Massa, J.
A jury found Zachariah Konkle guilty of voluntary manslaughter for knowingly killing Michael Steele. During closing arguments to the jury, the State invoked a well-known rule of tort law, the eggshell skull doctrine, to rebut assertions that Steele died from preexisting heart conditions. On appeal, Konkle argues: (1) that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by invoking the eggshell skull doctrine in a murder case, (2) that the State lacked sufficient evidence to prove that he “knowingly” killed Steele, and (3) that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Finding no prosecutorial misconduct, sufficient evidence to prove the “knowing” element of the crime, and that the sentence was appropriate, we affirm Konkle’s conviction.
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I. Prosecutorial Misconduct.
When reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct properly raised in the trial court, we determine “(1) whether misconduct occurred, and if so, (2) ‘whether the misconduct, under all the circumstances, placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to which he or she would not have been subjected’ otherwise.” Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 667 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Ind. 2006)). “Whether a prosecutor’s argument constitutes misconduct is measured by reference to case law and the Rules of Professional Conduct. The gravity of peril is measured by the probable persuasive effect of the misconduct on the jury’s decision rather than the degree of impropriety of the conduct.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Cooper, 854 N.E.2d at 835). To preserve the misconduct claim for appeal, the defendant must object at the time the alleged misconduct occurs. Wright v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1098, 1111 (Ind. 1997). Before proceeding to the merits of Konkle’s prosecutorial misconduct claim, we must first determine whether Konkle waived or preserved the prosecutorial misconduct claim for appellate review. This requires exploring the history and development of our preservation rule when objections occur during arguments to the jury.
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However, we are presented with the same question regarding waiver that we originally left unanswered in Williams—whether a failure to seek an admonishment or mistrial should result in waiver despite a timely objection being overruled. Our review of the preservation rule and its underlying purpose leads us to agree with the Williams Court of Appeals’ reasoning that waiver should not be the result in such an instance.
The original purpose behind the appellate preservation requirement was two-fold: (1) it prevented counsel who were aware of misconduct from proceeding through trial without seeking relief, and then using the misconduct to set aside a verdict if the outcome was not favorable to them; and (2) it presented the trial court with an opportunity to address any grievances concerning the misconduct, for which a failure to act would open the door to appellate review. See Coleman, 13 N.E. at 102. As to the former, the initial objection satisfies this purpose. As to the latter, a trial court satisfies its duty to address any perceived error when it sustains an objection. At this point, the trial court has done all that was asked of it. If a defendant fails to seek any further relief as needed, then there is nothing left for the appellate court to review on appeal. But where a trial court overrules an objection—thereby implicitly approving of any perceived errors—now the court has been presented an opportunity to act which it has neglected or failed to take up. See Grubb, 20 N.E. at 260.
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Therefore, moving forward, where a defendant timely objects to alleged misconduct by the prosecutor and the trial court overrules the objection, nothing further is required to preserve the issue for appeal. [Footnote omitted.] However, while our decision here simplifies the requirements regarding overruled objections, we continue to hold that where a defendant objects and the trial court sustains the objection, our appellate preservation standard shall remain. That is to say, to preserve the issue for appeal following a sustained objection, the defendant must request an admonishment of the jury, and if further relief is required, move for a mistrial. Upon reexamination of our courts’ application of the rule, the rule has been consistently applied to sustained objections in light of the rule’s original purpose. For that reason, we see no need to change it in that context.
B. Konkle’s Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim
Turning to the merits of his claim, Konkle argues that the State misstated the law, and thus committed misconduct, by arguing that the eggshell skull doctrine applies to murder and voluntary manslaughter cases. However, we disagree and find that the State’s explanation was not a misapplication of the law and that no misconduct occurred.
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In order to determine whether prosecutorial misconduct took place, we first need to examine what the eggshell skull doctrine is and whether it applies to murder or voluntary manslaughter…
And importantly, it is also well known within our criminal law that the State is required to prove both causation and mens rea to satisfy the burden of proof for a given crime…
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But unlike with battery, the eggshell skull doctrine has not been applied to murder or its kindred in this state. To the extent that other courts have considered the doctrine in murder or voluntary manslaughter cases, there is some guidance to consult.
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These cases help us determine that the eggshell skull doctrine can be applied both inside and outside the context of murder. Moreover, as the eggshell skull doctrine is one of causation, and causation is a required element in proving a criminal conviction, it only makes sense that the doctrine be applied for such purposes. This concept is clearly demonstrated in each of the cases discussed thus far. But as O’Bannon and Brackett further illustrate, the doctrine should not be construed to alleviate the State’s burden to prove any requisite intent elements. In fact, the doctrine should not be invoked for proving mens rea, period. The Seventh Circuit explicitly recognized this limiting principle. In intentional murder cases specifically, a victim’s preexisting ailment will be of no concern where a murderer’s intentional actions will result in the victim’s death regardless of whether a preexisting condition exists. See Brackett, 11 F.3d at 82. Therefore, because the eggshell skull doctrine has traditionally dwelled within an analysis of causation—whether in tort or criminal law—our ruling today clarifies that this is where it should dwell hereafter.
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Given our conclusion that the eggshell skull doctrine is applicable to the charges at issue here, we find that the prosecutor, in invoking the doctrine, did not misstate the law.
The record reflects that the doctrine was not invoked to discuss whether Konkle was aware of Steele’s heart conditions, and thus whether Konkle was aware of a high probability that his conduct would result in Steele’s death. Rather, the doctrine was raised to combat Konkle’s argument that Steele’s death was purely a result of his coronary artery disease…
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Thus, because the doctrine was directed at weighing causation, and not mens rea, it was therefore not a misstatement of law to mention it. As a result, we conclude that no prosecutorial misconduct occurred.
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Conclusion
For the reasons articulated above, we affirm Konkle’s conviction, including the thirty-four-year sentence.
Rush, C.J., and Slaughter and Molter, JJ., concur.
Goff, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion
Goff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I take no issue with the Court’s well-reasoned holding on the appellate-preservation rule—a holding that aligns with deep-seated criticism by Indiana courts and commentators and with most other jurisdictions, not to mention Trial Rule 46, which deems “unnecessary” any “formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court.”
Despite my agreement with the Court’s resolution of this procedural issue, I part ways with the Court on the merits of Konkle’s claim. In my view, the Court unnecessarily expands the eggshell-skull doctrine to homicide cases requiring proof of a knowing or intentional mens rea, and—unnecessary expansion aside—it misapplies that doctrine to Konkle. For these reasons, I would hold that the prosecutor’s misstatement of the law, though not necessarily misconduct, amounted to reversible error, thus entitling Konkle to relief.
I. The Court unnecessarily expands the eggshell-skull doctrine to homicide cases requiring proof of a knowing or intentional mens rea.
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II. The Court misapplies the doctrine to Konkle.
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III. Though not necessarily misconduct, the prosecutor’s misstatement of the law amounted to reversible error.
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