Robb, S.J.
Alice M. Flowers, the bail agent, appeals from the trial court’s order to forfeit the surety bond posted for the defendant in this case. Flowers argues that because the trial court had previously ordered the bond revoked, it cannot now order the bond forfeited. We disagree and affirm.
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Current Indiana case law does not set forth a standard of review for a ruling on a bond forfeiture motion. However, a ruling on the similar “motion for release from a bail bond” is reviewable for an abuse of discretion. O’Connor v. State, 173 N.E.3d 719, 721 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021); Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. State, 750 N.E.2d 865, 867 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). And this Court has long held that another similar motion to “withhold declaring a forfeiture” of a bond is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Scholl v. State, 170 N.E. 343, 344 (Ind. App. 1930). For clarity, today we formally adopt the abuse of discretion standard of review for a ruling on a bond forfeiture motion. “An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” O’Connor, 173 N.E.3d at 721.
Indiana Code section 27-10-2-12 (2013) outlines the procedure for a bond forfeiture. If a defendant does not appear, the trial court shall issue (1) a warrant for the defendant’s arrest and (2) an order for the bail agent and the surety to surrender the defendant. Ind. Code § 27-10-2-12(a)(1). Then, the clerk shall mail notice of the order to the bail agent and the surety within thirty days of the defendant’s failure to appear. Ind. Code § 27-10-2-12(a)(2).
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We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion. Under the statute, Flowers had only 365 days to justify McCaleb’s absence. See Ind. Code § 27-10-2-12(b)(2). A close examination of the record reveals that in the 365 days following the mailing of the notice, Flowers did not prove McCaleb’s appearance was prevented, nor did she prove his absence was without her consent. In fact, the only docket entries made between the December 2021 warrant and order and the March 2024 motion for bond forfeiture concerned the trial court’s (1) cancellation of a previously scheduled jury trial and (2) withdrawal of McCaleb’s counsel. As Flowers concedes in her brief, there was “[n]o activity in this case for[,] nearly, two years.” Appellant’s Br., p. 8 (emphasis omitted). Flowers had a duty to speak of McCaleb’s whereabouts, but she remained silent, even long after the 365-day period had elapsed. Any justification made following the 365-day period is irrelevant, and the bond is subject to forfeiture.
On appeal, Flowers attempts to justify her delayed action by arguing that because the trial court had previously ordered the bond revoked, it cannot now order the bond forfeited. We disagree. A bond forfeiture proceeding is unaffected by and operates independently of bond revocation. See Ind. Code § 27-10-2-12(a). As such, a prior bond revocation does not preclude a trial court from later entering judgment for bond forfeiture.
The trial court’s decision to order the bond forfeited is not against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. The trial court did not abuse its discretion, and the bond forfeiture should be upheld.
Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Bradford, J., concur.