Massa, J.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, meaning the “thing speaks for itself,” is a rule of circumstantial evidence that may be used to infer negligence from certain types of accidents that typically do not happen without someone’s negligence. In such bizarre and rare circumstances, where direct evidence of cause is unavailable, we ask whether the event was probably more occasioned by negligence of the defendant rather than some other cause. In 2018, in Bloomington, such a bizarre event took place. Kiera Isgrig, a college student, was injured after a window and its casing, without warning, fell on her while she was studying with friends. As there was no direct evidence pointing to the cause of the window falling, Isgrig filed a complaint against the Trustees of Indiana University (“the University”) alleging negligence and asserting res ipsa loquitur. However, the trial court granted summary judgment for the University. Based on an analysis of our evolving common law, we conclude that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be applied to premises liability cases involving fixtures where an invitee is injured on a landowner’s premises. We thus find that Isgrig has demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact to overcome summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
…
Isgrig seeks to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact by applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to infer that the University was negligent. Conversely, the University argues that res ipsa loquitur is not applicable unless a plaintiff first establishes that the defendant would be liable under a theory of premises liability.
These two competing arguments frame the question for this Court: whether a plaintiff can utilize the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to infer negligence in a premises liability case. We find that our case law allows the doctrine in premises liability cases “[i]f [the] injury results from a fixture or other component that [others] did not or could not disturb . . . and the incident would not normally occur absent negligence[.]” Griffin, 175 N.E.3d at 816. And, in proceeding on such a theory, a plaintiff need not first establish the elements of premises liability.
I. Premises Liability and the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
Indiana law has evolved to permit the application of res ipsa loquitur in premises liability negligence cases involving injury caused by fixtures. In order to properly understand how premises liability and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur correlate, we must first analyze each independently.
….
II. Res Ipsa Loquitur in the Context of Premises Liability
….
We find, however, a crucial distinction which separates Griffin from the instant case. The Griffin Court noted that it declined to hold that res ipsa loquitur can never apply to a premises liability case. “If an injury results from a fixture or other component that customers did not or could not disturb—such as a chandelier suspended from the ceiling, or a set of shelves bolted to the wall—and the incident would not normally occur absent negligence, res ipsa could be appropriate.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Rust, 215 N.E.2d at 44–45).
We have long held that a fixture is “a thing that originally was a chattel, but has become a part of real estate by reason of attachment thereto by one having an interest therein.” Ochs v. Tilton, 103 N.E. 837, 838 (Ind. 1914). We find that our use of the word fixture in Griffin was not unintentional. In that last paragraph, this Court made the distinction that where the injuring instrumentality is a fixture, then res ipsa loquitur could be applicable in premises liability. Griffin foresaw the circumstances here, where a window and its frame—a fixture that is bolted to the wall— became the injuring instrumentality.
III. Isgrig Can Rely on the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur to Overcome Summary Judgment.
This foregoing survey of Indiana law leads us to hold that res ipsa loquitur is appropriate in premises liability where the injuring instrumentality is a fixture and where such an incident would not normally occur absent negligence. Griffin, 175 N.E.3d at 816. To rely on res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must still present evidence that (1) the injuring instrumentality is under the exclusive control of the defendant, and (2) the accident is one which in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who control the instrumentality use proper care. See Shull, 477 N.E.2d at 927.
Isgrig argues that she designated sufficient evidence to permit her to proceed to trial on a theory of res ipsa loquitur. She also argues that the window was under the exclusive control or management of the University, and that windows do not ordinarily fall out of walls if those who have management or control have exercised proper care. We agree on both points.
The University argues that Isgrig cannot succeed on a theory of res ipsa loquitur without first establishing premises liability. The first two prongs of premises liability ask the plaintiff to show that the landowner should have known about a defect that the invitee could not have discovered on their own. Burrell, 569 N.E.2d at 639–40. Griffin states that “if there’s no liability under a premises liability standard, res ispa [sic] cannot apply,” and that “determining the res ispa [sic] issue is necessarily dependent on whether a defendant can be liable under premises liability in the first place.” 175 N.E.3d at 815. We find that this standard in Griffin, requiring the plaintiff to show that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge before demonstrating the two elements of res ipsa loquitur is duplicative and unnecessary. This is because a showing that the injuring instrumentality was within the exclusive management and control of the defendant, and that the accident was one that does not ordinarily happen if those who have management and control exercise proper care (the first two elements of res ipsa loquitur) reaches the same result as requiring the plaintiff to establish the first two prongs of the premises liability standard. Whether a defendant knew or reasonably should have known about the defect in an injuring instrumentality is exactly the sort of information that res ipsa loquitur is intended to supply by inference. Curtis v. Lein, 239 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Wash. 2010). Therefore with respect to this standard, which was adopted in Griffin, we find that where the injuring instrumentality is a fixture and if the plaintiff is relying on res ipsa loquitur, they do not need to first establish that the defendant had actual and constructive knowledge of the fixture’s defect.
This reasoning is supported by our understanding of fixtures, which, by their nature, are permanently attached—or fixed—to the property and have, therefore, become part of the real estate by reason of attachment….
Here, the evidence shows that the window is a fixture and thus res ipsa loquitur could apply. The evidence demonstrates that the window fell out of the wall with its entire frame and casing, which was affixed to the surrounding wall. The window in this case was a fixture more akin to a set of bolted shelves, the chandelier in Rust, or the mirror in Deming Hotel. Like the lighting fixture in Rector, we “cannot say that a [window] fixture falling from the ceiling of a business is the sort of event which ordinarily happens if those who have the management and control exercise proper care.” 809 N.E.2d at 892.
….
As Isgrig has provided evidence that the injuring instrumentality is under the exclusive control of the University, and the accident is one which in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who control the instrumentality use proper care, she may proceed on a theory of res ipsa loquitur. The dissent argues that Isgrig has failed to provide a theory for what could have possibly caused the window to fall out of its frame or what actually caused the window to fall. Therefore, she cannot prove that the University breached its duty or that the breach caused her injuries to succeed on a claim of negligence. Post, at 2.
Respectfully, we think this compounds the burden of proof required by a plaintiff that seeks to rely on res ipsa loquitur. The application of res ipsa loquitur only establishes that a duty exists, and a breach took place; the plaintiff nevertheless still bears the burden of proving the other elements of negligence. The invocation of res ipsa loquitur does not eliminate the need to show that the defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of the injury, and that the plaintiff suffered damage as a result. Once relied on, “the inference of negligence drawn from the facts does not disappear from the case, but instead remains, and is placed upon the scales to be weighed by the trier of fact.” Gold, 720 N.E.2d at 1182.
Conclusion
Building owners exercise management and control of fixtures attached to their buildings. Given the well-established duty of care that landowners owe to invitees, it follows that landowners should bear responsibility if invitees are injured by defective fixtures in buildings on their land. Should such circumstances arise where direct evidence is unavailable, plaintiffs in such cases may rely on the circumstantial evidence doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to infer negligence. This inference does not secure a finding of negligence, because the final determination is still left to the trier of fact. Such an inference, however, is enough for a plaintiff to survive summary judgment.
For these reasons, and based on the evidence presented, we conclude that Isgrig has demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact to infer that the University was negligent. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Rush, C.J., and Goff, J. concur.
Molter, J., dissents with separate opinion in which Slaughter, J., joins
Molter, J., dissenting
….
Yet today the Court reverses the trial court’s judgment based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which recognizes that an accident’s circumstances can sometimes support an inference that the accident was likely caused by the defendant’s negligence. The doctrine establishes an evidentiary rule of circumstantial evidence based on probability, so the inference can only arise when: (1) the defendant has exclusive control over what caused the injury, and (2) the accident is the sort usually caused by the defendant’s negligence. Isgrig makes neither showing, and the Court’s reasoning confuses an inference with the sort of speculation we typically hold is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.
I therefore respectfully dissent.
….