remand the case for further proceedings,” pointing out that “[a]lthough the court knew that Maze had some money in savings and could work, it did not inquire into his expenses or other assets, and therefore did not consider his total financial situation.
An indigent criminal defendant is entitled to the appointment of counsel under the Sixth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution. E.g., Reese v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Indiana Code section 35-33-7-6(a) safeguards this right, providing as follows: “Prior to the completion of the initial hearing, the judicial officer shall determine whether a person who requests assigned counsel is indigent under section 6.5 of this chapter. If the person is found to be indigent, the judicial officer shall assign counsel to the person.” At one point, “appellate caselaw governed Indiana’s standards for indigency determinations, albeit somewhat inconsistently.” Spells v. State, 225 N.E.3d 767, 778 (Ind. 2024). However, “[i]n 2020, the General Assembly enacted a new statute governing indigency determinations,” id., providing: “In determining whether a person is indigent, the court shall consider . . . [t]he person’s assets,” “[t]he person’s income,” and “[t]he person’s necessary expenses,” Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6.5. Pursuant to the statutory framework, it is possible for the court to conclude a person is eligible for appointed counsel, but “able to pay part of the cost of representation by the assigned counsel[.]” I.C. § 35-33-7-6(c); cf. I.C. § 35-33-7-6.5(e) (specifying that, when it comes to imposing fines, fees, and court costs, the court “may prorate” the amount owed and “require the person to pay an amount that the person can reasonably afford”). Notably, the trial court “may issue an initial indigency determination pending receipt of documentary or other evidence from the person concerning the person’s income, assets, expenses, or welfare eligibility.” I.C. § 35-33-7-6.5(c). Moreover, Indiana Code section 35-33-7-6(g) allows a court to revisit its indigency finding “at any time during the proceedings” if the court (1) “receives evidence of a material change in the person’s income or assets” or (2) “the person has failed to provide the court with sufficient evidence, including documentary evidence, to sustain the court’s initial indigency determination.”
As our Supreme Court recently explained, now that our legislature “firmed up the requirements for determining indigency,” trial courts “must consider three distinct items—assets, income, and necessary expenses—that the legislature deems essential in calculating a defendant’s ability to pay.” Spells, 225 N.E.3d at 778 (citing I.C. § 35-33-7-6.5(a)). “[I]t is incumbent on trial courts to consider these factors,” which “means that if the parties fail to provide the information, courts themselves must make inquiries calculated to bring out the necessary evidence.” Id. Indeed, “the right to counsel is a fundamental constitutional right[.]” Shively v. State, 912 N.E.2d 427, 431 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Our caselaw establishes that, if the trial court failed to make an adequate inquiry into whether the criminal defendant was indigent, reversal is necessary.
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Here, the trial court elicited evidence about Maze’s assets and income, learning that Maze initially had access to around $3,000.00 in savings, was unemployed and currently without income, and might be able to re-enter the workforce. Yet, there was inadequate inquiry into Maze’s necessary expenses, particularly in light of evidence he needed the money to support himself and a dependent. Based on the record presented, we agree with the parties that the conviction must be reversed because the trial court denied Maze’s request for appointed counsel without adequate inquiry into whether Maze was, in fact, indigent. Under the circumstances, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
Mathias, J. and Felix, J., concur.