Shepard, S.J,
Casimir R. Starsiak, Jr. (Casimir) and Diane L. Hahn (Diane) appeal from the trial court’s order denying their motion to correct error. They asked the court for permission to amend their complaint to add a count seeking relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act and to amend their statutory claim to quiet title to include a common law claim to quiet title in personal property. Casimir and Diane now contend the trial court erred by denying their motion. Additionally, they challenge the merits of the court’s underlying judgment, in which the court held there is no statutory right in Indiana to quiet title to personal property and that the probate court had already determined the ownership of the personal property.
We do not question that Casimir and Diane hold a bona fide belief that they have a claim to the seemingly abandoned one-third share of their mother’s estate. Based upon the record before us, however, they have no present claim to their sister’s share and their request for relief is premature and based on speculation. Thus, for reasons we explain below, we affirm the trial court’s decision.
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Casimir and Diane argue that the trial court erred in denying their complaint because “the trial court erroneously concluded there is no common law right to quiet title to personal property in Indiana.”… This is a correct statement of law. See I.C. 32- 30-3-1. There is no statute providing for an action to quiet title to personal property.
However, the substance of Casimir and Diane’s challenge concerns the court’s implicit conclusion that there is no equitable action to quiet title in Indiana….
Although the trial court correctly found that the action in Citizens (a 1913 decision) was not brought under the quiet title statute (which was not enacted until many decades later), the claim in Citizens was an equitable action to determine the ownership of shares of stock. In that case, the trial court had concluded that the relatrix was the owner of the stock in question and it granted the equitable remedy of mandate, commanding the bank to recognize her as the owner of the stock in question. 101 N.E. at 623. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and, relying on cases from other jurisdictions, found that the complaint “stated a good cause of action.” Id. at 626. And in Whitman v. Whitman, 83 N.E. 520, 521 (Ind. Ct. App. 1908), a “quiet title action” was brought to determine whether the wife’s share under the will was calculated before or after the payment of debts. The court interpreted the language of the will and concluded that the wife’s share was to be paid immediately and that the other legatees’ shares would be reduced by the payment of their proportionate share of the debts. Id.
Furthermore, Trial Rule 75(A)(2), addresses preferred venue in the county where the land is located or the chattels are regularly located or kept. “‘Chattel’ is defined as ‘[m]ovable or transferable property; personal property; esp[ecially], a physical object capable of manual delivery and not the subject matter of real property.’” ….
We conclude that a common law action to quiet title to personal property is a viable cause of action in Indiana and that the enactment of the statutory provision concerning quieting title to real estate did not eliminate such claims. Therefore, to the extent the trial court appears to have implicitly said otherwise, it erred.
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Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. The issue of the legal ownership of Janette’s share of Mildred’s estate has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. And the motion to correct error was correctly denied because it sought relief which was unavailable after final judgment and alleged no legal error.
Affirmed.
May, J., and Crone, J., concur.