Goff, J.
J.D. (Grandfather) and M.D. (Grandmother) (collectively, Grandparents) are the great grandparents of eight-year-old P.J.W. (Child). For most of his life, Child has lived with Grandparents while both his parents struggled with incarceration, substance abuse, and violence. After successfully obtaining guardianship over Child, Grandparents petitioned to adopt him. Child’s biological father R.W. (Father) contested the adoption. Even though Grandparents are healthy and have provided for Child emotionally and financially, the trial court concluded that adoption was not in Child’s best interest because of Grandparents’ advanced ages and Father’s purported rehabilitation.
This case presents an issue that we have not previously considered. That is, how should trial courts address a petitioner’s advanced age when determining whether to grant an adoption petition. We hold that a petitioner’s advanced age should be considered as to whether “the petitioner or petitioners for adoption are of sufficient ability to rear the child and furnish suitable support and education” under Indiana Code subsection 31-19-11-1(a)(2). We also hold that the trial court based its best-interest determination on an erroneous legal conclusion that it is “inherently” in Child’s best interest to be raised by a biological parent. See App. Vol. 2, p. 10. We thus reverse and remand with instructions to consider Grandparents’ advanced ages in light of ability under subsection 31-19-11-1(a)(2) and to conduct a new best-interest determination using the proper legal standard.
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I. The trial court erred by not considering Grandparents’ ages in light of ability under Indiana Code subsection 31-19-11-1(a)(2).
A petitioner’s advanced age is an appropriate consideration when determining whether to grant a petition to adopt a minor child. However, the statutory authority for such consideration arises from Indiana Code subsection 31-19-11-1(a)(2), which requires the court to specifically determine whether the petitioner has the ability to rear and support the child, rather than Indiana Code subsection 31-19-11-1(a)(1), which requires the court to determine generally whether adoption is in the child’s best interest. As people age, they may become more infirm or less financially stable. But these issues go more directly to their ability to raise the child than to the child’s best interest generally.
To be sure, other courts have found that advanced age factors into the more general best-interest determination. But those courts still consistently link age to ability. Decisions by trial courts that deny a petition for adoption because of the petitioner’s advanced age cite issues like the likelihood that the child will suffer the loss of the adoptive parent before becoming an adult, difficulty for the adoptive parent to supply the material needs of the child, potential limited participation in activities with the child, or difficulty in mustering the physical effort required to control a young child…
Here, the trial court considered Grandparents’ ages a less than “ideal situation.” App. Vol. 2, p. 11. But beyond noting that Grandparents “will be 82 and 86 years” old when Child becomes legally independent, the trial court entered no specific findings related to Grandparents’ ages to explain why they are incapable of rearing and supporting Child. See id. at 8, 11. Here, Grandparents own a home with the mortgage almost paid off. Grandparents provide Child with schooling and medical care. Grandparents take Child on play dates and have enrolled him in activities like karate, tumbling, swimming, and tee ball. Grandfather testified to “walk[ing] three miles a day,” to playing basketball and soccer with Child, and to “roller skating on Saturday nights” with him. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 75. While Grandfather takes medication for Type-2 diabetes, his overall “health is good” and he has no “disease or illness” that is “debilitating” or that would otherwise “cause [him] to be unable to take care of [Child].” Id. at 75, 91. For her part, Grandmother testified to taking blood-pressure and cholesterol medication but that she had not had any extended hospital stays in the last several years. Id. at 97. And Grandfather attested to her being in “perfectly good health.” Id. at 76; see In re Adoption of Dove, 368 N.E.2d 6, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (finding petitioner-grandparents sufficiently capable of raising child after providing him with education, housing, and care for the past eight years).
While we acknowledge that the best-interest-of-the-child standard is a flexible one, the General Assembly has specified that the ability of the petitioners is separate from the best-interest prong of the adoption statute. And if the General Assembly wanted courts to consider age without considering ability, it could have set a maximum age for adoptive parents. But the General Assembly has not done so, instead recognizing that abilities vary with age and family dynamics. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to consider Grandparents’ advanced ages in light of ability under subsection 31-19-11-1(a)(2).
II. The trial court based its judgment on an improper legal conclusion that it is “inherently” in Child’s best interest to be raised by a biological parent.
In its best-interest determination, the trial court made a legal conclusion that it is “inherently in a child’s best interest to be raised by a biological parent.”…
But this does not necessarily mean it is always in a child’s best interest to be raised by a biological parent. The General Assembly has therefore limited parental rights in certain cases such as this one. Here, the trial court concluded in March 2023 that Father’s consent for the adoption was not required because (1) Grandparents have had custody of Child since 2019 while Father struggled with his criminal past and underwent rehabilitation, and (2) Father at times “had the ability and means to provide some support to the Child since his release from custody in 2021” but knowingly failed to do so. App. Vol. 2, pp. 30, 32–34; see I.C. § 31-19-9- 8(a)(2)(B) (no consent required where child has been in the custody of another if for at least one year, parent knowingly fails to provide support for child when able to do so). To conclude that it is “inherently” in a child’s best interest to be raised by a biological parent presumes that “the mere existence of a biological parent would preclude adoption in every instance,” which is not the case. In re Adoption of P.J.W., 223 N.E.3d at 296 (Crone, J., dissenting). A “blood relationship, while a material factor, is not controlling.” In re Adoption of J.L.J., 4 N.E.3d 1189, 1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (cleaned up), trans. denied. Instead, the “main concern should lie with the effect of the adoption on the reality of the minor child’s life.” In re Adoption of N.W., 933 N.E.2d 909, 915 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), opinion adopted, 941 N.E.2d 1042 (Ind. 2011).
The reality is that Child has lived with Grandparents nearly his entire life and has formed stable relationships with them and within his community while having very little contact with Father…
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Conclusion
We hold that the trial court’s denial of Grandparents’ petition to adopt was clearly erroneous. We acknowledge, as the trial court properly did, that Father has made significant and impressive progress towards rehabilitation through his community involvement and successful participation in drug court. Still, Father’s progress does not diminish the much-needed stability, security, and love Grandparents have provided Child his entire life. We reverse the trial court’s denial of Grandparents’ adoption petition and remand with instructions to consider Grandparents’ ages in light of their ability to raise Child under Indiana Code subsection 31-19-11-1(a)(2) and conduct a new best-interest determination using the proper legal standard. [Footnote omitted.]
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Molter, JJ. concur.