Riley, J.
Anderson presents this court with one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the evidence supports Anderson’s affirmative defense that she was a victim of human trafficking at the time she committed the offense of prostitution.
…
Not contesting the sufficiency of the evidence that she committed prostitution as a Class A misdemeanor, Anderson contends that there was sufficient evidence to establish her affirmative defense that she was a trafficked person at the time she committed the offense of prostitution. Indiana Code section 35-45-4-2, which defines the charge of prostitution as a Class A misdemeanor in section (a), provides in section (b) that “[i]t is a defense to a prosecution under this section that the person was a victim or an alleged victim of an offense under [I.C. §] 35-42-3.5-1 through [I.C. §] 35-42-3.5-1.4 [the provisions on human and sexual trafficking] at the time the person engaged in the prohibited conduct.” See Neese v. State, 994 N.E.2d 336, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (explaining that a legislative exception to guilt constitutes an affirmative defense, rather than a material element of the offense, when it is placed in a separate sentence of subsection of the statute).
As a matter of first impression, we need to address the allocation of the burden of proof with respect to the affirmative defense as the statute itself is silent… The burden of proving a defense may be placed on the defendant so long as proving the defense does not require the defendant to negate an element of the crime. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 233-34, 107 S.Ct. 1098, 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987) (positing that state law may assign a defendant the burden of proof on a defense of self-defense); Moore v. State, 673 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. Here, the defense of human trafficking does not negate any elements of the prostitution charge; rather, it operates by entirely excusing the culpability for engaging in prostitution. In essence, the defense of human trafficking “admits all the elements of the crime but proves circumstances which excuse the defendant from culpability.” Butrum v. State, 469 N.E.2d 1174, 1176 (Ind. 1984).
When, as here, a defense only addresses the defendant’s culpability, the defendant may be assigned the burden to prove the defense by a preponderance of evidence. Newson v. State, 785 N.E.2d 1155, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The law regularly places the burden upon a criminal defendant to prove defenses that address culpability. See, e.g., Carson v. State, 807 N.E.2d 155, 159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (insanity defense); Brown v. State, 790 N.E.2d 1061, 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“unloaded firearm” defense under I.C. § 35-47-4-3); Newson, 785 N.E.2d at 1157 (defense of transporting a student to school under I.C. § 34-479-2); Weida v. State, 778 N.E.2d 843, 848 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (abandonment); Cooper v. State, 760 N.E.2d 660, 667 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied (previous incarceration as defense to nonpayment of child support).
Unlike the defense of justification for which a defendant is only required to produce some evidence to put the defense at issue, after which the burden shifts back to the State to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt, we find that the human trafficking defense in Indiana Code section 35-45-4-2(b) is predicated on a fact—the forcibility element inherent in human trafficking— that alters our view of the defendant’s moral culpability for the criminal conduct. See, e.g., Moon, 823 N.E.2d at 716 (pointing to self-defense and entrapment as justification defenses). While the defense does not negate the wrongfulness of the prostitution, it looks at the culpability of the accused. As such, it should be noted that the facts relating to the culpability defense of human trafficking at the time of the prostitution are peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant and the defendant can fairly be required to adduce additional evidence to support the defense’s burden of persuasion. This allocation of the burden of proof is consistent with the position advanced by the Indiana Judges Association’s Criminal Instructions Committee. See Comment to Pattern Jury Instruction (Criminal) 6.0600 (4th ed. 2021) (instruction on the offense of prostitution) (“The Committee believes that the burden to prove this defense is appropriately assigned to the defendant, by the greater weight of the evidence.”). Accordingly, we find that Anderson carried the burden to prove the defense of human trafficking by a preponderance of evidence.
…
To establish her affirmative defense, Anderson was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was a victim of one of the trafficking offenses set forth in Indiana Code Chapter 35-42-3.5.
…
At trial and on appeal, the State conceded that Anderson may have previously been a victim of human trafficking related to the assault in September, but the State also contends that Anderson was not a victim as specified under the Statute at the time of the instant offense, on October 14, 2022.
The evidence reflects that on October 14, 2022, several weeks after Ferguson had assaulted her, Anderson was removed from Ferguson’s orbit of influence: she was housed in a safe place, she had a new cell phone, she had been provided with a new cell phone number, and she had been given money by Silent No More. Despite this removal, Anderson voluntarily contacted Ferguson and provided him with her new phone number and address for the purpose of posting an advertisement on Mega Personals for her. She told Detective Hartman that she had agreed to give him half of the proceeds she would make from prostitution in exchange for his help posting the advertisement. Rather than being coerced and threatened by Ferguson to engage in prostitution on October 14, 2022, Anderson voluntarily sought out his assistance to return to escort services because she needed money. Although Anderson changed her testimony at the bench trial, claiming that the advertisement dated from before the September assault; that the phone number in the advertisement differed from the one given to her by Silent No More; and that Ferguson monitored her phone calls with a special application and communicated with her clients through the application, by denying Anderson’s affirmative defense, the trial court explicitly credited the testimony of the detectives establishing that she engaged in prostitution without Ferguson’s coercion.
While on October 14, 2022, Anderson voluntarily elected to reach out to Ferguson and use his help in placing the advertisement, she fails to establish that her connection with Ferguson on that date went beyond a purely transactional undertaking. Ferguson may have collaborated, facilitated, or rendered assistance to Anderson in finding prospective clients for her illegal activity in exchange for a cut of the proceeds, but there is no evidence that he forced, coerced, or threatened her to return to prostitution on October 14, 2022. See I.C. § 35-42-3.5-1.1. Anderson’s arguments merely amount to a request to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Accordingly, we affirm her conviction for prostitution as a Class A misdemeanor.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Anderson failed to establish the affirmative defense that she was a victim of human trafficking at the time she committed the offense of prostitution beyond a preponderance of the evidence and therefore, we affirm her conviction for prostitution.
Affirmed.
Kenworthy, J. and Felix, J. concur.