Tavitas, J.
Case Summary
In this interlocutory appeal, Amanda Peters (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s dismissal of Benjamin Brassard (“Father”) and Cynthia Meyer (“Grandmother”) from a Child Wrongful Death Statute (“CWDS”) action brought by Mother against the Girl Scouts of Southwest Indiana (“Girl Scouts”).1 The trial court dismissed Father’s and Grandmother’s claims based upon their failure to file claims within the two-year period prescribed by the CWDS, but Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion by doing so. We conclude that Father and Grandmother failed to file timely claims, and accordingly, we affirm.
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Here, Isabelle died on June 24, 2019; Mother filed her action on July 10, 2020, well within the two-year time constraint. Mother added Father as a defendant in November 2020, but service was not made upon Father until July 2021. Father did not file an answer until August 9, 2021. Accordingly, although Father was added as a defendant well within the two years, service of the complaint and his answer were not made until after the two-year time constraint expired. As for Grandmother, she was not added as a defendant until June 2022, well after the two-year time period, and she has never answered or filed an appearance in this litigation.
Mother, however, argues that neither Father nor Grandmother were required to “bring a claim” to be entitled to an apportionment of damages under the CWDS….
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Only one action for Isabelle’s death is allowed under the CWDS. See, e.g., Hanna v. Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 963 N.E.2d 72, 77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (“Pursuant to the CWD[S], it is apparent that the parents of a minor child can maintain a single, joint claim for the death of their minor child. In other words, nothing in the statute permits each parent to maintain a separate wrongful death claim in his or her own right.”), trans. denied. Thus, where, as here, one parent has filed a CWDS action, the statute requires that the other parent be added as a “codefendant to answer as to his or her interest.” See Ind. Code § 34-23-2-1(c)(1).
Here, Mother added both Father and Grandmother as defendants. The Girl Scouts complain that the CWDS does not allow a guardian to be named as a codefendant. We acknowledge that the CWDS does not require the guardian— here, Grandmother—who may also maintain an action, to be added as a codefendant. Although the CWDS requires a parent to add the other parent as a codefendant, we conclude that nothing in the CWDS prevents the parent from also joining the guardian as an indispensable party under Trial Rule 19. [Footnote omitted.] A guardian could also file a motion to intervene pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 24. [Footnotes omitted.]
Despite the addition of Father and Grandmother as parties to the litigation, Mother argues that it was unnecessary for Father and Grandmother to file a claim in the action until the case was ready for settlement or trial. Mother’s argument, however, is inconsistent with our basic trial rules and procedures. We are aware of no authority for the proposition that a party claiming damages from the defendant may simply show up any time before settlement or trial and assert a right to damages.
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Here, although Father asserted his rights in an answer after the two-year time constraint expired, Grandmother has never filed a claim or even an appearance in the litigation. In fact, Mother concedes in her Reply Brief that, should Mother’s appeal be dismissed, Father and Grandmother “will not have a right to maintain [Mother’s] claim, and the statute of limitations will bar them from filing an independent claim of their own.” Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 8. Mother, however, contends that, because her complaint was timely, Father’s and Grandmother’s “right to an apportionment of damages arising therefrom is not subject to a statute of limitation dismissal.” Appellant’s Br. p. 13. Mother cites no relevant authority, including any trial rules, for this proposition.
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We reach the same conclusion here. Under our trial rules, Father and Grandmother were required to assert a claim to be entitled to an apportionment of damages. Neither Father nor Grandmother asserted their claims within the CWDS’s two-year time constraint, and Mother presents no relevant authority for the proposition that Father’s and Grandmother’s claims were timely simply because Mother’s complaint was timely. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed Father and Grandmother.
Conclusion
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the Girl Scouts’ motions to dismiss Father and Grandmother. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed. Pyle, J., and Foley, J., concur.