Pyle, J.
Statement of the Case
C.M. and K.M. (“Adoptive Parents”) appeal the trial court’s order, which established Y.N.’s (“Putative Father”) paternity of L.A. (“L.A.”). Adoptive Parents argue that Putative Father was barred from establishing paternity because his consent to L.A.’s adoption had been irrevocably implied when he failed to timely register with the Putative Father Registry (“the Registry”). Concluding that Putative Father’s consent to L.A.’s adoption had been irrevocably implied as a result of his failure to timely register with the Registry and that he was, therefore, barred from challenging the adoption or establishing paternity, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.
We reverse.
Issue
Whether Putative Father was barred from establishing paternity because his consent to L.A.’s adoption had been irrevocably implied when he failed to timely register with the Registry.
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Adoptive Parents argue that Putative Father was barred from establishing paternity because his consent to L.A.’s adoption had been irrevocably implied when he failed to timely register with the Registry. We agree.
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“A putative father who fails to register within the period specified by [INDIANA CODE § 31-19-5-12(a)] waives notice of an adoption proceeding. The putative father’s waiver under this section constitutes an irrevocably implied consent to the child’s adoption.” I.C. § 31-19-5-18. See also I.C. § 31-19-9-12 (providing that “[a] putative father’s consent to adoption is irrevocably implied without further court action if the putative father . . . (4) is required to but fails to register with the putative father registry established by IC 31-19-5 within the period under IC 31-19-5-12”).
Further, a putative father “whose consent to adoption is [irrevocably] implied under . . . IC 31-19-5-18 is not entitled to challenge: (1) the adoption; or (2) the validity of the putative father’s implied consent to the adoption.” I.C. § 31-19- 9-13. In addition, a putative father whose consent to an adoption has been irrevocably implied may not establish paternity. K.G.B., 18 N.E.3d at 297; see also I.C. § 31-19-9-14 (stating that a putative father whose consent to the adoption has been statutorily irrevocably implied is not entitled to establish paternity of the child).
Here, K.Q.A. did not disclose the name or address of Putative Father. Therefore, in order to be entitled to notice of the adoption, Putative Father was required to comply with INDIANA CODE § 31-19-5-12, which, as set forth above, provided as follows at the time Adoptive Parents filed the petition to adopt L.A.:
(a) To be entitled to notice of an adoption under IC 31-19-3 or IC 31-19-4, a putative father must register with the state department of health under section 5 of this chapter not later than:
(1) thirty (30) days after the child’s birth; or
(2) the earlier of the date of the filing of the petition for the:
(A) child’s adoption; or
(B) the termination of the parent-child relationship between the child and the child’s mother;
whichever occurs later.
The trial court interpreted this statute to allow Putative Father to register with the Registry not later than thirty days after the date of filing of the adoption petition. [Footnote omitted.] Adoptive Parents argue that “the Trial Court mistakenly interpreted IC 31-19-5-12(a) to allow [Putative Father] 30 days from the date of the filing of the adoption petition – not 30 days from the birth – to register with the [Registry].” (Adoptive Parents’ Br. 13). We agree with Adoptive Parents.
The outcome in this case turns on the interpretation of INDIANA CODE § 31-19- 5-12(a) because if the trial court properly interpreted the statute, Putative Father’s registration with the Registry was timely. However, if Adoptive Parents are correct that the trial court misinterpreted the statute, Putative Father’s registration with the Registry was not timely. And, if Putative Father’s registration was untimely, his consent to the adoption was irrevocably implied and he was barred from establishing paternity of L.A.
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INDIANA CODE § 31-19-5-12(a) provides that a putative father must register with the Registry by the later of two dates, which are set forth in subsections (1) and (2). INDIANA CODE § 31-19-5-12(a)(1) “does say” that one of those dates is not later than thirty days after the child’s birth. However, INDIANA CODE § 31- 19-5-12(a)(2) “does not say” that the other of those dates is not later than thirty days after the date of the filing of the adoption petition. Instead, it simply reads the date of the filing of the petition for the child’s adoption.
We further note that had the legislature intended for the thirty days to apply to both subsections (1) and (2), the legislature could have included the thirty-day time period in subsection (a). Or, the legislature could have repeated the thirty-day time period in subsection (2). The legislature did neither.
We, therefore, conclude that to comply with INDIANA CODE § 31-19-5-12(a) and to be entitled to notice of an adoption, a putative father must register with the Registry not later than thirty days after the child is born or not later than the date of the filing of the adoption petition, whichever date occurs later.
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Applying our interpretation of the statute to the facts of this case, we note that L.A. was born on August 15, 2022, and Adoptive Parents filed a petition to adopt L.A. on August 25, 2022. Thus, pursuant to the terms of the statute, Putative Father was required to register with the Registry no later than thirty days after L.A.’s birth, which would have been September 14, 2022; or the date of the filing of the adoption petition, which was August 25, 2022. The later of these dates is September 14, 2022. However, Putative Father did not register with the Registry until September 23, 2022. Putative Father’s registration was untimely because it was nine days past the statutory deadline. Pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 31-19-5-18, Putative Father’s consent to the adoption was, therefore, irrevocably implied, and Putative Father was barred from challenging the adoption or establishing paternity. Accordingly, the trial court erred in entering an order establishing Putative Father’s paternity, and we reverse the trial court’s judgment. [Footnote omitted.]
Reversed. Tavitas, J., and Foley, J., concur.