Goff, J.
This case presents us with a straightforward question: whether a trial court’s sua sponte order for a competency evaluation extinguishes, and thus resets, the Criminal Rule 4(B) period. We hold that it does not. So long as the defendant maintains a position reasonably consistent with his speedy-trial request, delays attributable to competency evaluations simply toll the applicable deadline. Thus, the trial court erred by resetting the Rule 4(B) deadline upon completion of the defendant’s evaluation. But because the defendant failed to properly notify the court of its scheduling error, we hold that the defendant waived his right to discharge. We thus affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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Our decision proceeds in two parts: We first consider whether the trial court erred by resetting the Criminal Rule 4(B) deadline upon completion of Bradley’s competency evaluation. In holding that it did, we reject the State’s theory that an evaluation order extinguishes, rather than tolls, the applicable Rule 4 period. We then consider whether Bradley’s objection to continuing trial properly notified the trial court of its specific scheduling error. In concluding that it did not, we hold that Bradley waived his right to discharge.
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For the reasons below, we reject the State’s theory that a trial court’s sua sponte order for a competency evaluation extinguishes the Criminal Rule 4(B) period. So long as the defendant maintains a position reasonably consistent with his speedy-trial request, delays attributable to competency evaluations—whether requested by a party or ordered by the court on its own motion—simply toll the applicable deadline.
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Upon motion by an incarcerated defendant for an early trial, Criminal Rule 4(B) requires the defendant’s discharge “if not brought to trial within seventy (70) calendar days from the date of such motion.” Ind. Crim. Rule 4(B)(1) (repealed and replaced).1 An exception to this seventy-day window applies when the defendant moves for a continuance or when “the delay is otherwise caused by his act.” Id. According to the State, any such delay extinguishes rather than tolls the seventy-day window. Pet. to Trans. at 10–11. And “[d]elays due to competency proceedings should be treated the same no matter who alerts the trial court to concerns about the defendant’s conduct.” Id. at 14.
We disagree.
To begin with, the State’s theory conflicts with the history and plain language of Criminal Rule 4.
Beyond the history and plain language of Criminal Rule 4, the precedent on which the State relies undermines its theory that a “delay to determine competency should extinguish an early trial request.” See Pet. to Trans. at 14–15 (citing Curtis v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1143, 1150 (Ind. 2011)). In fact, the relevant case law aligns with Criminal Rule 4(F)’s directive that delays caused by the defendant toll or extend the applicable speedy-trial window. In Curtis, for example, the defendant requested a competency evaluation but then rescinded his request about a month later, prompting the trial court to cancel the evaluation it had ordered. 948 N.E.2d at 1149. In analyzing the defendant’s speedy-trial claim, this Court noted the longheld rule that “delays attributable to a defendant’s claim of incompetency are charged against the defendant for Rule 4(C) purposes.” Id. at 1150 (citing Baldwin v. State, 274 Ind. 269, 271, 411 N.E.2d 605, 606 (1980)). The Court, however, did not find that the delay extinguished the defendant’s speedy-trial request; rather, the delay simply tolled the applicable time limit—the “trial court’s cancellation of the competency evaluation” having resumed or “restarted the Rule 4(C) period.” Id. (emphasis added). And the Court went on to cite Criminal Rule 4(F) for the proposition that “delays caused by the defendant technically extend the Rule 4(C) one-year time period.” Id. (emphasis added).
Still, the State attempts to distinguish Curtis because that case, which involved Criminal Rule 4(C), “said nothing about Rule 4(B), which differs from other parts of Criminal Rule 4 due to its requirement that the defendant affirmatively request an early trial.” Reply in Supp. of Trans. at 6. But, as noted above, under the express dictate of Criminal Rule 4(F), the tolling or extension of time resulting from the delay applies to “any time limitation contained” in Criminal Rule 4, whether under subpart (A), (B), or (C) (emphasis added).
Finally, the State’s proposed rule stands in clear tension with the text of the competency statute itself. Under that statute, a trial court must order a competency determination when it has “reasonable grounds for believing that the defendant lacks the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of a defense.” Ind. Code § 35-36-3-1(a). When the defendant is found competent following an evaluation, he must be returned to trial and “the court shall hold the trial as if no delay or postponement had occurred.” I.C. § 35-36-3-2 (emphasis added). “In other words,” one commentator has observed, “the time limits under any applicable speedy trial provisions are tolled while a defendant is mentally incompetent.” William Andrew Kerr, 16B Ind. Practice, Criminal Procedure: Trial § 18.5, at 25 (1998) (emphases added). And with no limitations in the statute on who may request the competency evaluation, it would “appear to cover any delays that are caused by the trial court acting sua sponte or at the suggestion of a person other than the defendant.” Id. (emphases added).
The State likens these cases—Payne and Talbott in particular—to the circumstances here, arguing that a defendant’s conduct prompting a competency determination “is inconsistent with his desire for an early trial.” Pet. to Trans. at 9–10, 13. While admitting that incompetency “is not a matter of fault or intentional design by the defendant,” the State insists that it’s “no less true that the necessary consequence of the defendant’s actions, which are outside the control of the court and the State, make it impossible to comply with his prior request for an early trial.” Id. at 14.
Again, we disagree.
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In short, although there may be circumstances where a defendant’s evaluation-inducing conduct extinguishes a speedy-trial request, we find no such circumstances here.
Finally, the State urges us to adopt its extinguishment theory as a matter of sound policy. According to the State, the “tolling rule causes practical problems,” especially here. Pet. to Trans. at 17. “Requiring all parties to hold a trial within eight days of the competency determination was unworkable,” the State insists, depriving both parties of sufficient time to assemble potential jurors, subpoena witnesses, and otherwise prepare. Id. By contrast, the State submits, “[e]xtinguishing rather than tolling a prior early trial request” due to intervening competency proceedings “provides a simple and efficient rule that protects all of defendant’s rights.” Id. at 16.
We disagree.
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Here, on March 15, 2022, Bradley objected to the trial court’s continuance of his trial date beyond the Rule 4 period. The substance of his objection was that the seventy-day clock began running on September 16, 2021 (the date of his first post-arrest hearing). Based on that date, the deadline would have passed on November 25—four days before the trial court referred Bradley for a competency evaluation. Bradley repeated this argument in his written motions. But the magistrate to whom Bradley addressed his first oral request for early trial rejected it, and properly so. See McGowan v. State, 599 N.E.2d 589, 591 (Ind. 1992) (holding that a trial court may require an early trial motion to be made in writing).5 The clock didn’t start ticking until twelve days later—on September 28, 2021—when the trial court accepted Bradley’s second request for an early trial. See Second Supp. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 5. Bradley did not argue, as trial counsel argued three months later and as Bradley now argues on appeal, that the trial court set trial beyond the Rule 4 deadline. He did not, in other words, demand a trial within the eight days left on the clock. Thus, Bradley failed to put the trial court on notice of the specific error it was committing, namely restarting the seventy-day clock instead of tolling it.
Under these circumstances, we cannot say that Bradley made a timely objection with sufficient specificity to alert the trial court to its error and to secure his right to a speedy trial. To hold otherwise would permit Criminal Rule 4(B) to become a device for making surprise attacks on convictions after the fact. We therefore hold that Bradley waived his right to discharge.
for the reasons above, we hold that the trial court erred by resetting the Rule 4(B) deadline upon completion of Bradley’s competency evaluation. But because Bradley failed to properly notify the court of its scheduling error, we hold that he waived his right to discharge.
Affirmed.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Molter, JJ., concur.