Vaidik, J.
Jacob McGee was convicted of Level 5 felony possession of a machine gun for possessing a Glock 22 handgun with a machine-gun conversion device attached to it. He now appeals, arguing Indiana’s machine-gun ban violates his Second Amendment right to bear arms and, in the alternative, that the evidence is insufficient to prove he knew the conversion device made his gun a machine gun.
In New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), the United States Supreme Court established a two-step framework for analyzing Second Amendment claims. The first step is determining whether the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct. We agree with the overwhelming number of federal district courts that have determined under step one of Bruen that the Second Amendment does not protect machine guns because they are dangerous and unusual. We also determine that the evidence is sufficient to prove that McGee knew the conversion device made his gun a machine gun. We therefore affirm the trial court.
…
McGee challenges the constitutionality of Section 35-47-5-8.
…
Section 35-47-5-8 provides that “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally owns or possesses a machine gun commits a Level 5 felony.” Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-190, in turn, defines “machine gun”:
“Machine gun” means a weapon that:
(1) shoots;
(2) is designed to shoot; or
(3) can be readily restored to shoot;
automatically more than one (1) shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.
(b) The term includes:
(1) the frame or receiver of a weapon described in subsection (a);
(2) a:
(A) part designed and intended solely and exclusively; or
(B) combination of parts designed and intended; for use in converting a weapon into a machine gun; and
(3) any combination of parts from which a machine gun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person.
McGee doesn’t dispute that his Glock 22 with the switch qualifies as a machine gun under Indiana law. See Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 4. Instead, he argues that Section 35-47-5-8, as applied to him, violates his Second Amendment right to bear arms.
…
In Bruen, the United States Supreme Court established a two-part framework for determining whether a gun regulation violates the Second Amendment:… 597 U.S. at 17 (quotation omitted); see also United States v. Just, No. CR23-78BLG-SPW, 2025 WL 264056, at *2 (D. Mont. Jan. 22, 2025) (“Courts have called the Bruen analysis a two-step test.”). In other words, the first step is determining whether the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct. If it does, the Second Amendment presumptively protects that conduct. Courts must then proceed to the second step, where the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with our country’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. If the government satisfies its burden, the firearm regulation passes constitutional muster.
McGee asserts that “under the first step of Bruen, the plain text of the Second Amendment applies to his conduct of possession of a machine gun”
…
Accordingly, McGee’s argument continues, “The burden then shifted to the State to establish under the second Bruen test that the challenged statute is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id.
The State responds that we can stop at step one of Bruen because “the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.” Appellee’s Br. p. 10; Heller, 554 U.S. at 625. The federal appellate courts have uniformly concluded that machine guns are not protected by the Second Amendment based on the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.”
…
McGee recognizes this authority but asserts that the United States Supreme Court changed the Second Amendment framework in Bruen and that the result is different under Bruen.
…
We agree with the overwhelming number of federal district courts that have determined under step one of Bruen that the Second Amendment does not protect machine guns because they are dangerous and unusual. McGee’s Second Amendment challenge thus fails.
In the alternative, McGee contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.
…
McGee acknowledges that his Glock 22 with the switch qualifies as a machine gun under Indiana law. He argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove he knew the switch made his gun a machine gun. Knowledge and intent are both mental states and, absent an admission by the defendant, the trier of fact must resort to the reasonable inferences from both the direct and circumstantial evidence. A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1064 (Ind. 2024). Here, a reasonable inference from the evidence presented at trial is that McGee knew his gun was a machine gun. McGee bought the gun the day before his arrest. The switch was attached to the gun when he bought it, and the seller told him “what it was.” When asked what a switch does, McGee testified that it “make[s] your gun shoot fast basically.” Although McGee maintained that he didn’t know a switch makes a gun fire multiple bullets with the single pull of a trigger, the trial court did not believe him, explaining, “He understood there was something on there that was going to amplify the abilities of that gun to fire in more than a . . . semi-automatic function. I believe that . . . meets the element of knowingly.” McGee is simply asking us to reweigh the evidence, which we don’t do.
McGee cites our Supreme Court’s decision in A.W., which affirmed a juvenile’s delinquency adjudication for Level 5 felony possession of a machine gun. Specifically, the Court found that it was a “close call” as to whether the juvenile knew his handgun with a Glock switch was a machine gun but affirmed his adjudication based on his “abrupt flight” from the traffic stop. Id. at 1065. Here, unlike A.W., McGee made statements both on the scene and at trial that go directly to his knowledge. This case is not close like A.W.
The evidence is sufficient to prove McGee knew the switch made his gun a machine gun.
Affirmed.
Tavitas, J., and Felix, J., concur.