Bailey, J.
In this interlocutory appeal, Aaron Brackenridge challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the charge of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony, 1 and raises the sole issue of whether the trial court erred in its ruling. Because the felony on which the charge was based had been converted to a misdemeanor, we reverse.
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Here, the parties do not dispute the facts; rather, they raise the sole legal question of the proper interpretation of the statute making it a crime for a serious violent felon to possess a firearm, Indiana Code Section 35-47-4-5 (hereinafter, “SVF statute”). Brackenridge asserts the SVF statute only applies to those who have been “convicted” of a listed “felony,” and, at the time he was charged with violating the SVF statute, his prior Class D felony conviction had been converted to a Class A misdemeanor conviction. Therefore, he asserts, he does not meet the definition of a “serious violent felon” as used in the SVF statute. The State contends—and the trial court agreed—that anyone who has had a conviction for one of the listed SVF felonies is a serious violent felon regardless of whether the conviction was subsequently converted to a misdemeanor pursuant to the AMS statute.
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The plain language of the SVF statute provides that it only applies to convictions for one of the listed felonies. And the AMS statute plainly states that a sentencing court may reduce a Class D felony conviction to a Class A misdemeanor conviction if it finds certain criteria are met. In addition, our Supreme Court has considered the legislative history around the AMS statute and concluded that the policy behind the statute is to “reward good behavior by removing the stigma of certain Class D felony convictions.” State v. Smith, 71 N.E.3d 368, 370-71 (Ind. 2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In conformity with that purpose, the Supreme Court has concluded that “[t]he entry of judgment of conviction upon the misdemeanor offense [pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-7(d)] constitutes a new and different judgment effectively vacating the prior judgment.” Gardiner v. State, 928 N.E.2d 194, 197 (Ind. 2010) (emphasis added); see also Moss, 6 N.E.3d at 962 (concluding an enhancement based on a prior felony should have been dismissed where the prior felony had been reduced to a Class A misdemeanor pursuant to the AMS statute).
Interpreting the AMS statute as being applicable to felonies listed in the SVF statute harmonizes the statutes so that they both have meaning. And we note that the SVF statute was enacted in 2003. At that time, the AMS statute was already in existence, having been enacted in 1999. Thus, we must presume that the legislature was aware of the possibility that a felony listed in the SVF statute could be converted to a misdemeanor pursuant to the AMS statute. See Wagler, 898 N.E.2d at 818. And we take notice of the fact that the legislature did not state that the AMS statute was inapplicable to the felonies listed in the SVF statute.
Nevertheless, the State asserts that the purpose of the SVF statute is to keep demonstrably dangerous people from possessing firearms, and a conversion of an SVF felony to a misdemeanor does not change the fact that the defendant committed a dangerous crime, i.e., a serious violent felony, and therefore, still “pose[s] a danger to the public if [he] possesses a firearm.”
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The State’s argument fails for several reasons. First and foremost, it distorts the plain language of the statutes, as discussed above. Second, it would require us to add language to the AMS and/or SVF statutes, when the legislature chose not to do so; but we “may not engraft new words onto a statute or add restrictions where none exist.” Kitchell, 997 N.E.2d at 1026. Third, it conflicts with the purpose of the AMS statute to reward good behavior by removing the stigma of certain Class D felony convictions. See Smith, 71 N.E.3d at 370. Fourth, it ignores the rule of lenity which requires that we construe a penal statute strictly against the State. See Fix, 186 N.E.3d at 1139.
And finally, the State’s proffered interpretation of the statutes ignores the process clearly provided in the AMS statute for determining whether a classification reduction should be granted. Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-7(d), in order to reduce the felony to a misdemeanor, the sentencing court must find, among other things, that the defendant was not a “sex or violent offender” as defined in Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-5, 6 that he was not convicted of a felony that “resulted in bodily injury to another person,” and that at least three years had passed—without additional criminal charges—since he completed his sentence for the Class D felony. Thus, the AMS statute itself disallows a reduction in classification if the underlying felony was a violent one, and there is no reason to contort the language of the SVF statute—which we may not do anyway—to achieve that same result.
Here, Brackenridge’s sentencing court necessarily determined that he met the criteria—including being a non-violent offender—for judgment of conviction to be entered as a class A misdemeanor rather than a D felony. See I.C. § 35-50-2- 7(d)(1-7). Therefore, it “vacated” Brackenridge’s former criminal confinement felony that qualified him as a serious violent felon when it converted that felony conviction to a misdemeanor conviction in 2016. See Gardiner, 928 N.E.2d at 197. Thus, when Brackenridge subsequently was stopped by the police in 2023, he only had a misdemeanor conviction,7 not a felony conviction, and the SVF statute did not apply to him. Given these facts, the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss the charge brought under the SVF statute.
At the time the State charged Brackenridge with being a serious violent felon in unlawful possession of a firearm, Brackenridge was not a felon because his Class D felony conviction had been vacated and replaced with a Class A misdemeanor conviction pursuant to the AMS statute. Therefore, the trial court erred when it denied Brackenridge’s motion to dismiss the charge brought under the SVF statute.
We reverse.
Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.