Brown, J.
Rory Kerwood appeals from the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the Elkhart County Sheriff’s Department. We affirm.
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Kerwood asserts the trial court erred in concluding he did not have a private right of action against the Sheriff’s Department and that it erred in entering summary judgment on the claims in his amended complaint.
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In June 2019, Kerwood filed a complaint alleging that he was found not guilty for a prior criminal charge, the court ordered the Sheriff’s Department to expunge and seal all records of the charge and arrest, the Sheriff’s Department failed to comply with the order, employees of the Sheriff’s Department disseminated information about his prior arrest, and as a result he was terminated from Kankakee Fire. In August 2021, the Sheriff’s Department filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. On November 5, 2021, the court issued an order stating that it would treat the Sheriff’s Department’s motion as a Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion, finding Kerwood did not have an implied private right of action for the Sheriff’s Department’s alleged failure to properly expunge or seal his records, stating “common law remedies exist and [the Sheriff’s Department was] not entitled to judgment on the pleadings on this issue,” and granting the Sheriff’s Department’s motion as to any claims for a private cause of action based on an alleged violation of a court order of expungement and denying the motion as to all other claims. Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 86.
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A. No Implied Right of Action
Kerwood asserts that a private right of action is implied in the expungement statute. He argues the statute “only contains an enforcement mechanism against those who have directly discriminated against the person because of a prior expunged record” and “[t]here is no independent enforcement mechanism built into the statute for situations experienced by [him] wherein a law enforcement agency tasked with expunging the records fails to abide by the Order and as a result causes harm.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. The Sheriff’s Department argues there is no private right of action under the expungement statute and “[t]he expungement statutes provide one remedy, an infraction, and expand the ability of the courts to provide a remedy by bringing third parties under a court’s contempt power.” Appellee’s Brief at 18.
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The Indiana legislature, in enacting Ind. Code § 35-38-9-10(f), set forth mechanisms to enforce the expungement provisions, and we “may not engraft another.” See Doe #1, 81 N.E.3d at 204. We cannot infer that the Indiana legislature intended to create a private right of action beyond the mechanisms in Ind. Code § 35-38-9-10(f). See id. at 202-204 (addressing whether, in enacting another statute, Ind. Code § 31-33-18-2, the General Assembly intended for the statute to create a right of action despite not saying so expressly; observing the statute contained enforcement mechanisms, including Ind. Code § 5-14-3-10(a); and concluding “our General Assembly might choose to impose a right of action,” “[b]ut separation of powers requires us to leave that decision to the legislature, rather than make it ourselves under the guise of statutory interpretation,” and “[t]hus, we cannot infer that the General Assembly intended [Ind. Code § 31-33-18-2] to impose civil liability”). [Footnote omitted.] Reversal on this basis is not warranted.
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court.
Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Foley, J., concur.