Molter, J.
These four interlocutory appeals require us to decide whether a judge’s decision to recuse from a prior case disqualifies her from presiding over these cases because they all present the same concerns that led her to recuse in the prior case.
Andrew Royer was the petitioner in the previous case, and he sought post‐conviction relief to set aside his 2005 murder conviction. He alleged that “systemic” police and prosecutorial misconduct had produced an “epidemic” of wrongful convictions in Elkhart County, including his own. Shortly after Royer first made these allegations, his attorney held a press conference amplifying them through comments that the judge concluded violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. That led the judge, who is a former Elkhart County deputy prosecutor, to not only enjoin the attorney’s further public comments about the case, but also to remark that the attorney’s comments were “defamatory.”
Royer then argued, and the judge agreed, that the judge had to recuse for one of, or a combination of, two reasons. Royer said he would be calling many witnesses—law enforcement officers, deputy prosecutors, and an elected prosecutor—with whom the judge worked when she was a deputy prosecutor and some of whom remained the judge’s social acquaintances. She could not, Royer argued, be expected to remain impartial either when evaluating so many of her friends’ and former colleagues’ credibility or when evaluating Royer’s allegations of systemic police and prosecutorial misconduct that spanned the judge’s own time as a deputy prosecutor in Elkhart County. Even if that were not reason enough to recuse, Royer also argued that the judge’s characterization of his attorney’s comments as “defamatory” suggested she had pre‐judged his allegations of systemic misconduct before hearing any evidence.
Each of the appellants here petitioned for post‐conviction relief before the same judge who recused in Royer’s case. Royer’s attorney represents them too, and they allege the same sort of “systemic” misconduct that they claim has led to an “epidemic” of wrongful convictions. And like Royer, they intend to call as witnesses former law enforcement officers and prosecutors who are the judge’s former colleagues and/or current social acquaintances.
But unlike in Royer’s case, the judge declined to recuse in these cases. And as we explain below, we conclude that was a mistake. We hold that the judge is disqualified from presiding over these cases because her determination that recusal was mandatory in Royer’s case would lead an objective observer to reasonably question her impartiality in these cases, where the petitioners raised the same concerns as Royer.
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The default is the duty to preside. Judges are presumed unbiased, and they are required to preside over cases duly assigned to them unless their recusal is mandatory. Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 269 (Ind. 2014). That duty not only promotes efficiency by spreading cases more evenly among judges and avoiding a subsequent judge needlessly duplicating the work of a previous judge, but it also promotes public trust in our judicial system. Jud. Cond. R. 2.7, cmt. 1. Without the duty to preside, the system may appear too easily gamed. Some judges might avoid difficult or controversial cases, and the parties may seem able to delay cases unfairly through judicial disqualification or to steer their cases to judges they perceive as more favorable. See id.; see also Richard E. Flamm, Judicial Disqualification: Recusal and Disqualification of Judges 15 (3d ed. 2017) (“Conversely, if removing a judge were to be made too simple, both the cost of seeking justice and the delay in obtaining justice would likely soon become intolerable.”).
But just as important as the duty to preside is its built‐in exception: judges cannot preside over cases when recusal is mandatory. Zavodnik, 17 N.E.3d at 269. And recusal is mandatory when either a judge subjectively doubts their impartiality, Voss v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1211, 1220 (Ind. 2006), or, even if they don’t, when an objective observer, familiar with all the relevant circumstances, would have a reasonable basis for doubting the judge’s impartiality, Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 610 (Ind. 2001).
These four interlocutory appeals require us to explore the interplay between the duty to preside and the duty to recuse. The petitioners argue that because the judge concluded in Royer’s case that her duty to preside had to give way to her mandatory recusal based on concerns about her impartiality that persist in these cases, she should have recused in these cases too. In response, the State argues that each case must be evaluated on its own terms, and a judge who recuses in one case isn’t forever bound to reach the same conclusion in future cases, lest judges face too strong a disincentive to recuse at all. Viewed in isolation from the Royer recusal, the State doesn’t believe any of these cases require recusal.
Below, we lay out the standards governing recusal decisions. And as we explain, once a judge concludes their recusal is mandatory, they must continue recusing in future cases when confronted with the same concern that led them to recuse in the prior case. That is, unless their prior recusal was mistaken or circumstances have changed so that their recusal is no longer mandatory, in which case they again have a duty to preside.
In the end, we agree with the petitioners that our holding requires us to reverse the decision declining to recuse in each case. The judge’s determination that recusal was mandatory in Royer’s case would lead an objective observer to reasonably question the judge’s impartiality in these cases because the petitioners raised the same concerns as Royer; there is no suggestion that the judge’s prior recusal was mistaken; and there has been no change in circumstances making recusal no longer mandatory.
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The petitioners moved for a change of judge under Post‐Conviction Rule 1(4)(b). That rule requires a petitioner seeking a change of judge to file an affidavit stating “the facts and the reasons” leading the petitioner to believe “the judge has a personal bias or prejudice against” them. Ind. Post‐Conviction Rule 1(4)(b).
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The rule only requires recusal for a “personal” bias or prejudice, P.C.R. 1(4)(b), which is one that “stems from an extrajudicial source—meaning a source separate from the evidence and argument presented at the proceedings,” Lambert v. State, 743 N.E.2d 719, 728 (Ind. 2001). A judge is not personally biased or prejudiced merely because they have formed judgments about proceedings over which they have presided. After all, that is their job.
For example, after hearing the evidence in a criminal trial, a judge may “be exceedingly ill[‐]disposed towards the defendant, who has been shown to be a thoroughly reprehensible person.” Id. at 729 (quotations omitted). Since the judge derived that knowledge and opinion from the court proceedings, weighing those considerations when sentencing the defendant does not reflect any improper bias or prejudice. Id. Likewise, recusal is not required simply because the judge’s opinion is based on prior proceedings over which they presided because, again, the opinion does not derive from an extrajudicial source. Id. Thus, for example, a post‐ conviction judge need not recuse merely because the judge presided over the related trial. Id. at 730.
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Further to the petitioners’ point, Post‐Conviction Rule 1(4)(b) requires the judge to treat the historical facts in the petitioner’s affidavit as true. Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 939. And when judges reach legal conclusions based on undisputed facts or facts they must assume true—like when deciding a Trial Rule 12 motion to dismiss or a Trial Rule 56 summary judgment motion—we generally review those decisions de novo. Safeco Ins. of Ind. v. Blue Sky Innovation Grp., Inc., 230 N.E.3d 898, 901 (Ind. 2024) (motion to dismiss); Performance Servs., Inc. v. Randolph E. Sch. Corp., 211 N.E.3d 508, 511 (Ind. 2023) (summary judgment).
We can reconcile the notion that we are reviewing a legal determination with a “clear error” standard of review by, as the State correctly explains, invoking our precedent that misapplying the law to properly found facts is clear error, “and in that situation we do not defer to the trial court.” State v. Van Cleave, 674 N.E.2d 1293, 1296 (Ind. 1996). So even though the two sides affix different labels—the petitioners call our review “de novo” and the State calls it “clear error”—both sides appropriately agree we don’t afford any deference to the judge’s evaluation of whether an objective observer would reasonably doubt the judge’s impartiality based on the facts that the judge must accept as true.
In these cases, there is no material dispute about the facts that the judge had to accept as true. Instead, the disagreement is how to apply the legal standard to the facts, assessing whether an objective person, knowledgeable of all the circumstances, would have a reasonable basis for doubting the judge’s impartiality in these cases. We turn to that assessment next.
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We agree with the broad propositions that the judge stated and that the State argues. The mere fact that a judge previously served as a prosecutor or deputy prosecutor does not mean they must recuse from all cases involving their former office or people they worked with in that office. See Rankin v. State, 563 N.E.2d 533, 536 (Ind. 1990) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to a change of judge where the trial judge was a former prosecutor who signed the information alleging a felony that was the basis for a habitual offender finding because there was no factual dispute about the prior conviction); Dishman v. State, 525 N.E.2d 284, 285 (Ind. 1988) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to a change of judge where the trial judge was a former prosecutor who secured convictions underlying a habitual offender finding because there was no “factual contesting” of the prior convictions); Broome v. State, 687 N.E.2d 590, 596– 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to a change of judge where the judge, as a former prosecutor, hired, trained, and supervised the prosecutor on the defendant’s case and had counseled and trained many local law enforcement officers), summarily aff’d in relevant part by 694 N.E.2d 280, 281 (Ind. 1998); see generally Wayne R. LaFave et al., 6 Crim. Proc. § 22.4(c) n.46 (4th ed. 2023) (collecting authority).
Relatedly, “[t]he fact that an adjudicator happens to be socially acquainted or even friends with a party, attorney, witness or other person” does not, by itself, “ordinarily supply a litigant with a cognizable basis for questioning the ability of that judge to be impartial in presiding over that proceeding.” Flamm, supra, at 461; accord L.G. v. S.L., 88 N.E.3d 1069, 1073 (Ind. 2018) (“Just as ‘friendship’ alone may not be enough to require recusal (in some cases, it could be), neither does professional admiration always demand recusal.”). The State is also correct that our trial courts must “routinely sit[ ] in [judgment] of allegations that the prosecutors and/or the police in their county have committed some act or omission that renders evidence inadmissible or jeopardizes the validity of a conviction,” and those judges should not recuse merely because they have worked in some capacity with those prosecutors or officers before. Appellee’s Br. at 26. And we agree with the judge and the State that a judge’s statement that counsel’s conduct in a case over which the judge is presiding violates the Rules of Professional Conduct does not, by itself, require recusal either. See State ex rel. Allen v. Carroll Cir. Ct., 226 N.E.3d 206, 217–18 (Ind. 2024) (holding that the judge’s conclusion that counsel’s representation reflected “gross negligence” did not require recusal (quotations omitted)).
But these appeals can’t be decided on those broad propositions. What is different about these appeals—and this is critical to our holding—is that the judge already decided in Royer’s case that recusal was mandatory. So while viewing each of the petitioners’ various concerns in isolation may not warrant recusal, the judge herself already concluded that their overarching concerns about her entanglement with the evidence and her remark about their attorney’s comments do require recusal. And an objective observer who knows the judge previously concluded she had a duty to recuse could thus reasonably doubt her impartiality in these cases. That objective observer could reasonably ask: What changed since the judge decided she was required to recuse in Royer’s case? And the record does not reveal a good answer.
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Here, there is no suggestion that the judge’s recusal in Royer’s case was mistaken. That was not a case where the judge was merely a former coworker of deputy prosecutors and law enforcement officers in the case before her. The many witnesses who were her former colleagues would be providing evidence related to Royer’s allegations of systemic police and prosecutorial misconduct that he claimed covered the judge’s own time in the prosecutor’s office. And an objective observer could reasonably consider that context when interpreting the judge’s remark that the comments by Royer’s attorney about alleged systemic misconduct were “defamatory.” See Thakkar v. State, 644 N.E.2d 609, 611 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (reversing a criminal sentence based on the judge’s decision declining to recuse after making remarks “clearly bring[ing] into question the trial court’s objectivity in the matter”).
There is also no evidence in the record before us of changed circumstances since the judge concluded she needed to recuse in Royer’s case based on the same concerns the petitioners raise here, other than circumstances that further weigh in favor of recusal. Cf. Selkridge, 360 F.3d at 170 (holding that a trial judge “cannot, without explanation,” recuse from one group of cases while, at the same time, declining to recuse “in another group of cases that appears indistinguishable for purposes of recusal”). Most importantly, the judge’s entanglement with the evidence has only deepened. And even if those new developments do not independently warrant recusal, they do nothing to eliminate the concerns that led the judge to recuse in Royer’s case.
The judge dismissed the argument that her recusal in Royer’s case should compel her to recuse in these cases too by saying she only recused in Royer’s case to “cure any lingering concerns.” App. Vol. IX at 28 (Seabolt); App. Vol. IV at 10 (Tyson). But she did not explain what those lingering concerns were and why they no longer linger. Nor is it apparent to us. So an objective observer could reasonably persist in doubting the judge’s impartiality in these cases based on her own conclusion in Royer’s case that there were reasonable questions about her impartiality.
Thus, the judge needed to continue recusing in these cases until there was some change in circumstances that would no longer lead an objective observer to reasonably question her impartiality.
For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order denying the petitioner’s motion for recusal in each case and remand with the instruction to grant the motions.
Rush, C.J., Massa and Goff, JJ., concur.
Slaughter, J., not participating.