Tavitas, J.
In 2014, EDCO Environmental Services, Inc. (“EDCO”) installed a boiler in Judy Lammons’ home in Crown Point (“the City”). Lammons experienced issues with the boiler and eventually learned that the boiler had been manufactured in 2003. The City refused to inspect the boiler because a permit had not been acquired, even though a permit was not required by city ordinance. Lammons appeared before the Crown Point City Council regarding the need for such an ordinance, discussed her dealings with EDCO, and asked the City to protect consumers from “unscrupulous licensed contractors[.]” Ex. Vol. IV p. 40. EDCO sued Lammons, alleging that her statements constituted defamation, and after a bench trial, the trial court ruled in EDCO’s favor.
Lammons appeals and argues that her statements, as a matter of law, do not constitute false defamatory statements. Because Lammons’ statements neither state nor imply a provably false fact but merely indicate her honestly held opinion, we conclude that the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
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EDCO argued, and the trial court determined, that Lammons’ statements to the City Council constituted defamation per se. Defamation per se is a specific kind of defamation that “‘imputes: (1) criminal conduct; (2) a loathsome disease; (3) misconduct in a person’s trade, profession, office, or occupation; or (4) sexual misconduct.’”…
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We conclude that the trial court clearly erred by determining that Lammons’ statements, including the use of “unscrupulous,” constituted defamation, let alone defamation per se. Unscrupulous means “[u]nprincipled; having or displaying no scruples.” Unscrupulous, SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (6th ed. 2007) (“SHORTER”); see also Scruple, SHORTER (“A thought or circumstance that causes the mind unease or disquiet; a feeling of doubt or hesitation with regard to the morality or propriety of a course of action”).
Lammons never characterized EDCO itself as unscrupulous; rather, Lammons asked the Council, in general, “What will the City of Crown Point do to protect its citizens from unscrupulous licensed contractors?” Ex. Vol. IV p. 40. Even still, Lammons’ use of “unscrupulous,” at most, reflects her opinion regarding EDCO’s conduct during their business relationship. This opinion does not constitute the sort of “provably false” statement necessary to trigger defamation liability. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20.
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Here, Lammons’ use of “unscrupulous” is not the sort of provably false statement couched in terms of opinion discussed in Milkovich. On the contrary, the statement, at most, reflects her personal ethical assessment of EDCO with regard to its business dealings with her. And she testified at trial that this opinion was honestly held. Lammons’ statements are not actionable as defamation.
The trial court seems to have believed that Lammons’ use of “unscrupulous” was defamatory per se because her consumer complaint with the Attorney General, small claims action, and claim against the surety bond were unsuccessful. But whether EDCO was an “unscrupulous” business was not adjudicated in these forums, and the outcomes of these actions are irrelevant to Lammons’ right to voice her opinion regarding her dealings with EDCO.
Ultimately, reasonable minds could differ regarding whether EDCO acted unscrupulously here. But that is precisely why Lammons’ speech is protected. A consumer’s right to voice his or her opinion regarding business services rendered is central, not only to the figurative marketplace of ideas the First Amendment seeks to protect, but to our free market economy as well. See Wilkow, 241 F.3d at 557 (“Capitalism certainly does not depend on sharp practices, but neither is an allegation of sharp dealing anything more than an uncharitable opinion.”). Lammons voiced her opinion to the elected officials tasked with protecting the public from unfair business practices, and she did so with a legitimate purpose to persuade the City Council to adopt an ordinance clarifying the permit requirements for the installation of boilers. Lammons’ statements do not constitute defamation as a matter of law. The trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous, and we, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Conclusion
Lammons’ statements did not constitute defamation. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Reversed.
Altice, C.J., and Brown, J., concur