Vaidik, J.
A sex or violent offender must register, among other things, their username for any “social networking web site.” A website is a “social networking web site” if, among other things, it “provides a member with the opportunity to communicate with another person.” We hold today that this element does not require the website to have a built-in messaging or chat function so long as it provides some way for a member to contact another person.
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To convict Rose of failure to register as a sex or violent offender, the State had to prove that he failed to register as required by Indiana Code chapter 11-8-8. See Ind. Code § 11-8-8-17. Rose had to register, among other things, “Any electronic mail address, instant messaging username, electronic chat room username, or social networking web site username that the sex or violent offender uses or intends to use.” I.C. § 11-8-8-8(a)(7) (emphasis added).
A “social networking web site username” means “an identifier or profile that allows a person to create, use, or modify a social networking web site, as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-307.” I.C. § 11-8-8-1.8. A “social networking web site,” in turn, means an Internet web site, an application, a computer program, or software that: (1) facilitates the social introduction between two (2) or more persons; (2) requires a person to register or create an account, a username, or a password to become a member of the web site and to communicate with other members; (3) allows a member to create a web page or a personal profile; and (4) provides a member with the opportunity to communicate with another person. The term does not include an electronic mail program or message board program. I.C. § 35-31.5-2-307 (emphasis added).
Rose concedes the evidence sufficiently proves that the three dating websites satisfy subsections (1)-(3) of Section 35-31.5-2-307. Appellant’s Br. p. 12. He argues, however, that the evidence is insufficient to prove subsection (4) because the State presented no evidence “that the three web sites . . . provide members with the opportunity to communicate with another person.” According to Rose, the State had to establish that the websites themselves had a “messaging or chat function.” Id. at 13.
Subsection (4) states that the website must provide “a member with the opportunity to communicate with another person.” While evidence that the website has a built-in messaging or chat function would no doubt satisfy subsection (4), 1 that is not the only way to do so. So long as the website provides some way for a member to contact another person (such as by a phone number or email address), the website has furnished the member with an “opportunity to communicate.” As the State highlights, there would be no point to a dating website if it didn’t provide members with some way to communicate with each other.
Here, Rose stated during his videotaped interview that the dating websites gave him an opportunity to “chat to somebody”; he just claimed he didn’t want to pay for it. In other words, Rose admitted that the websites had some sort of messaging or chat function. But even without this evidence, Exhibit 3 shows that Joann from Christianfilipina.com texted Rose, thanked him for “talking” to her, and gave him a phone number and meeting date and time for Nestle. Thus, Christianfilipina.com provided Rose with an “opportunity to communicate” with another person. Based on this evidence and Rose’s admissions that the websites were dating websites and allowed him to “chat to somebody” if he paid the fee, it was reasonable for the trial court to infer that the other dating websites Rose joined provided a similar “opportunity to communicate.” Because the State proved that the dating websites Rose joined were “social networking web sites,” the evidence is sufficient to support Counts 2, 3, and 4.
Affirmed.
May, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.