Najam, S.J.
Statement of the Case
Linda Salmon brings this interlocutory appeal from the denial of her motion for summary judgment on Rita Tafelski’s complaint for tortious interference with Tafelski’s inheritance from her mother’s estate. Tafelski’s mother died intestate. Tafelski alleged that Salmon had exerted undue influence and engaged in fraud causing the decedent to make inter vivos transfers of property that benefited Salmon and would otherwise have been included in the decedent’s estate and ultimately in Tafelski’s inheritance. The trial court held that Tafelski could maintain an independent action for tortious interference with her inheritance outside the estate. We conclude, however, that in asserting her claims Tafelski failed to pursue remedies pursuant to our probate code and that Salmon is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We reverse and remand with instructions that Salmon’s motion for summary judgment be granted.
Issue
Both the threshold and dispositive issue in this case is whether the heir of a decedent who died intestate has authority to maintain an independent claim for tortious interference with an inheritance outside the probate estate where a remedy is available and adequate under the probate code.
First, regarding Tafelski’s claim that Indiana law does not require that a tortious interference claimant exhaust her remedies under the probate code before asserting an independent tort claim, we hold that a tort claimant may not maintain an independent claim where a remedy under the probate code is available and would provide adequate relief.
Second, concerning Tafelski’s claim that there is no adequate remedy available to her under the probate code, we hold that she had, but failed to exercise, the adequate remedies available to her under the probate code.
Third, with regard to Salmon’s claim that Tafelski does not have standing to bring her action for tortious interference with an inheritance, conversion, fraud, constructive trust, breach of fiduciary duty, and intermeddling, we hold that Tafelski does have standing to maintain her cause of action, which is subject to her pursuit of a claim under the probate code where such a claim is available and sustainable.
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At the heart of this case is Tafelski’s claim for tortious interference with an inheritance. This Court first recognized the tort of intentional interference with an inheritance in Minton v. Sackett, 671 N.E.2d 160 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). In doing so, we stated that such a cause of action arises when “‘[o]ne who by fraud or other tortious means intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third person an inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have received is subject to liability to others for the loss of the inheritance or gift.’” Id. at 162 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774B (1979)). We further held that this tort is not permitted “where the remedy of a will contest is available and would provide the injured party with adequate relief.” Minton, 671 N.E.2d at 162. And we concluded that the remedies available under the will contest adequately provided for the damages sought by the plaintiff. Id. at 163.
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In the present case, citing Minton and Keith, the trial court determined, in effect, that those cases, which both involved will contests, were not controlling because Neitzel died intestate and, therefore, that Tafelski had “no ability . . . to contest a will.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 35 (Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment). Thus, the court held that it is permissible for Tafelski to bring an independent action for tortious interference with an inheritance. Id.
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The distinction between whether the decedent died testate or intestate and, hence, whether a will contest is available, is not dispositive of whether an interested person has standing to maintain an independent tort claim for interference with an inheritance. In Minton, Keith, and Moriarty, the decedent died testate and there was a will contest. Until now, we have not had occasion to look beyond a will contest and consider the operation and effect of our probate code on a tortious interference with an inheritance claim where the decedent died intestate, and, hence, no will contest is available.
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Nevertheless, Tafelski maintains she may bring her claim independent of the personal representative given the non-probate nature of the contested assets and because she is seeking reparation for harm she personally suffered, rather than harm to Neitzel or her estate, as a result of Salmon’s alleged misconduct. [Footnote omitted.] The harm alleged here, if proven, would be a harm against Neitzel during her lifetime, which flowed through to her estate upon her death. Thus, Tafelski’s claims are derived from her standing as an heir of her mother’s estate. While the harm alleged may be “personal” to Tafelski in an ordinary sense, her claims are subject to exhaustion of available remedies found in our probate code.
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In sum, as we emphasized in Inlow, the probate code gives the personal representative plenary authority to collect and manage the assets of the estate and “specifically circumscribes the instances when heirs may inject themselves into the administration of the estate.” 787 N.E.2d at 393. When an heir believes the personal representative is neglecting his duty to the detriment of the estate, the heir must follow the procedures of the probate code to rectify the problem. Id. at 394. And, again, where “‘any person has, or is suspected to have, concealed, embezzled, converted or disposed, of any real or personal property belonging to the estate of a decedent,’” the probate court is vested with the authority to “‘finally adjudicate the rights of the parties before the court with respect to such property.’” Id. at 392 (quoting I.C. §§ 29-1-1-3, 29-1-13- 10).
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Today we follow our holding in Inlow that during administration, as well as when administration of an estate is available, the action must be brought within the probate proceeding. See Inlow, 787 N.E.2d at 394. This rule applies not only where a will contest is available and would provide the injured party with adequate relief, as in Minton, but across the board where, as here, a remedy under probate code provisions is available and would provide adequate relief to heirs and other persons interested in the estate who claim to have been injured. Of course, this rule does not apply where there is no administration or where administration is neither anticipated nor viable.
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Conclusion
We conclude that Tafelski had adequate remedies under the probate code to pursue her claim against Salmon and that she failed to avail herself of these remedies. Accordingly, she is now precluded from maintaining an independent claim for tortious interference with an inheritance, including its various alleged subparts and iterations. Thus, Salmon is entitled to summary judgment on Tafelski’s claim. We reverse and remand with instructions that the trial court enter summary judgment for Salmon.
Reversed and remanded.
Crone, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.