Bradford, J.
In August of 2020, authorities received a report that Anthony Graff had sexually abused two of his step-grandchildren several years previously. A detective with the Aurora Police Department contacted Graff, who agreed to speak with the detective. Following the discussion, Graff agreed to return for a polygraph examination, which he did. After Graff was informed of his right to counsel, orally and in writing, he executed a written waiver of that right, submitted to the examination, was told that he had failed the polygraph examination, and made incriminating statements. The State charged Graff with several crimes, and he moved to suppress the incriminating statements he had made to police following the polygraph examination. The State filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence related to the polygraph examination and/or expert testimony regarding the accuracy of polygraph examinations. The trial court denied Graff’s motion to suppress, granted the State’s motion in limine, and certified the case for interlocutory appeal. Graff contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress and in granting the State’s motion in limine. Because we disagree with Graff’s first contention but agree with his second, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
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Graff makes three arguments to support his general contention that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress. First, Graff argues that his interactions with police violated his Indiana constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination. Second, Graff contends that his constitutional right to counsel was violated because the State did not provide him with an attorney before administering the polygraph examination. Finally, Graff contends that the State has failed to establish that his statements were made voluntarily.
A. Right Against Self-Incrimination
Graff contends that his statements to police were obtained in violation of Article 1, Section 14, of the Indiana Constitution, which provides, in part, that “[n]o person, in any criminal prosecution, shall be compelled to testify against himself.”
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Suffice it to say that the record does not indicate that anything like compulsion occurred in this case. It is worth noting that Graff has not even testified that he felt compelled to incriminate himself, so he would have us infer compulsion from the circumstances. The record does not support such an inference. Graff voluntarily came in to speak with police, voluntarily submitted to a polygraph examination, and voluntarily submitted to an interrogation, during which he incriminated himself. During these official interactions, Graff was advised of his rights several times and was repeatedly told that his participation was optional, he was not in custody, and he was free to leave at any time. While it is true that Graff expressed an interest in speaking with an attorney three days before the polygraph examination, he nonetheless appeared for and submitted to the examination, after again being told that he did not have to take it and being advised of his rights, which rights he subsequently waived. Because these circumstances do not establish that Graff’s statements to police were compelled, he has failed to establish that his right against compelled self-incrimination was violated.
B. Right to Counsel
Graff argues that his right to counsel, as guaranteed by the United States and Indiana Constitutions, was violated during his polygraph examination and subsequent police interview.
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As with his previous argument, Graff’s argument regarding his right to counsel focuses on the Indiana Constitution. Graff cites our 2008 decision in Caraway, in which a panel of this court concluded that a pre-charge, pre-arrest polygraph examination was a critical stage on the basis that counsel’s absence could imperil the defendant’s right to a fair trial. 891 N.E.2d at 126. The State notes that there is a split on this particular point and argues that we should follow Kochersperger v. State, 725 N.E.2d 918 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), in which we summarized prior Indiana cases and concluded that a pre-charge polygraph examination is not a critical stage. Id. at 924.
We agree with the Kochersperger court that where a suspect has not “been arrested, arraigned, or indicted at the time […] the polygraph examination and post-testing interrogation were conducted, […] the examination and interrogation did not constitute critical stages of a criminal proceeding because criminal proceedings had not yet commenced[.]” Id. (citation omitted); see also Callis v. State, 684 N.E.2d 233, 238 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that exclusion of defense attorney from polygraph examination and post-testing interview did not violate defendant’s right to counsel on the basis that we must “distinguish between pre- and post-arrest/indictment proceedings”). In so doing, we believe we are doing no more than following clear precedent from the Indiana Supreme Court, whose rulings are absolutely binding on us.
The Indiana Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that, while Indiana’s right to counsel is broader than the federal right, it attaches at arrest, which had not occurred when Graff submitted to the polygraph examination. See, e.g., Taylor, 49 N.E.3d 1019 at 1024; Taylor, 689 N.E.2d at 703–04; Suter, 227 Ind. at 658, 88 N.E.2d at 390 (“We think it must be conceded that appellant had a right to have counsel when he was arrested[.]”); and Batchelor v. State, 189 Ind. 69, 77, 125 N.E. 773, 776 (1920)… There is no suggestion in any Indiana Supreme Court jurisprudence to date, however, that the right to counsel attaches at any point prior to arrest. Because Graff was not under arrest at the time he made the incriminating statements, he has failed to establish that his Indiana constitutional right to counsel had attached.
C. Voluntariness of Statements
Finally, Graff contends that his statements to police should be suppressed because they were made involuntarily.
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Graff’s argument in this regard is, essentially, to go through the polygraph examination and subsequent police interview and argue that various circumstances, such as the police acting consistently with the Reid interrogation technique, the length of the interview, the setting, etc., rendered his statements involuntary. For its part, the State notes that Graff chose not to testify about his perception of events and that, without Graff’s testimony about coercion, any conclusion that he felt pressured by anything the police did would be based on pure speculation without support in the record. The State argues that Graff is, essentially, inviting the court to re-draw inferences against the State contrary to the relevant standard of review. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (Ind. 2004) (stating that reviewing courts only look to whether the inferences supporting the trial court’s judgment were reasonable, not whether other, “more reasonable” inferences could have been made).
On this point, we agree with the State. Whatever the circumstances under which Graff made his incriminating statements, they do not inexorably lead to an inference that his statements were made involuntarily. At every stage prior to his incriminating statements (including immediately prior to), Graff was advised that his participation was voluntary, he was free to refuse to speak to the police, he had the right to counsel, he had the right to remain silent, and (where relevant) he was free to go. There is no direct evidence of official deception, despite Graff’s unsupported suggestion that police were lying when they told him that he had failed the polygraph examination. There is no evidence that Graff’s maturity, education, physical condition, and/or mental health left him particularly susceptible to police coercion, much less that the police were aware of (and exploited) any such conditions. These circumstances, particularly in the absence of any evidence from Graff that his will was actually overcome by any alleged official impropriety, amply support the trial court’s conclusion that Graff’s statements were made voluntarily.
Motion in Limine
Graff contends that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the State’s motion in limine, which was seeking to exclude evidence of the administration of the polygraph examination and any expert testimony related to it.
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Evidence of a polygraph test is inadmissible without a prior stipulation. Myers v. State, 887 N.E.2d 170, 191 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Glenn v. State, 796 N.E.2d 322, 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied), trans. denied. Graff, however, attempts to avoid the operation of this general rule by relying on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986). In that case, the Kentucky state courts had denied the defendant’s request to admit evidence of “the physical and psychological environment in which the confession was obtained” to show that his confession was “unworthy of belief.” Id. at 684.
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“In the absence of any valid state justification, exclusion of this kind of exculpatory evidence deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor’s case encounter and survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.” Id. at 690–91 (quotation omitted). Graff argues that Crane and similar cases give him the right to present at least some evidence about his polygraph examination in support of his attempt to undermine the incriminatory value of his admissions to Detective Bridges.
On this point, we agree with Graff. It seems to us that matters related to Graff’s polygraph examination are just the sort of evidence that concerned the Crane Court. Put another way, evidence that the polygraph examination directly preceded the confession, occurred in the exact same room, and involved the same officer to which the confession was given, easily qualifies as evidence regarding “the physical and psychological environment in which the confession was obtained.” Id. at 684. Preventing Graff from presenting any evidence regarding the polygraph examination would deny him the chance to show that the circumstances surrounding it cast doubt on the credibility of his confession, which was, as mentioned, given within minutes of the examination’s completion.
Our conclusion is consistent with Indiana Rule of Evidence 106, which provides that “[i]f a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.” The preliminaries to the polygraph examination, the examination itself, and the subsequent police interview are all part of one recorded statement, and fairness dictates that neither party should be able to decide that the jury will hear only the parts of the statement it deems favorable to its case.
That said, we do not believe that we are in the best position to determine exactly how this issue is to be handled on remand. We conclude that Graff should be allowed to present evidence regarding the polygraph examination for the expressly limited purpose of giving the jury a fair and full account of the circumstances surrounding his confession. As for the exact contours of this presentation, we leave it to the trial court and parties to define them on remand.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
Bailey, J., and Foley, J., concur.