Molter, J.
McKinley Kelly was still emerging from a childhood enmeshed in violence when a jury found that he brutally murdered three young adults. He was sixteen years old when he committed the murders and seventeen when he was sentenced. The judge, after vacating one of those convictions, sentenced him to 110 years in prison—fifty-five-year consecutive sentences for each offense. Kelly unsuccessfully appealed his convictions and sentence, pursued state court post-conviction relief, and sought habeas relief in federal court.
But the landscape of juvenile sentencing—even for the most heinous crimes like these—has since changed. So the Court of Appeals authorized Kelly to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief challenging his sentence. His claims focus on a deepening scientific understanding of adolescent brain function, which better explains why juveniles are less culpable and more capable of change. Those developments, he contends, should lead either to a resentencing—reconsidering his sentence in light of this better understanding—or to a more lenient sentence offering more hope for a meaningful period of life outside prison walls.
After permitting Kelly to amend his claims, the post-conviction court denied his petition, and when he appealed, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Today, we grant transfer to address important procedural issues for postconviction relief and important substantive issues for juvenile sentencing. Like the Court of Appeals, we affirm the post-conviction court, and we reach three key conclusions along the way.
First, while the Indiana Rules of Post-Conviction Remedies (“Post-Conviction Rules”) require appellate screening before filing a successive petition for post-conviction relief, those rules do not require appellate screening before amending a successive petition. So the post-conviction court’s decision to permit Kelly to amend his claims was appropriate. Second, the state and federal constitutional provisions Kelly cites with various sentencing restrictions and requirements for equal treatment do not compel a more lenient sentence here. And third, Kelly’s sentence is not inappropriate based on the nature of his offenses and his character.
We hasten to note, though, that in this procedural posture we are only reviewing Kelly’s claims that our state and federal constitutions, along with our court rules, compelled more leniency when he was sentenced. That is different than reviewing a request for a statutorily authorized sentence modification, which involves considering an offender’s personal, rehabilitative progress after sentencing. A key premise of Kelly’s arguments is that “a court cannot reliably determine at the time of sentencing whether a child is irredeemable.” Appellant’s Br. at 42. That is true, but that mystery is just as much a reason not to shorten a sentence— after all, time may prove the child is irreparably corrupted.
Helpfully, the legislature addressed this dilemma recently by amending its sentence modification statute to offer juvenile offenders like Kelly a right to have their sentences reexamined after twenty years. Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17(n). At that point, the reviewing court will have the benefit of evidence related to Kelly’s rehabilitative successes or failures. And all the constitutional provisions that guide sentencing and direct distinct treatment of juvenile offenders will continue to inform the reviewing courts’ analysis and discretion.
…
The parties disagree over both the scope and merits of Kelly’s claims. Below, we first explain that it was proper for the post-conviction court to consider Kelly’s amendments to the claims in his successive petition for post-conviction relief. After that, we explain that none of Kelly’s claims merit relief—the post-conviction court did not err in denying all the claims in his amended petition, and we decline to revise his sentence through our Appellate Rule 7(B) discretion.
Kelly’s Amendments to His Successive Petition
The State makes a threshold argument that while Kelly properly obtained appellate court permission to file his successive petition for postconviction relief, he waived his amended claims because he failed to submit those amendments for appellate screening. Kelly responds that the State misreads the Post-Conviction Rules, which only require appellate screening for filing successive petitions, not amending them. We agree with Kelly.
…
After the first petition for post-conviction relief, a party may file an additional petition—a “successive” petition—only if they first get permission from our appellate courts, which will authorize the filing only if the petitioner makes a threshold showing that there is a “‘reasonable possibility’” that they are entitled to relief. Shaw v. State, 130 N.E.3d 91, 92 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(12)). Once an appellate court authorizes the petitioner to file a successive petition, the petitioner files the petition in the same court where the petitioner’s first petition for post-conviction relief was resolved. P-C.R. 1(12)(c).
…
The plain language in the rules instead suggests Kelly is correct that it is for the post-conviction court, not the Court of Appeals, to decide in the first instance whether a petitioner’s amendment is proper. The rules for amending petitions don’t distinguish between initial and successive petitions, and they say the post-conviction court “may make appropriate orders for amendment of the petition.” P-C.R. 1(4)(a); see also P-C.R. 1(4)(c) (authorizing the amendment of petitions). And when, as here, the State Public Defender appears after the petition was filed, she must “confer with petitioner and ascertain all grounds for relief . . . , amending the petition if necessary to include any grounds not included by petitioner in the original petition.” P-C.R. 1(9)(c). Again, there is no distinction noted for initial and successive petitions. Because Kelly points to language in the rules empowering post-conviction courts to permit proper amendments, and the State does not point to any language requiring permission from the Court of Appeals to amend (as opposed to file) successive petitions, we conclude Kelly offers the better reading of the rules.
The State worries our interpretation of the Post-Conviction Rules will “generate interlocutory appeals of rulings authorizing or denying new claims.” Resp. to Trans. at 7. That is true enough, but that further illustrates that Kelly’s interpretation enhances rather than undermines judicial efficiency. Interlocutory review would be discretionary, only permitted if both the post-conviction court and the Court of Appeals conclude that would be the most efficient way to proceed. Ind. Appellate Rule 14(B).
In contrast, under the State’s proposed approach, appellate screening for all amendments would be required even when, as here, that would be the least efficient approach. Since the State does not dispute Kelly’s amendments were proper, time would have been lost, and nothing gained, by returning to the Court of Appeals for appellate screening.
Having the post-conviction court screen amendments will often be more efficient than appellate screening because a post-conviction court will often be more familiar with the matter. The successive petition will already be before the court, and it will be the same court that handled the first petition and the underlying criminal case. P-C.R. 1(2), 1(12)(c). If instead the successive petition must return to the Court of Appeals to screen amendments, the rotating appellate motions panel screening the amendments will likely be a different panel than the panel that screened the successive petition.
The State’s proposed approach is also out of sync with the Court of Appeals’ current screening practices, at least as reflected in this case. Here, the motions panel did not screen Kelly’s proposed successive petition claim-by-claim. Instead, the panel issued a short, boilerplate order with a single sentence of analysis for the petition as a whole, stating: “Petitioner has established a reasonable possibility that he is entitled to postconviction relief, and accordingly, the Court authorizes the filing of the petition.” Order, Kelly v. State, No. 19A-SP-3095 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020). Reflecting this wholesale rather than surgical claim-by-claim treatment, the court authorized the petition in its entirety even though the Sixth Amendment claim was so weak that Kelly immediately dropped it once he had the assistance of counsel.
We don’t criticize that Court of Appeals’ practice of authorizing petitions in their entirety, nor do we suggest the Court of Appeals can’t undertake claim-by-claim screening before authorizing a successive petition. But we do not see any good reason to require that amendments receive claim-specific appellate preapproval when there is no such claim specific requirement or practice for the underlying successive petition.
Because the Post-Conviction Rules do not say the Court of Appeals screens amendments to the successive petitions it has authorized, we conclude the post-conviction court was correct that the rules vested it rather than the Court of Appeals with responsibility for overseeing amendments. And because the State’s only complaint is about who authorized the amendment and not whether the amendment was proper, we review the merits of all Kelly’s amended claims.
Kelly’s Claims
All of Kelly’s legal arguments rest on a foundational understanding that children are less culpable and more capable of change than adults, so we generally should not sentence children to a life of incarceration even when they commit the most heinous crimes. Those arguments all emphasize two facts.
First, Kelly contends that, practically speaking, he has been sentenced to life in prison. He was sentenced to incarceration for 110 years, meaning the earliest he can be released (assuming a reduction in time for good behavior) is when he will be sixty-nine years old, which he argues is beyond his life expectancy.
Second, advancements in developmental psychology and neuroscience after Kelly was sentenced better explain why children are less culpable and more capable of change than adults. In short, Kelly describes the scientific understanding—gleaned in part from brain imaging scans—that the portions of children’s brains responsible for impulse control, emotional regulation, and executive function (the prefrontal cortex) lag in development behind the portions responsible for processing emotional responses to incentives and rewards (the limbic system). This leads to “sensation-seeking and risky behavior” because children’s brains “focus more heavily on the benefits of risky behavior than on the potential negative consequences.” Appellant’s Br. at 24–25. And that is exacerbated by the sort of childhood trauma that Kelly experienced. On the other hand, children have greater capacity for rehabilitation “because an adolescent brain can mature and change more than an adult brain.” Id. at 25.
This sharpening scientific understanding has contributed to a few key developments in how we apply our state and federal constitutions to juvenile sentencing since Kelly was sentenced: now juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to death (Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)); they cannot be sentenced to life without parole for crimes other than homicide (Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)); life sentences cannot be mandatory for juveniles (Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)); and life without parole sentences must be reserved for only the rare juveniles who are irreparably corrupt (Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016)).
…
Constitutional Claims
Kelly argues that both the state and federal constitutions compel a sentence reduction based on his youth when he committed his offenses. “Because we only need to reach the federal constitutional analysis if the Indiana Constitution does not resolve the claim, we begin with” Kelly’s state constitutional law claims. State v. Katz, 179 N.E.3d 431, 442 (Ind. 2022). After concluding that there is no relief under the state constitution, we turn to the federal constitution, which we conclude offers no relief either.
Indiana Constitution
Kelly argues that the Indiana Constitution’s prohibitions on punishments that are either cruel and unusual, disproportionate to the offense, vindictive rather than reformative, or unnecessarily rigorous compel a sentence reduction. If not, then he argues the constitutional requirement to treat similarly situated people similarly renders his sentence invalid because he did not receive the same procedural protections as those who are sentenced to life without parole even though, he argues, his lengthy term-of-years sentence has the same practical consequence for him. Each of these arguments falls short.
…
Kelly argues his lengthy sentence is disproportionate because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater ability for reform than adult offenders, so a juvenile sentence should be less than an adult’s sentence for the same offense. Yet a lifetime in prison is a harsher sentence for a juvenile than an adult because the remainder of a juvenile’s life is longer.
…
One of Kelly’s other points undercuts his argument though. He correctly observes that the transient nature of youth means “it is not possible to accurately determine when sentencing a child whether he is capable of rehabilitation.” Appellant’s Br. at 46. But that uncertainty is no more of a reason to conclude a child is capable of rehabilitation than it is to conclude they are not. After all, we have recognized that “even considering the notable differences between juveniles and adults,” sometimes “the juvenile’s crimes are so reprehensible and heinous that an LWOP sentence would be appropriate.” Conley, 183 N.E.3d at 284. Thus, Kelly acknowledges that all the State needs to provide is a “meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”
Our legislature has provided just that. It has designed a sentencing regime where (1) a sentencing judge initially takes a juvenile’s youth into account when fashioning a sentence (as the judge did here); (2) then a juvenile offender has the same right as an adult to seek a sentence modification based on their progress towards rehabilitation, though this requires the permission of the prosecuting attorney if it has been more than a year since sentencing; and (3) then juvenile offenders like Kelly have an additional opportunity for sentence modification that is not available to those who were adults when they committed their offense. I.C. §§ 35-38-1-7.1(c); 35-38-1-17(k), (n). For murder, youthful offenders like Kelly can have their sentence reexamined after twenty years when courts have a better opportunity to assess whether the individual has been rehabilitated, or is on that path. I.C. § 35-38-1-17(n)(2). Unlike with adult offenders, there is no requirement to obtain the prosecutor’s consent for this review.
Courts considering these sentence modification petitions have the benefit of a “report from the department of correction concerning the convicted person’s conduct while imprisoned.” I.C. § 35-38-1-17(e)(2). And the reviewing court will continue to be guided by the sentencing-related constitutional provisions, including those requiring distinct treatment of juvenile offenders. This gives a petitioner a chance to show the court that their immaturity at the time of the crime was truly transient and that they are not irreparably corrupt. The court reviewing the petition will be in a better position to evaluate the petitioner’s capacity for reform than the court at the initial sentencing.
Thus, the legislature constructed precisely the sort of sentencing framework Kelly says the constitution demands, which is one with built-in flexibility to recognize the distinct nature of offenses that children commit and to both assess and then later reassess their capacity for reform. Especially for an issue like this, where Kelly’s argument focuses on evolving understandings—an evolving scientific understanding and an evolving understanding of Kelly’s personal development—prudence cautions towards relying on the legislature’s more flexible solution vindicating our Constitution’s commands rather than resorting to a more calcified court-crafted rule. See In re Adoption of P.J.W., 248 N.E.3d 574, 579 n.3 (Ind. 2025) (explaining that “we generally avoid addressing constitutional questions if a case can be resolved on other grounds”).
Article 1, Section 18 states, “[t]he penal code shall be founded on the principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice.” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 18. Since our State’s founding, this concern has been especially acute for juvenile offenders.
…
Section 18’s requirement applies to Indiana’s criminal code generally, and we have repeatedly held that individual, fact-specific challenges of the penal code’s applications are not reviewable under Article 1, Section 18. Ratliff v. Cohn, 693 N.E.2d 530, 542 (Ind. 1998); Lowery v. State, 478 N.E.2d 1214, 1220 (Ind. 1985). Kelly argues that the blanket application of Indiana’s penal code to juvenile offenders at sentencing violates Article 1, Section 18 because it “fails to consider the unique characteristics of children . . . when imposing adult penalties on them.” Appellant’s Br. at 50.
But this ignores the discretion our trial courts exercise in sentencing when they consider an offender’s youth as a mitigating factor. It also ignores that Kelly can seek a modification of his sentence under Indiana Code section 35-38-1-17. Since the court that decides whether to modify a juvenile’s sentence will be able to see the extent of the offender’s success towards the rehabilitative goal, the penal code continues to ensure that juveniles’ unique characteristics are taken into account before their sentences are fully served. Indiana’s sentencing statutes, including its sentence modification statutes, ensure that rehabilitation—not vindictiveness—is the core of juvenile sentencing in Indiana.
Article 1, Section 15 of the Indiana Constitution provides, “[n]o person arrested, or confined in jail, shall be treated with unnecessary rigor.” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 15. This provision is typically invoked when a prisoner suffers severe mistreatment, like being beaten or tortured. See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 307 N.E.2d 501, 506 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974); Kokenes v. State, 13 N.E.2d 524, 530 (Ind. 1938); Bonahoon v. State, 178 N.E. 570, 571 (Ind. 1931). And we have specifically declined to interpret Article 1, Section 15 as prohibiting anything more than physical abuse. Moore v. State, 771 N.E.2d 46, 55 (Ind. 2002) (“[T]he length of time a person has spent on death row does not render his execution unconstitutional under the federal or state constitution.”); Ratliff, 693 N.E.2d at 541.
Kelly acknowledges precedent holding that Article 1, Section 15 only prohibits physical abuse, but asks us to reconsider this interpretation. He argues that imposing a long term-of-years sentence on a juvenile offender constitutes “unnecessary rigor” under the plain meaning of those words. We disagree. “Article [1], § 15 is not a catch-all provision applicable to every adverse condition accompanying confinement.” McQueen v. State, 711 N.E.2d 503, 505 (Ind. 1999). Even an extremely long sentence cannot constitute unnecessary rigor. See id.; Moore, 771 N.E.2d at 55. The length of a sentence may be unconstitutional because it is disproportionate to the nature of the offense, but that is a claim under Article 1, Section 16, not Section 15.
Kelly also argues that Indiana Code section 35-50-2-9 (the LWOP statute) grants unequal privileges, violating Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution. That section provides, “[t]he General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 23. A statute creating disparate treatment does not violate Section 23 if two conditions are met: First, the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated classes. Second, the preferential treatment must be uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated. Whistle Stop Inn, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 51 N.E.3d 195, 198 (Ind. 2016) (quotation omitted).
…
We agree with the State that the disparate treatment is reasonably related to the inherent characteristics distinguishing the classes. Simply put, an LWOP sentence is lengthier than Kelly’s sentence because Kelly’s sentence allows for Kelly’s eventual release. And we cannot say it is unreasonable for the legislature to provide heightened statutory protections for heightened sentences. It makes no difference that Kelly was eligible for an LWOP sentence since that is not the sentence he received.
Federal Constitutional Claims
Kelly argues that his 110-year sentence violates these Eighth Amendment protections, but we disagree for two reasons. First, as we explained above, Kelly was sentenced to a term of years, not life without parole. Supra, Section II.B.1.a. Second, even if Miller did apply, its requirements were satisfied here because Indiana has procedures in place to ensure that only “the rare juvenile offender” is sentenced to die behind bars. See Jones, 593 U.S. at 108. The trial court considered Kelly’s age before imposing the term-of-years sentence. And the legislature has afforded him a statutory right to seek a sentence modification to a reduced or suspended sentence after he has served twenty years. I.C. § 35-38-117(n)(2).
Kelly next argues that sentencing him without the LWOP statutory protections violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection clause, which prohibits a state from denying “to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. That clause protects against “intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
…
Kelly’s argument fails because he is not similarly situated to defendants the State charges under the LWOP statute—he received a more lenient sentence. Defendants sentenced after the State successfully prosecutes them under the LWOP statute will die in prison, while Kelly’s sentence leaves open the possibility that he will be released from prison before he is seventy years old. See Stewart v. State, 945 N.E.2d 1277, 1288–89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (rejecting the same equal protection argument because the term-of-years sentence did not foreclose the possibility of parole), trans. denied. He does not explain why treating these groups differently lacks any rational basis, nor does he point to any cases reaching that conclusion.
Appellate Rule 7(B)
Nothing about the circumstances of Kelly’s offenses suggests that the presumptive sentence he received was inappropriate.
…
Kelly’s character, particularly the fact that it was still developing given his age at the time of the offenses, is the most significant factor in this case. As noted throughout this opinion, juvenile offenders are less culpable and more capable of rehabilitation… Kelly’s age at the time of his offenses is comparable to the juvenile offenders in Brown, Fuller, Wilson, and similar cases, but his sentence is substantially shorter than their sentences were before they were revised. Kelly’s 110-year sentence is similar to Wilson’s revised 100-year sentence, and Kelly will be sixty-nine years old on his earliest possible release date. We observed in Wilson that release in one’s mid-to-late sixties provides a “reasonable hope for a life outside prison.” 157 N.E.3d at 1184.
Kelly’s sentence gives him that hope, which aligns with how we have treated other juvenile offenders. His sentence is therefore appropriate considering the nature of his offenses and his character, and we decline to revise it.
For these reasons, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment, and we deny Kelly’s request that we revise his sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B).
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.