Brown, J.
Brandon Francis Schaefer appeals his conviction for murder following a jury trial. Specifically, the jury found Schaefer guilty but mentally ill. He asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it, sua sponte and over his objection, instructed the jury on the possible penal consequences of a not responsible by reason of insanity verdict and a guilty but mentally ill verdict. We affirm.
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Schaefer asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when, on its own accord and over his objection, the court read to the jury Ind. Pattern Jury Instruction 11.1700 which provides a general description of the consequences of a guilty but mentally ill verdict and a not responsible by reason of insanity verdict. He argues that “it is improper to instruct the jury of the penal consequences of a verdict” unless the jury has been “misled as to the law” and he challenges “the court’s authority to give the instruction over his objection.”
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In Georgopulos v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court observed the longstanding general rule that it is improper to instruct a jury on the specific penal ramifications of its verdicts unless an erroneous view of the law . . . has been planted in [the jurors’] minds.’” 735 N.E.2d 1138, 1141 (Ind. 2000) (quoting Dipert, 259 Ind. at 262, 286 N.E.2d at 407). However, due to “the potential for confusion in cases where the jury is faced with the option of finding a defendant not responsible by the reason of insanity or guilty but mentally ill,” in the exercise of its supervisory authority, the Georgopulos Court adopted the following procedural rule: “When the verdict options before a jury include not responsible by reason of insanity or guilty but mentally ill, and the defendant requests a jury instruction on the penal consequences of these verdicts, the trial court is required to give an appropriate instruction or instructions as the case may be.” Id. at 1143 (emphasis added). In other words, if the defendant requests an instruction on the penal consequences of an insanity verdict, the defendant is entitled to the instruction regardless of whether an erroneous view of the legal consequences has been planted in the minds of the jurors. Alexander v. State, 819 N.E.2d 533, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
In light of this precedent, Schaefer argues, “[i]n Indiana, one of two events can lead to the instruction [being] given (1) the defendant can ask for it or (2) it can be given when a misstatement of the law occurred.” Appellant’s Amended Reply Brief at 8. He argues that Georgopulos stands for the specific proposition that “[t]he ability to request an instruction on penal consequences, absent a misstatement of the law, appears to rest solidly with the defense in the State of Indiana.” Id. at 10. We cannot agree. Simply because an instruction is required at the request of the defendant does not mean it is prohibited absent such a request or upon his objection. Moreover, we see no indication that the Georgopulos Court intended to limit the trial court’s authority to give an approved of instruction on its own accord to instruct what it perceives to be a confused jury.
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Schaefer maintains that, in order for the trial court to give the instruction absent his request or over his objection, the court needed to specifically identify a misstatement of law. Georgopulos does not say this. Even if it did, the record reflects that defense counsel referred to the penal consequences of a not responsible by reason of insanity verdict on multiple occasions, including stating that it was not simply “a get out of jail free card.” Id. at 27. This statement could be viewed at the very least as a misleading or incomplete statement and one that was need of correction and further explanation.
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Thus, a not responsible by reason of insanity verdict results in a commitment hearing rather than a sentencing hearing, and a defendant found to be criminally insane will be committed to an appropriate facility rather than being sentenced to jail or the DOC.12 Defense counsel’s reference to the NRI verdict as not being “a get out of jail free card” hardly provided an accurate or complete picture for the jury of that verdict or the other possible verdicts available in this case. We have little difficulty identifying defense counsel’s reference as misleading or a misstatement of law. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it read to the jury Ind. Pattern Jury Instruction 11.1700.
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Schaefer’s conviction.
Affirmed.