Crone, J.
The State charged Jeffrey Tyree with criminally confining and sexually battering K.H. Tyree issued three subpoenas for K.H. to appear for a taped statement, but K.H. failed to appear. Tyree filed a motion to exclude K.H.’s testimony, and the State filed a motion to set a rule to show cause hearing. The trial court held a hearing on the motions, at which K.H. testified regarding her failures to appear, and the court granted Tyree’s motion to exclude. The State dismissed the charges against Tyree and filed an appeal pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-4-2(a)(5), which authorizes the State to take an appeal as of right “[f]rom an order granting a motion to suppress evidence, if the ultimate effect of the order is to preclude further prosecution of one (1) or more counts of an information or indictment.” Tyree filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the basis that the State is challenging a discovery sanction and not an order on a motion to suppress. The motions panel of this Court denied Tyree’s motion.
On appeal, the State argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Tyree’s motion to exclude K.H.’s testimony. On cross-appeal, Tyree renews his argument to dismiss the State’s appeal. We conclude that the State’s appeal is authorized by Section 35-38-4-2(a)(5) because Tyree’s motion was a motion to suppress K.H.’s testimony. We further conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Tyree’s motion to exclude and K.H.’s statement could have been taken during or after the hearing. Consequently, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
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Because it is potentially dispositive, we first address Tyree’s argument on cross-appeal that this appeal should be dismissed because the State lacks statutory authority to appeal the trial court’s order granting his motion to exclude K.H.’s testimony.
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Tyree contends that “[t]his appeal does not address a motion to suppress” and quotes a legal dictionary’s definition of that term: “A request that the court prohibit the introduction of illegally obtained evidence at a criminal trial.” Appellee’s Br. at 11 (quoting Motion to Suppress, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)). Tyree further argues, “Under the plain text of the statute, a request for a discovery sanction is not a motion to suppress.” Id.
We must decline Tyree’s invitation to read Section 35-38-4-2(a)(5) so narrowly. It is well settled that “[a]bsent a manifest legislative intent that words employed in a statute are to be given a technical or limited meaning, words are to be given their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning.” Beach v. State, 411 N.E.2d 363, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). Also, “it is just as important to recognize what the statute does not say as it is to recognize what it does say.” N.D.F. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (Ind. 2002). The plain text of the statute does not suggest that the legislature intended for “motion to suppress” to be a term of art applying only to motions alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, which govern searches and seizures. We agree with the State that “the statute focuses on the effect of the trial court’s ruling: whether the ruling on the defendant’s motion prevents the State from presenting evidence necessary to prove its case.” And that is precisely what the trial court’s ruling on Tyree’s motion to exclude K.H.’s testimony does here. Accordingly, we affirm our motions panel’s denial of Tyree’s motion to dismiss this appeal.
We now address the State’s argument that the trial court improperly granted Tyree’s motion to exclude K.H.’s testimony.
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Regarding any evidentiary deficiencies, such as whether and why the first subpoena was actually returned as undeliverable and whether K.H. actually received the other two subpoenas, Tyree has only himself to blame. As the State points out, “Tyree’s motion to exclude was his first attempt at seeking judicial intervention in K.H.’s failure to attend the taped meetings” and that the trial court “did not even attempt to explore other less-extreme remedies[,]” such as admonishing K.H. that she would be held in contempt if she disobeyed any future subpoenas. Appellant’s Br. at 12-13.
The State further observes, and we agree, that “because K.H. was in the courtroom for the hearing on the parties’ motions, Tyree could have taken her taped statement immediately after the hearing, or the trial court could have permitted Tyree to take her statement on the stand during the hearing.” Id. At that point, Tyree had not even requested a trial date, and any harm resulting from the relatively brief discovery delay could have been satisfactorily alleviated on the spot. Although the trial court might not have been satisfied with K.H.’s reasons for her failures to appear, exercising the nuclear option of excluding her testimony, and thus precluding further prosecution of Tyree, was against the logic and effect of the attendant facts and circumstances. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Tyree’s motion to exclude, so we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
Bailey, J., and Pyle, J., concur.