Foley, J.
K.R. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s decision to modify the custody of two of her children, J.M. and K.M. (“the Children”), in lieu of adjudicating the Children as Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”). Mother raises several issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as follows:
I. Whether the trial court misapplied the legal standard for modifying child custody;
II. Whether sufficient evidence supported the decision to modify child custody; and
III. Whether modifying child custody deprived Mother of a meaningful opportunity to engage in CHINS-related services.
We affirm.
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Indiana Code section 31-30-1-13 grants CHINS courts concurrent jurisdiction over custody matters, providing the option to resolve CHINS cases through custody modification if appropriate…
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In support of its decision to modify child custody, the trial court specifically found that “there ha[d] been a substantial change in circumstances that warrant[ed] a modification of custody because of repeated domestic violence incidents between Mother and [M.W.] that place[d] [the Children] at risk while in Mother’s care.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 p. 20. This finding addressed the requirement that, to modify child custody, there must be a substantial change in circumstances related to a factor bearing on a custody decision. Moreover, this finding related to factor (7) of the Custody Statute, which concerns evidence of domestic violence. Further, although the court did not specifically state that modifying custody was in the Children’s best interests, it is apparent from the order that ongoing safety risks animated the trial court’s decision in this case.
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In conclusion, although the trial court did not make express findings on all relevant factors, given the evidence presented and the presumption that the trial court considered all relevant factors, we are unpersuaded that the order evinces an unjustifiable risk that the trial court failed to comply with the applicable law.
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All in all, the trial court determined that there was a substantial change in circumstances based on the ongoing risk of domestic violence and that modifying custody to Father—who expressed his desire for custody and outlined plans for the Children’s care—was in the best interests of the Children. Based on the evidence presented, we cannot say the court’s decision to modify custody was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.
Mother contends that she was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to engage in services as a result of the trial court’s decision to modify child custody. See Appellant’s Br. pp. 23–25. Mother also advances several policy concerns about the prudency of modifying child custody in the context of a CHINS case.
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Here, Mother questions whether custody modification furthered the policy objective identified in J.B. Moreover, relying on J.B., Mother argues that the instant CHINS case should remain open so she can participate in services…
At times, Mother essentially asks us to conclude that the trial court should have accepted her admission and adjudicated the Children as CHINS rather than grant Father’s request to modify custody. Yet, this position overlooks the legislative intent underlying Indiana Code section 31-30-1-13, which gives CHINS courts the authority to modify custody as an alternative to a CHINS adjudication. See I.C. § 31-30-1-13. This provision recognizes that when a suitable parent is willing and able to care for a child, a CHINS adjudication may not be necessary or appropriate….
Along these lines, to the extent Mother suggests that modifying child custody at an early stage of a CHINS proceeding serves as a barrier to reunification—or that it is otherwise imprudent for a court to modify child custody in the context of a CHINS case—Mother essentially asks us to second-guess the legislature’s decision to authorize custody modification in this scenario. However, these types of public policy arguments are better directed toward the legislature.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the trial court’s decision to modify custody, rather than to adjudicate the Children as CHINS, reflects its consideration of all available evidence, including Father’s ability and desire to care for the Children. Accepting Mother’s argument would require us to reweigh evidence regarding the Children’s need for services under the CHINS statutes, which is inconsistent with our standard of review. [Footnote omitted.] See I.C. § 31-34-1-1 (establishing scenarios where a child is a CHINS, ultimately requiring that the child “needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that: (A) the child is not receiving; and (B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.”).
Conclusion
The order modifying custody of the Children, rather than adjudicating them as CHINS, was supported by the record and reflects adherence to applicable law. To the extent Mother argues that modifying child custody deprived her of a meaningful opportunity to engage in services, this argument is better directed toward the legislature, which has authorized modification in these scenarios.
Affirmed.
Vaidik, J. and Weissmann, J., concur