Vaidik, J.
Case Summary
Mark Campbell sued his son, Andrew Campbell, for defamation and false light invasion of privacy after Andrew alleged in a book and on social media that Mark committed domestic violence against Andrew’s mother decades earlier when he was growing up. Andrew moved to dismiss Mark’s complaint under Indiana’s anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute. Under this statute, defendants may invoke the anti-SLAPP defense when faced with a civil action for acts or omissions in furtherance of their right of petition or free speech under the federal and state constitutions “in connection with a public issue.” The trial court dismissed Mark’s complaint, and he now appeals.
While domestic violence is of general public interest, that does not make every allegation of domestic violence a newsworthy event, particularly when, as here, the allegations concern private conduct by private individuals and attract no public interest on their own. Because Andrew has failed to prove that his statements were made in connection with a public issue, the anti-SLAPP defense does not apply. The trial court erred in dismissing Mark’s complaint. We therefore reverse and remand.
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Mark does not dispute that Andrew’s statements were in furtherance of his frees-peech rights. He argues, however, that Andrew failed to prove that his statements were “in connection with a public issue.” [Footnote omitted.] In Gresk, our Supreme Court addressed, for the first time, “what is or is not a ‘public issue’ under Indiana’s anti-SLAPP statute.” 96 N.E.3d at 571. The Court determined that speech is “in connection with a public issue” if it is addressed to “any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, as determined by its content, form, and context.” Id. (quotation omitted). In setting forth this “guide,” the Court specifically rejected a broad interpretation of the term “public issue” and instead directed courts to “analyze the narrow statements at issue, avoiding a sweeping view of what is ‘public.’” Id.
Mark acknowledges that domestic violence, in general, is a topic of public interest. He claims, however, that “[t]here is no public interest whatsoever in the question of whether or not Mark, undeniably a private figure, committed domestic violence and abuse against his wife, also a private figure, in their marital home more than 20 years ago.”…
There are no doubt differences between Gresk and this case, most notably that in Gresk the doctor made a statutorily required and confidential report of child abuse to DCS. But the Court’s holding on whether the report was made in connection with a public issue did not turn on whether the report was statutorily required and confidential. Rather, the Court’s holding was more broad: while child-abuse reporting is of “general public interest,” a report stemming from a “private matter” that “one child” is the victim of abuse is not. he same goes for domestic violence. As Mark notes, “Certain cases of domestic violence—where the perpetrator or victim are in the public eye, for example, or where an alleged incident of domestic violence attracts public attention or is considered newsworthy—will undoubtedly fall within the Anti-SLAPP statute’s protection.” Appellant’s Br. p. 18.
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This case does not involve someone in the public eye or a newsworthy event. Andrew’s statements concerned private conduct by private individuals and attracted no public interest on their own besides through Andrew’s publicization of them in his book (which has garnered only $800 to $1,200 in sales), social-media posts, and speaking engagements. We agree with Mark that a person can’t turn private conduct by private individuals into a public issue simply by communicating it to a large number of people. See Weinberg v. Feisel, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1122, 1133 (2003). If communication of private conduct by private individuals, by itself, were enough, it would give a sweeping view of what is a “public issue,” which our Supreme Court has rejected. See id. (“If the mere publication of information in a union newsletter distributed to its numerous members were sufficient to make that information a matter of public interest, the public-issue limitation would be substantially eroded, thus seriously undercutting the obvious goal of the Legislature that the public-issue requirement have a limiting effect.”). Given the content, form, and context of Andrew’s statements, he has failed to establish that they were made in connection with a public issue.
Because Andrew has failed to prove that the anti-SLAPP defense applies, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Mark’s complaint and remand this case to the trial court to continue the litigation of Mark’s claims and Andrew’s counterclaim.
Reversed and remanded.
May, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur