Molter, J.,
While they were married, Christi Wohlt and August Wohlt owned a company called Echo Systems, Inc., which mined, traded, and stored cryptocurrencies. When they dissolved their marriage, they agreed in their property settlement that “Husband shall retain all assets of the business, except for . . . Wife’s Mac computer and printer, iPhone, iPad and laptop,” which she would retain. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 59. But they both forgot that Echo Systems still owned some cryptocurrencies, and the question we must answer is whether that oversight makes their agreement ambiguous as to who should own them.
As we explain below, we hold there is no ambiguity, and the parties’ agreement that August would retain “all” of the company’s assets included the company’s cryptocurrencies. While parties sometimes agree in their property settlements to make later adjustments for forgotten assets, the parties here instead made clear that their agreement divided all their assets—forgotten and remembered—so that their division would be final. And while a party who remembers a forgotten asset after a dissolution decree may sometimes have a remedy through claims like mutual mistake or fraud, this appeal doesn’t present those claims.
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I. The parties’ agreement that August would retain “all” the company’s assets unambiguously included the cryptocurrencies.
The trial court concluded that (1) the parties’ agreement was ambiguous because they forgot about the cryptocurrencies when dividing their assets, and (2) the court should resolve that ambiguity by finding the parties reached no agreement about who should own the cryptocurrencies. The court then divided the assets by awarding Christi half their value. But August argues the trial court was mistaken at the first step because there is nothing ambiguous about the parties’ agreement to award him “all” of the company’s assets except for a few pieces of technology they agreed Christi would retain. And as we explain next, ordinary principles of contract interpretation lead us to agree with him.
A. Contract Principles
Property settlement agreements are governed by the same rules of construction as other contracts…
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Applying these principles to the property settlement agreement here, we conclude the parties’ agreement is unambiguous.
B. Wohlt Property Settlement Agreement
We conclude the Wohlt agreement is unambiguous because the word “all” is not reasonably susceptible to multiple interpretations in this context. And to the extent the term might reflect a mistake, there is no claim for relief based on the doctrine of mutual mistake.
1. Interpreting the Agreement
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Here, the parties repeatedly expressed that they desired finality through their property settlement agreement. Their agreement’s introductory recitals explained that they were resolving “their respective rights in connection with any and all issues whatsoever and any and all rights and claims which either of them has against the other.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 53 (emphases added). Then, the first substantive provision of their agreement—Section 1.1, titled “Issues Settled”—explained: “The subject matter of this Agreement is the settlement of all of the respective rights of the Husband and Wife arising in or outside the marital relationship to all things, actions, and property, whether real, personal or mixed, now in their joint or separate names or possession in which either or both has any direct or indirect interest.” Id. (emphases added).
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There is only one reasonable way to interpret these provisions. The term “all” means “the whole number or sum of.” All, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/all [https://perma.cc/ZP5D-ET7T] (last visited Nov. 21, 2024). So when the parties agreed that they were settling their “respective rights” to “all” of the marital “property,” they conveyed that they were dividing the whole of their property—they weren’t leaving anything out. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 53. And by transferring “all” of Echo Systems’ property to August, id. at 59, the parties included the company’s cryptocurrencies because that was part of the whole of the company’s assets, see id. at 36 (trial court findings that the “cryptocurrency assets originated with EchoFS,” that “both parties owned an interest in EchoFS,” and that “Section 2.10 applies to these assets”).
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Because the parties unambiguously agreed to transfer “all” of Echo Systems’ property to August, he was entitled to judgment in his favor confirming that he owned the cryptocurrencies.
2. Mutual Mistake
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It is too late for Christi to raise a mutual mistake claim. She was reminded of, and raised concerns about, the forgotten cryptocurrencies outside of Trial Rule 60(B)(1)’s one-year time limit for seeking relief based on a mistake. See Ind. Trial Rule 60(B).1 And even if the claim had been timely, it is unclear what relief, if any, Christi should obtain. For example, the parties have not litigated whether the appropriate remedy is reformation or rescission….
We therefore cannot decide whether any relief might be warranted based on mutual mistake. This case was instead framed as one about contractual ambiguity. And like the Court of Appeals, we hold that the fact that the parties forgot about the cryptocurrencies does not render their agreement to transfer “all” of Echo Systems’ property to August ambiguous. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 59.
II. The trial court did not have the authority to modify the parties’ agreement.
Since we conclude the parties’ agreement unambiguously transferred ownership of the cryptocurrencies to August, the only way the trial court could award some or all of them to Christi would be to modify the parties’ agreement. And the court could do that only if the agreement authorized that modification, if the parties agreed post-decree to allow the court to modify their agreement, or if the agreement was tainted by fraud. I.C. § 31-15-2-17(c); I.C. § 31-15-7-9.1(a). But the trial court did not purport to modify the parties’ agreement, and Christi did not argue in her appellee’s brief that any of the exceptions to the general prohibition on courts modifying property settlement agreements apply. So we decline to apply any exceptions here.
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In sum, we decline to affirm the judgment based on a trial court’s authority to modify a property settlement procured through fraud because the trial court didn’t purport to exercise that authority, Christi didn’t request that the judgment be affirmed on that basis, and the record doesn’t support affirming on that basis.
Conclusion
For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order denying August’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of his ownership of the cryptocurrencies. Under Appellate Rule 58(A)(2), we also summarily affirm footnote 2 and Section II of the Court of Appeals’ opinion, which addressed the remaining issues on appeal.
Rush, C.J., and Massa and Slaughter, JJ., concur.
Goff, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Goff, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the Court’s opinion. In my view, the property-settlement agreement (Agreement) distributing “all” assets of the business was ambiguous as a matter of law, and we should defer to the trial court’s interpretation of the Agreement awarding Wife half the value of the cryptocurrencies. Wife could have also prevailed on her constructive-fraud claim—purported waiver notwithstanding. I would further hold that the trial court reasonably divided the post-dissolution value of the coins.
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