Bailey, J.
Gregory Henderson appeals his sentence for Resisting Law Enforcement, as a Level 6 felony. He presents the sole issue of whether the trial court’s determination that it lacked discretion to sentence Henderson under Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-7, an alternative minimum sentencing (“AMS”) statute, was contrary to law. We reverse and remand for resentencing.
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The trial court accepted Henderson’s guilty plea and turned to the matter of Henderson’s request for AMS. The State argued that Henderson was ineligible for AMS because Henderson had, within the prior three years, committed a felony for which judgment would be entered as a misdemeanor. Specifically, Henderson anticipated AMS in a Hendricks County case, contingent upon his successful completion of probation.
Henderson then argued that he had not actually received an AMS benefit in that case. The State urged the court to “let him earn it out there,” and the trial court opined that the best course of action would be to “leave this open for appeal.” (Tr. Vol. II, pgs. 32-33.)
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In the trial court, the parties disputed the application of Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-7(c), which provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), if a person has committed a Class D felony (for a crime committed before July 1, 2014) or a Level 6 felony (for a crime committed after June 30, 2014), the court may enter judgment of conviction of a Class A misdemeanor and sentence accordingly. However, the court shall enter a judgment of conviction of a Class D felony (for a crime committed before July 1, 2014) or a Level 6 felony (for a crime committed after June 30, 2014) if:
(1) the court finds that:
(A) the person has committed a prior, unrelated felony for which judgment was entered as a conviction of a Class A misdemeanor; and
(B) the prior felony was committed less than three (3) years before the second felony was committed[.]
Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-7(c)(1) proscribes the application of AMS to a second felony within three years when “the person has committed a prior unrelated felony for which judgment was entered as a conviction of a Class A misdemeanor.” (emphasis added.) The statute employs past tense, as opposed to prospective, terminology. At the time of Henderson’s sentencing, he had not received an AMS benefit within the preceding three years. To the extent that the trial court expressed doubt that it had discretion to enter Henderson’s conviction as a Class A misdemeanor, the trial court misconstrued the law.
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We agree with the State that a trial court has discretion as to whether leniency will be accorded under Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-7. See e.g., F.D.F. v. State, 916 N.E.2d 708, 711 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (recognizing that the trial court is vested with “broad” discretion in utilizing AMS). But we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would reject AMS in Henderson’s case regardless of his eligibility. Indeed, the trial court actively encouraged Henderson to seek guidance on eligibility from this Court before the trial court engaged in any deliberative process as to the merits of AMS.
The trial court misapprehended the law when sentencing Henderson; we thus reverse and remand for resentencing.
Reversed and remanded.
Altice, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur.