Brown, J.
Kathryne Tillett appeals her convictions and sentence for two counts of child molesting as level 1 felonies. She raises three issues, one of which we find dispositive and revise and restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request to assert an insanity defense. We reverse and remand.
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Tillett claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her belated request to assert an insanity defense. She contends that defense counsel explained why the insanity defense was belatedly filed including a discussion of the difficulty in trying to obtain a psychological assessment and in trying to take appropriate steps to ascertain her competency. Tillett argues that “the evidence overwhelmingly shows that [her] alleged inappropriate sexual conduct is directly driven by her mental illnesses.”
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The omnibus date in this case was ultimately set for April 26, 2022. Thus, under the statute, Tillett was required to file her notice of an insanity defense by April 6, 2022. As Tillett attempted a late filing of the required notice, the trial court had discretion whether to accept it. See Ankney v. State, 825 N.E.2d 965, 970 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“Ankney attempted a late filing of the required notice, and, thus, the trial court had discretion whether to accept it.”) (citing Eveler v. State, 524 N.E.2d 9, 11 (Ind. 1988) (holding that, after the omnibus date, “the trial court’s discretion controlled” and “[s]uch discretion is exercisable upon a showing of good cause by a defendant who has missed the deadline”)), trans. denied.
We find the Indiana Supreme Court’s comments in Wampler v. State, 67 N.E.3d 633 (Ind. 2017), instructive. In that case, Anthony Wampler had a history of psychiatric problems and hospitalizations. 67 N.E.3d at 634. Wampler initially was found incompetent to stand trial, received treatment, and was later found competent. Id. After a bench trial, Wampler was convicted of two counts of burglary as class B felonies and was adjudicated an habitual offender. Id. The trial court sentenced Wampler to concurrent eighteen-year terms on the burglary convictions, enhanced by fifteen years for the habitual offender adjudication, for an aggregate sentence of thirty-three years. Id. Wampler appealed, contending his sentence was inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed Wampler’s sentence. Id. (citing Wampler v. State, 57 N.E.3d 884 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied). Judge Mathias dissented and would have granted Wampler sentencing relief. Id. (citing 57 N.E.3d at 887-892 (Mathias, J., dissenting)).
On transfer, the Indiana Supreme Court observed that Judge Mathias noted, “[a]lthough Wampler challenges only the appropriateness of his sentence, the most important issue in this case is the clear failure, yet again, of our criminal justice system to adequately and properly respond to and treat those with mental health issues.” Id. (quoting 57 N.E.3d at 890 (Mathias, J., dissenting)). The Court further observed that Judge Mathias “referred to what he characterizes as ‘the large and ironic lapse in the logic of our criminal justice system, in which the initial imperative is to determine the competency of defendants prospectively, to assist counsel at trial, not to promptly consider whether the defendant was competent at the time the crime was committed.’” Id. (quoting 57 N.E.3d at 890 (Mathias, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
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The record does not reveal that Tillett’s counsel received any psychological report prior to the April 26, 2022, omnibus date. Dr. Anderson’s forensic evaluation, which was filed on April 12, 2023, found that Tillett had a mental illness and was not “presently capable of assisting in the preparation of her defense.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 73. He observed that Tillett engaged in behaviors typical of psychosis and “appeared to have a difficult time sustaining attention to [his] questions, as if distracted by internal stimuli.” Id. at 71. He diagnosed her with “Unspecified Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorder” and wrote that she “engaged in bizarre behavior and appeared to be responding to internal stimuli.” Id. at 72. He also wrote, “It’s my opinion that Ms. Tillett[] is an unreliable historian due to her psychosis, which impedes her ability to provide important historical information for defense planning.” Id. at 74. He further indicated that he believed “there is a good chance [Tillett] could be restored to competency with treatment.” Id. During the September 21, 2023 competency hearing, Dr. Anderson stated that Tillett “had a difficult time paying attention to my questions, and it was as if she was distracted by what we call internal stimuli, which is usually it could be voices in the head; it could be intrusive thoughts.” Transcript Volume II at 46.
In its September 21, 2023 order, the trial court found that Tillett “presently lacks the ability to understand the proceedings and to assist in the preparation of a defense,” ordered that the proceedings be continued, and committed Tillett to the Indiana Division of Mental Health and Addiction for competency restoration services. Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 92. It was not until January 26, 2024, that Reynolds filed his letter which referenced Dr. Ara’s report and indicated that Tillett had attained the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of her defense. Reynolds wrote, “In order to maintain her current level of mental/emotional stability and competence when she returns to jail to await trial it is imperative that she remain on her medications.” Id. at 102.
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A little over two months passed between the time Reynolds filed his January 26, 2024 letter, and the time Tillett’s counsel filed the Motion to Permit Belated Notice of Insanity Defense on April 3, 2024. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Tillett made a showing of good cause. Mindful of the Indiana Supreme Court’s comments in Wampler, we conclude that granting Tillett’s Motion to Permit Belated Notice of Insanity Defense would have been in the interest of justice and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Tillett’s convictions and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Tavitas, J., concurs.
Altice, C.J., dissents with separate opinion.
Altice, C.J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, as I do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Tillett’s motion to permit belated notice of insanity defense, which was filed less than two weeks before trial and nearly two years after the statutory deadline. While Ind. Code § 35-36-2-1 grants a trial court discretion to permit filing of such a notice any time before commencement of trial, the statute requires a defendant to make a showing of good cause for the late filing. See Eveler v. State, 524 N.E.2d 9, 11 (Ind. 1988) (“Such discretion is exercisable upon a showing of good cause by a defendant who has missed the deadline.”).
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In sum, Tillett obtained the psychological evaluations in February 2023 and April 2023, yet she waited another year before filing her motion to permit belated notice of insanity defense. Tillett also filed a motion to continue the jury trial, which was less than two weeks away, so that she could retain an expert to “present relevant evidence to the jury regarding [her] mental status and its effect on any culpability that [she] may have for the charged conduct in this matter.” Id. at 145. She baldly asserted that it “was not possible for counsel to investigate and pursue [this] until [her] competency could be restored[.]” Id.
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In my opinion, the trial court’s determination in this regard was not an abuse of discretion. While there was certainly good cause for missing the April 2022 deadline for filing the insanity notice, the trial court could reasonably determine that defense counsel did not have good cause for waiting more than a year after getting a “concrete understanding” of Tillett’s mental health with the February 2023 schizophrenia diagnosis.