Foley, J.
In this interlocutory appeal, Kelli Anderson (“Anderson”) appeals the trial court’s order denying her motion to dismiss the State’s charging information alleging she committed reckless homicide,1 a Level 5 felony. Anderson filed a motion to dismiss the charging information alleging the State utilized grand jury proceedings in violation of Indiana statutes and her due process rights, which was denied by the trial court. Anderson raises several issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to dismiss. We affirm.
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Anderson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to dismiss the charging information.
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In arguing that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss the charging information, Anderson asserts that the State violated the grand jury statutes, which caused the grand jury proceeding to be defective and which resulted in her due process rights to be violated. She first contends that the State “usurped the grand jury’s mandate and exclusive authority to investigate whether a crime has been committed and to deliberate” as to whether to issue an indictment. Appellant’s Br. p. 17. Anderson also claims that the State deprived her of her right to be notified of the grand jury proceedings and the right to testify on her own behalf.
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Because the State may charge an individual with a crime by either indictment or information, I.C. § 35-34-1-1, the grand jury is not required to initiate charges in Indiana by statute or by due process. Under Indiana Code section 35-34-2-2(a), “A grand jury shall hear and examine evidence concerning crimes and shall take action with respect to this evidence as provided by law.” The “duties of the grand jury in this state are governed by statute, and it has no rights or privileges based upon the common law.” Coons v. State, 134 N.E. 194, 197 (Ind. 1922). The functions of a grand jury are merely inquisitorial and not judicial. Ajabu, 677 N.E.2d at 1039 (citing Adams v. State, 17 N.E.2d 84, 85 (Ind. 1938)). Grand jury proceedings are not a trial or even an adversary proceeding. Id. Instead, “the grand jury is an independent body which is charged with investigating the facts to determine ‘whether probable cause exists that a crime has been committed and whether an indictment (true bill) should be returned against one for such a crime.’” Id. (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 855 (6th ed.1990)).
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Anderson argues that the information should have been dismissed pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-34-1-4(a)(1) because the charging information was defective under section 35-34-1-6. The question presented is whether once a grand jury is convened, is the grand jury required to deliberate and decide upon an indictment. Anderson contends that the grand jury was required to investigate and deliberate as to whether or not to charge her with a crime. However, nothing in the statutes mandate the State to submit the matter for deliberation as to whether to issue an indictment.
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Under Indiana Code section 35-34-1-6(b), in order for an information to be defective, three things are required, and here, none of these requirements were met. Anderson was not identified on the record as the target of the grand jury proceeding, no offense which she was alleged to have committed was identified on the record, nor did the grand jury proceed to deliberate on whether to issue an indictment and then vote not to indict. Although the grand jury statutes contemplate that once convened, the grand jury will proceed to deliberation to determine whether to issue an indictment, we fail to find any statutory provision that mandates that procedure. Because the grand jury was not required to deliberate as to whether to issue an indictment, and because none of the requirements were met to render the information defective under section 35-34-1-6(b), Anderson has not proven that the information should have been dismissed under section 35-34-1-4(a)(1).
Anderson also asserts that the State violated her right to due process because she was deprived of the right to be notified of the grand jury proceeding and the right to testify. Anderson is correct that, under Indiana Code section 35-34-29(b), “[a] target of a grand jury investigation shall be given the right to testify before the grand jury,” and the State “shall notify a target of his opportunity to testify.” A target of a grand jury is a person who has been charged by information for an offense the grand jury is investigating, or who is a subject of the grand jury investigation. I.C. § 35-34-2-1. Indiana Code section 35-34-212(a) provides that, “[b]efore the grand jury proceeds to deliberate on whether to issue an indictment, the prosecuting attorney shall, on the record: (1) identify each target of the grand jury proceeding; and (2) identify each offense that each target is alleged to have committed.”
Reading this statute strictly, the State need not identify or name the target of the grand jury proceeding and identify the crime that the target was alleged to have committed unless the grand jury proceeds to deliberate on whether to issue an indictment. Therefore, Indiana Code section 35-34-2-12(a) provided that Anderson did not need to be named a target of the grand jury proceeding, which would trigger her right to testify under section 35-34-2-9(b), until the grand jury was ready to proceed to deliberation. Here, because the grand jury was discharged after Dr. Puzio’s testimony and did not proceed to deliberations, Anderson’s right to testify and right to be notified were not triggered and were not required. Therefore, the State’s obligation to notify Anderson of the grand jury proceeding and allow her to testify was not required at the time the grand jury was discharged.
Our Supreme Court has stated that a subject of a grand jury investigation is not accorded “the full panoply of constitutional rights due a criminal defendant, but . . . violations of the letter of statutes governing grand jury machinations are viewed . . . with a jaundiced eye.” State v. Bowman, 423 N.E.2d 605, 608 (Ind. 1981). However, only in cases in which there is such “flagrant imposition of the grand jurors’ will or independent judgment” will the court find a violation of due process. Averhart v. State, 470 N.E.2d 666, 679 (Ind. 1984), cert. denied. Here, as we do not find any violations of the statutes governing grand jury proceedings and no flagrant imposition of the grand jury’s independent judgment, we do not find any violation of Anderson’s right to due process.
“The defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence every fact essential to support” a motion to dismiss a charging information. I.C. § 35-34-1-8(f). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Anderson has failed to prove that the information was defective under section 35-34-1-6(b) or any other ground that is the basis for dismissal as a matter of law. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Anderson’s motion to dismiss the charging information.
Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Riley, Sr. J., concur.