Kenworthy, J.
Following his conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OWI”), Matthew D. Coonce appeals the jury’s finding that he is a habitual vehicular substance offender (“HVSO”). He contends his prior unrelated vehicular substance offense (“VSO”) convictions do not meet the statutory requirements to support an HVSO enhancement because his three prior VSOs were not all felony convictions. Under our interpretation of the HVSO statute, prior unrelated VSOs used to support an HVSO enhancement may be either felony or misdemeanor convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the jury’s finding Coonce is an HVSO and the trial court’s imposition of a sentence enhancement.
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Coonce argues the plain language of the HVSO statute requires all three prior unrelated VSO convictions to be felonies when the State uses three convictions to support an HVSO enhancement. Coonce thus presents us with an issue of statutory interpretation.
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The HVSO statute—Indiana Code Chapter 9-30-15.5—consists of two sections. The first section contains only the VSO definition: As used in this chapter, “vehicular substance offense” means any misdemeanor or felony in which operation of a vehicle while intoxicated, operation of a vehicle in excess of the statutory limit for alcohol, or operation of a vehicle with a controlled substance or its metabolite in the person’s body, is a material element. The term includes an offense under IC 9-30-5, IC 9-24-6-15 (before its repeal), IC 9-24-6.1-7, and IC 9-11-2 (before its repeal). I.C. § 9-30-15.5-1.
The second section focuses on the elements and procedures used to support an HVSO finding. See I.C. § 9-30-15.5-2. 4 Subsection (a) prescribes the circumstances under which the State may seek an HVSO sentencing enhancement and the contents of the charging instrument:
(a) The state may seek to have a person sentenced as a habitual vehicular substance offender for any vehicular substance offense by alleging, on a page separate from the rest of the charging instrument, that the person has accumulated two (2) or three (3) prior unrelated vehicular substance offense convictions. If the state alleges only two (2) prior unrelated vehicular substance offense convictions, the allegation must include that at least one (1) of the prior unrelated vehicular substance offense convictions occurred within the ten (10) years before the date of the current offense.
I.C. § 9-30-15.5-2(a). In subsection (c), the legislature sets forth the elements the jury or court must find to establish a person is an HVSO and the burden of proof:
(c) A person is a habitual vehicular substance offender if the jury (if the hearing is by jury) or the court (if the hearing is to the court alone) finds that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the person has accumulated three (3) or more prior unrelated vehicular substance offense convictions at any time, or two (2) prior unrelated vehicular substance offense convictions, with at least one (1) of the prior unrelated vehicular substance offense convictions occurring within ten (10) years of the date of the occurrence of the current offense.
I.C. § 9-30-15.5-2(c).
Subsections (a) and (c) are harmonious. They each describe the two paths by which a person may be found an HVSO: either (1) by committing a third VSO within ten years of committing one of two prior unrelated VSOs, or (2) by committing a fourth VSO with three prior unrelated VSOs at any time. Under the statutory definition of VSO, prior unrelated offenses used to support an HVSO enhancement may be either misdemeanor or felony impaired driving offenses.5 I.C. § 9-30-15.5-1. The definition includes “an offense under IC 9- 30-5” (OWI offenses), id., which may be a misdemeanor or felony, depending on the circumstances, see I.C. §§ 9-30-5-1 to -5. Nothing in subsections (a) and (c) or in the definition of VSO limits the prior unrelated offenses to felony convictions. Under the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language, Coonce’s prior unrelated OWI convictions—one misdemeanor and two felonies—support the jury’s finding he is an HVSO.
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Coonce contends the word “felonies” in the introductory clause of subsection (b)(3) means the convictions must all be felonies when the State seeks an HVSO enhancement based on three prior unrelated VSO convictions. In other words, he argues “the statute requires three felonies when the State is proving three [VSOs] over any time period but only requires misdemeanors if the State is proving two convictions within 10 years.”
Here, the legislature provided a precise definition of VSO, which includes “any misdemeanor or felony” OWI. I.C. § 9-30-15.5-1. “When the General Assembly has defined a statutory term, we are bound by its definition.” WTHR-TV v. Hamilton Se. Schs., 178 N.E.3d 1187, 1191 (Ind. 2022). The defined term “vehicular substance offense” appears fourteen times in the HVSO statute, typically followed by the word “conviction.” Substituting the definition for the defined term produces a logical reading of the statute in all but one instance. For example, when substituted into subsection (c), it would read: “A person is a habitual vehicular substance offender if the jury . . . finds . . . the person has accumulated three (3) or more prior unrelated [misdemeanor or felony . . . OWI] convictions at any time[.]” This is precisely what the jury found in Coonce’s case.
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Still, Coonce argues his interpretation “makes sense” because “the statute requires more serious offenses if the look-back period is longer and less serious offenses if the look-back period is shorter.” Appellant’s Br. at 14. In other words, a person can be an HVSO “if they have convictions more than 10 years old[,] but because of the extended look-back period, the legislature chose to require the offenses to be more numerous (three as opposed to two) and more serious (felonies as opposed to misdemeanors).” Id. at 17.
Coonce is partially correct. The statute requires more offenses (three) to establish a pattern of habitual conduct if the offenses are older. But if the statute also required the older offenses to be more serious, as Coonce suggests, an individual with three misdemeanor drunk driving convictions would not be a habitual offender. Nor would someone like Coonce, who has a combination of older misdemeanor and felony OWI convictions. That result would be inconsistent with the purpose of a specialized habitual offender statute, which our legislature designed to provide enhanced sentencing for offenders who demonstrate a pattern of recidivism. See Downey, 770 N.E.2d at 795–96. It is the repetition, not the seriousness, of the offenses that establishes the habit. This is especially true in the context of HVSOs, because typically OWI is a Class A or Class C misdemeanor offense, unless aggravating circumstances are present. See I.C. §§ 9-30-5-1 to -5. Coonce’s interpretation would undercut the policy of this State to provide enhanced sentences for recidivist drunk drivers.
In sum, the introductory clause of subsection (b)(3) does not require the three prior unrelated VSO convictions to be felonies to support an HVSO enhancement. Prior unrelated VSO convictions used to support an HVSO enhancement may be either misdemeanor or felony convictions. The jury properly relied on Coonce’s prior unrelated VSO convictions when it determined he was an HVSO.
Coonce’s prior VSO convictions support the jury’s finding he is an HVSO, and the jury’s finding supports Coonce’s enhanced sentence.
Affirmed.
May, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.