Massa, J.
John Rust seeks the Republican nomination for United States Senator from Indiana in 2024. Concerned he would be denied access to the May primary ballot for failure to comply with state law, he sought preemptive relief in the Marion Superior Court. The law in question, commonly called “the Affiliation Statute,” contains objective criteria for determining eligibility to appear on the primary ballot of a major political party and discretion for a party to allow the candidacy regardless of compliance. [Footnote omitted.] A judge blocked enforcement of the law, finding it unconstitutional for a variety of reasons, triggering direct appeal to this Court. Focusing primarily on the weighing of First Amendment “rights of association” of both Appellants and Appellee, we first stayed the trial court’s ruling on February 15, 2024 and reversed it entirely on February 27, 2024, remanding with an order to enter judgment for Appellants on all claims. [Footnotes omitted] Today, we explain why.
Neither the Constitution of the United States nor the Constitution of the State of Indiana mentions political parties, but the Founders were keenly aware “that splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may do significant damage to the fabric of government.” Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974) (citing FEDERALIST, NO. 10 (Madison)). The United States Supreme Court fifty years ago accordingly found “the State’s interest in the stability of its political system” to be “compelling,” id. at 736, and later recognized that “[a] political party has a First Amendment right to limit its membership as it wishes, and to choose a candidate-selection process that will in its view produce the nominee who best represents its political platform,” N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 202 (2008) (citing Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisc. ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981)). The political party seeking the law’s enforcement and the State Appellants defending its legitimacy thus wield the First Amendment as a “shield,” López Torres, 552 U.S. at 203, to deny Rust entry to the ballot.
Appellee Rust, conversely, claims First Amendment associational rights of his own, to wield as a “sword,” id., to force his way on the ballot. And in that clash today, the shield checks the sword, as we find the minor requirements of the Affiliation Statute reflect an elegant balancing of First Amendment interests and are thus constitutionally sound.
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I. Rust’s First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges fail because the Affiliation Statute imposes a minor, reasonable and nondiscriminatory restriction that advances a litany of important state regulatory interests.
With justiciability established, we turn to the merits. Rust successfully challenged the Affiliation Statute on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds, arguing it violated his rights of association. Today, we reach the opposite conclusion, and hold the Affiliation Statute survives this constitutional attack.
A. First Principles of Free Association
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Against this backdrop, the core First Amendment question before us today is: Who decides? That is, who decides whether Rust can run as a Republican on the 2024 primary ballot for United States Senate in Indiana? Himself? Or the Republican Party? The Affiliation Statute says both: Rust decides if he votes in two primaries; the party decides if he does not.
We find solid footing in the broad principle pronounced in López Torres: “A political party has a First Amendment right to limit its membership as it wishes, and to choose a candidate-selection that will in its view produce the nominee who best represents its political platform.” 552 U.S. at 202 (emphasis added)…
B. Application of Anderson-Burdick Framework
With the First Amendment principles established, we turn to the Anderson-Burdick framework to evaluate whether the Affiliation Statute survives Rust’s First Amendment challenges. Under this standard, we assess the competing rights of both parties and candidates. Based on our application of this standard, the Affiliation Statute passes constitutional muster, despite Rust’s insistence to the contrary.
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The trial court, in reviewing this challenge, concluded there was (1) “no compelling or even rational government interest being served here,” and (2) the statute was not “tailored” to meet the State’s purported interests. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p. 20. We disagree. Because the Affiliation Statute imposes a minor, reasonable and nondiscriminatory restriction on Rust’s rights, justified by the State’s catalogue of legitimate interests, it survives this attack under the Anderson-Burdick standard. [Footnote omitted.]
1. The Affiliation Statute imposes a minor, reasonable and nondiscriminatory limitation on Rust’s associational rights.
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2. The State has important interests supporting this minor restriction on Rust’s access to the primary-election ballot.
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We therefore need not second-guess the wisdom of the Affiliation Statute—the expression of a majority of Hoosiers who are represented by legislators they elected who passed this law, and by a Governor who signed it. See Columbus, Chi. & Ind. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Grant Cnty., 65 Ind. 427, 438 (1878). These citizens—and their wishes as expressed in the Affiliation Statute—would have their will undermined if the dissent’s policy preference won out today. But that assertion of raw judicial power, ironically, made in the people’s name, would in the end diminish their power by enlarging ours. While the legislature may change the law, the First Amendment does not compel us to invalidate it.
Because the Affiliation Statute imposes a minor, reasonable and nondiscriminatory restriction on Rust’s First Amendment rights, which is justified by the State’s interests, it satisfies Anderson-Burdick standard.
II. Rust’s other arguments fail on the merits.
We address Rust’s remaining arguments in turn and conclude that none of them are successful on the merits.
A. Vagueness and Overbreadth
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The Affiliation Statute does not fit within this traditional understanding of void-for-vagueness because it does not prohibit certain conduct, nor is it enforced by civil or criminal penalties. See I.C. § 3-8-2- 7(a)(4). We are thus averse to applying this doctrine outside the criminal context…
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B. Seventeenth Amendment
Rust also argues that the Affiliation Statute violates the Seventeenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it “improperly takes rights away from voters and gives them to the state legislature and party chairs.” Appellee’s Br. at 38. He concludes this “indirectly” limits candidate choices, id. at 39, and thus “leads to voter disenfranchisement and an inability to cast votes effectively,” id. at 38. We disagree.
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C. Equal Protection under the Indiana Constitution
Rust presses a state constitutional claim that the Affiliation Statute violates his equal protection rights under Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution. Appellee’s Br. at 41. He argues that he suffered from (1) “disparate treatment” and that (2) this treatment was “not related to inherent characteristics.” Id. at 44. Id. at 44. We disagree.
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We agree with the State there is no equal protection violation as applied to Rust. The Affiliation Statute applies the same requirements on everyone who desires to run in a party’s primary election, including Rust. I.C. § 3-8-2-7(a)(4). Two reasons reinforce our conclusion today.
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D. Improper Amendment to the Indiana Constitution
Rust advances another state constitutional claim, arguing that the Affiliation Statute “improperly” amends Article 4, Section 7 of the Indiana Constitution, which establishes eligibility requirements to run for the State Senate and House of Representatives. Appellee’s Br. at 45. His argument is that the Affiliation Statute modifies this provision without following the amendment process. Unusually, this claim is about Rust’s status as a voter—not as a candidate for federal office—as “he seeks to have all willing and constitutionally eligible candidates on the ballot so that he may have meaningful choices and cast his vote effectively.” Id. at 46. He argues that the Affiliation Statute “adds extra requirements” to our Constitution. Id. at 45. The State objected, in part, because Rust lacks standing. We share the State’s concern.
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Because Rust lacks standing to bring this claim as a voter under Article 4, Section 7, his claim will not be reviewed on the merits.
E. Invalid Use of Discretion under Affiliation Statute
Finally, Rust argued that Chairperson Lowery’s discretion in applying the Affiliation Statute was invalid and illegal because it “violates multiple canons of statutory construction.” Appellee’s Br. at 48. Rust argues that her discretion: (1) conflicts with the purpose and spirit of the law; (2) engrafts words onto the statute; (3) renders a portion of the statute meaningless; and (4) conflicts with Indiana Code Section 3-10-1-2.
Rust is mistaken: the canons of interpretation support—not undermine—Lowery’s discretion..
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Conclusion
Because the Affiliation Statute is not unconstitutional, and because Rust’s remaining arguments lack merit, we reverse the trial court and remand with instructions to enter judgment for the State.
Slaughter and Molter, JJ., concur. Molter, J., concurs with separate opinion in which Slaughter, J., joins. Goff, J., dissents with separate opinion in which Rush, C.J., joins.
Molter, J., concurring.
I agree that all of John Rust’s claims fail for the reasons the Court’s opinion explains. For Rust’s First Amendment claim, the volleys between the Court’s opinion and the dissenting opinion continue great debates our country has been having since its founding about how democracy functions best and the role of judges in our divided government. I take no position on the best way to run elections, and between the competing views of the judicial role, I align more closely with the Court’s opinion.
But I write separately to demonstrate that when we walk through the First Amendment analysis with smaller steps, we can resolve this case without having to resolve those bigger debates. The bottom line boils down to this: the Affiliation Statute limits primary candidates to those who are either party members or who vote in the party’s primary elections, and the United States Supreme Court interprets the First Amendment as compelling that sort of limitation rather than prohibiting it. The Affiliation Statute does not impermissibly burden Rust’s First Amendment rights because its requirement to either become a party member or vote in the party’s primaries was not too onerous for Rust to satisfy. Instead, Rust did not satisfy the requirement because the party exercised its own First Amendment right to deny his membership, and he chose not to vote in the party’s primaries.
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A. The Affiliation Statute provides alternative routes to the primary ballot that reflect legislative balancing.
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B. For the party‐controlled option, county chairs certify only party membership, not permission to run for a particular office.
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C. A candidate can challenge a local party chair’s membership decision through the party’s internal appeal process.
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II. The Affiliation Statute’s Constitutionality
After establishing how the Affiliation Statute operates, the constitutional analysis rests on stronger footing. Rust’s argument that some county chairs are not complying with the Affiliation Statute is a reason to enforce the statute, not to invalidate it as unconstitutional. While Rust disagrees with Lowery’s decision that he is not a party member, he opted not to pursue the party’s internal appeal process or to seek relief in the courts to compel Lowery’s certification. And he cannot skip to the nuclear option of invalidating the statute before exhausting all other options for compelling statutory compliance consistent with the Constitution.
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A. Rust’s claim that some party chairs don’t follow the statute is a reason to enforce it, not to invalidate it.
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B. Rust’s First Amendment claim fails as both a facial challenge and as an as‐applied challenge.
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III. Conclusion
The First Amendment permits States to limit primary election candidates to those who are party members or vote in the party’s primary elections. That is all the Affiliation Statute does, and Rust has failed to carry his burden to prove that requiring him to comply with the statute violates his First Amendment rights. I therefore agree with the Court’s conclusion that we must vacate the injunction and that judgment must be entered for the defendants.
Slaughter, J., joins.
Goff, J., dissenting.
Because I believe the application of the Affiliation Statute to John Rust violates his First Amendment right of association, I respectfully dissent from the decision of the Court. [Footnote omitted.]
The Republican Party’s 2024 primary election to select their nominee for United States Senate will feature one candidate. That person’s nomination will therefore be uncontested. Meanwhile, Rust—who’s donated thousands of dollars to national Republicans, who adheres to the Republican Party platform’s core beliefs, and whose participation has been welcomed by his local Republican party—is barred by the Statute because he failed to vote in two consecutive Republican Party primaries and the party’s county chairperson has refused to certify him as a party member. The burden imposed on Rust by these restrictions, in my view, is unjustified by the interests advanced by the State. And while the legislature is best suited to weigh the costs and benefits of a given ballot restriction, this Court is still responsible for safeguarding against legislative overreach.
I. Primary elections emerged to divest party leaders of control over the nominating process, but today’s system can impose onerous barriers on candidates.
Disputes over the regulation of party primaries “are inherently intraparty squabbles pitting one component of the party (voters and candidates) against another (usually the party organization).” Nathaniel Persily, Candidates v. Parties: The Constitutional Constraints on Primary Ballot Access Laws, 89 Geo. L.J. 2181, 2185 (2001). In finding no violation of Rust’s associational rights, the Court focuses on the State’s “legitimate interest in safeguarding parties from forced inclusion of unwanted members and candidates.” Ante, at 19. But this position, it’s worth emphasizing, stands in stark contrast to the reason primaries in Indiana emerged to begin with: to limit the power of party leaders to dictate nominations. Primaries are not meant to be opportunities for party leaders to crown their favored candidates—and certainly not in uncontested ballots.
A. Primaries are a chance for the voters (i.e., the party-in-the-electorate), not just party leaders, to select nominees.
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B. Indiana’s current primary system features a high barrier to candidate entry.
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II. The Affiliation Statute violates Rust’s right to associate with the Republican Party as its nominee for U.S. Senate.
The Court insists that “the State could abolish its primary system altogether and provide no opportunity for Rust to exercise his associational rights if it so desired.” Ante, at 23. Though certainly true, this proposition misses the point. While “states enjoy near absolute authority in their decisions whether to create democracy, once they do so, they invite constitutional scrutiny over every aspect of the system they enact.” Persily, supra, at 2209 (emphasis added). So, “primary elections, while not constitutionally required, must abide by certain constitutional rules once the state (or party as state actor) makes them part of the selection process for representatives.” Id.
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A. The Affiliation Statute substantially burdens Rust’s associational rights.
I agree with the Court that Rust does not have “a fundamental right to run for United States Senate as the Republican nominee.” Ante, at 13. But Rust is relying on rights that rank among the “most precious freedoms” in our system of representative democracy: “the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.” [Footnote omittied.] Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30–31 (1968)). And while a state may restrict ballot access in the public interest, it can do so only by means that do not “unfairly or unnecessarily burden” the electorate’s right to vote and a candidate’s “equally important interest in the continued availability of political opportunity.” Lubin, 415 U.S. at 716 (emphasis added).
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B. The State’s alleged interests are insufficiently weighty to justify the ballot restrictions as applied to Rust.
For this Court to sustain the Affiliation Statute, the constitutional injury to Rust must be justified and counterbalanced by the “precise interests” offered by the State that “make it necessary to burden” his rights. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the State Defendants invoke the need to prevent “voter confusion by preserving party identifiability, avoiding ballot overcrowding and frivolous candidacies, and maintaining order, rather than chaos, in Indiana’s primary and general elections.” Appellants’ Br. at 27; see also id. at 15–16 (citing the need to maintain fair and honest elections, preserve party identities, enhance party-building efforts, guard against party raiding, and avoid voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, and frivolous candidacies).
While these interests are certainly legitimate in the abstract, they fall far short, in my view, of justifying the Statute’s ballot-access restrictions as applied to Rust.
1. There’s no potential for ballot overcrowding.
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2. There’s likewise no potential for party raiding or a frivolous candidacy.
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3. The State’s purported interest in protecting the parties’ associational rights is limited.
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a. Giving Rust primary-ballot access doesn’t impose his nomination on the Republican Party.
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b. The Republican Party has never excluded Rust from membership.
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c. Given its potential for arbitrary application, the certification option fails to mitigate the burden of the two-primary barrier.
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III. The Court’s decision gives the legislature unrestricted authority to regulate the primary ballot.
The Court characterizes the foregoing analysis as expressing a policy preference. Ante, at 26. But it carries out exactly what the Anderson/Burdick test calls for: weighing “the character and magnitude” of the plaintiff’s asserted constitutional injury against “the precise interests” offered by the state to justify the restriction and the “extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. The Court, for its part, simply recites the State’s asserted interests— avoiding voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, frivolous candidacies, and general “chaos” in Indiana’s elections—with no analysis of how those purported interests are necessary to burden Rust’s constitutional rights. See ante, at 21.
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Conclusion
“A fundamental principle of our representative democracy,” the U.S. Supreme Court once observed, quoting the words of Alexander Hamilton, “‘is that the people should choose whom they please to govern them.’” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) (quoting 2 Elliot’s Debates 257) (emphasis added). And “this principle is undermined as much by limiting whom the people can select as by limiting the franchise itself.” Id.
I couldn’t agree more. And while the State has a legitimate interest in regulating the ballot—to avoid voter confusion or party raiding and to preserve the parties’ associational rights—those interests, in my view, fail to justify the onerous burden imposed on Rust.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the decision of the Court to uphold the Affiliation Statute as applied to Rust.
Rush, C.J., joins.