Tavitas, J.
Following a jury trial more than twenty years ago, Bruce Waldon was convicted of several offenses, including two counts of burglary and two counts of theft for incidents that occurred over the course of one night. At his first sentencing hearing, Waldon argued that the offenses constituted a single episode of criminal conduct and, thus, consecutive sentences were limited by statute. The trial court disagreed and imposed consecutive sentences for these convictions.
Multiple appeals, post-conviction proceedings, and resentencing hearings followed over the next twenty years. At the fourth sentencing hearing, the trial court upheld its original finding that the offenses did not constitute a single episode of criminal conduct. Waldon again appeals and argues that the trial court abused its discretion in so finding. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.
Waldon raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion by finding that the offenses did not constitute a single episode of criminal conduct.
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Waldon argues that the trial court erred by finding that the offenses did not constitute a single episode of criminal conduct and that the trial court should have capped the consecutive sentences for those offenses in accordance with Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2.
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Our Supreme Court has explained that the determination of whether offenses constitute a single episode of criminal conduct is “‘a fact-intensive inquiry.’” Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1144 (Ind. 2022) (quoting Schlichter v. State, 779 N.E.2d 1155, 1157 (Ind. 2002)). Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2(b) directs us to examine whether the offenses “are closely related in time, place, and circumstance.” And our Courts have described an “episode” as “an occurrence or connected series of occurrences and developments which may be viewed as distinctive and apart although part of a larger or more comprehensive series[,including] the simultaneous robbery of seven individuals, the killing of several people with successive shots from a gun, [or] the successive burning of three pieces of property . . . .” O’Connell v. State, 742 N.E.2d 943, 950 (Ind. 2001) (brackets in original). (quoting Tedlock v. State, 656 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)). But no bright-line test determines whether multiple offenses constitute a single episode of criminal conduct.
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In Reed, 856 N.E.2d at 1200, however, our Supreme Court held that, whether one can “recount each charge without referring to the other can provide additional guidance on the question of whether a defendant’s conduct constitutes an episode of criminal conduct” but “is not a critical ingredient in resolving the question.” Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court instructed that we instead focus on the “less absolute terms” of whether the offenses constitute “‘a connected series of offenses that are closely connected in time, place, and circumstance,’” in accordance with the statute. Id. (quoting I.C. § 35-50-1-2(b)). In particular, we emphasize “‘the timing of the offenses’ and ‘the simultaneous and contemporaneous nature of the crimes,’ if any.” Fix, 186 N.E.3d at 1144 (quoting Reed, 856 N.E.2d at 1200).
In considering the time and place of the offenses, we are mindful that offenses may still constitute a single episode of criminal conduct even if the offenses: (1) are separated by a short span of time, Fix, 186 N.E.3d at 1144 (holding that burglary and robbery of victim during the same night, “‘although not precisely simultaneous or contemporaneous,’ were sufficiently connected in time” to constitute a single episode of criminal conduct) (quoting Reed, 856 N.E.2d at 1201); or (2) occur at separate, although close, locations, see Henson v. State, 881 N.E.2d 36, 39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that burglaries of neighboring garages over the course of the same morning constituted a single episode of criminal conduct), trans. denied.
We are also mindful that offenses may constitute a single episode of criminal conduct even if the offenses involve “separate victims and separate acts[.]” See Harris v. State, 861 N.E.2d 1182, 1188 (Ind. 2007). But in such cases, we have relied on the presence of a common scheme or purpose to unite the offenses. See id. (defendant had sex with two underage girls several minutes apart in exchange for allowing the girls to stay the night); Reed, 856 N.E.2d at 1201 (defendant fired at two police officers within minutes of one another while fleeing from law enforcement); Gallien, 19 N.E.3d at 310 (defendant timed burglaries of separate businesses such that law enforcement would be investigating the first burglary while the second burglary occurred).
The common scheme or purpose must be more specific than the mere desire to commit multiple crimes. See Reynolds v. State, 657 N.E.2d 438, 441 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that three burglaries of separate properties over the course of the same day did not constitute a single episode of criminal conduct). And although important, the presence of a common scheme or purpose will not save offenses that are not also closely related in time and place. See O’Connell, 742 N.E.2d at 951 (holding that defendant’s separate shootings over the course of two weeks, although united by his desire to harm African-Americans, did not constitute a single episode of criminal conduct).
From the foregoing cases, we distill the following test for determining whether offenses constitute a single episode of criminal conduct. We balance the following non-exclusive factors: (1) the time span over which the offenses occurred and the time between the offenses, with extra weight given when the offenses are simultaneous or contemporaneous; (2) whether the offenses occurred at separate locations, and if so, the distance between them; (3) whether the offenses each stand alone, that is to say, can be described without reference to one another; and (4) whether the offenses are united by a common scheme or purpose beyond the mere desire to commit multiple crimes. No one factor is determinative, although the first two are the most important. Ultimately, the time, place, and circumstances must demonstrate that the offenses are but parts of a “larger or more comprehensive series” such that they can be fairly described as a single episode of criminal conduct. O’Connell, 742 N.E.2d at 950.
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Here, the two burglaries were farther apart and occurred over a longer period of time than in Gallien. Waldon also did not use items stolen in the first burglary to assist him in the second burglary, unlike the defendant’s use of the cart in Gallien. And most importantly, unlike in Gallien, where the two burglaries were part of a single scheme based on distracting and diverting law enforcement, there was no such scheme here. Neither the time, place, nor the circumstances indicate that Waldon’s offenses constituted a single episode of criminal conduct. The trial court, thus, did not abuse its discretion by declining to limit Waldon’s consecutive sentences pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2. See Reynolds, 657 N.E.2d at 441.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the offenses did not constitute a single episode of criminal conduct. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Altice, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.