Tavitas, J.
Case Summary
Connie Davis-Brumley filed a wrongful death action against Fair Oaks Farms, LLC; Fair Oaks Hospitality, LLC; Farmhouse Restaurant, LLC (collectively “Fair Oaks”); and Samantha Kunkel (all collectively “Defendants”) based on the death of her son, Justin M. Davis (“Justin”). Davis-Brumley originally filed the action as natural mother of Justin, and she petitioned the probate court to be appointed as special administratrix of Justin’s estate (“the Estate”) the same day that she filed her wrongful death complaint. The next day, one day after the two-year period for the filing of the wrongful death action elapsed, the probate court granted Davis-Brumley’s petition to be appointed as special administratrix. Thereafter, in the wrongful death action, Davis-Brumley filed a motion to substitute the Estate as plaintiff. Fair Oaks then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the wrongful death action was not brought by the personal representative of the Estate within the statutory two-year filing period of the Wrongful Death Act.
The trial court entered an order granting the motion to dismiss and denying the motion to substitute. Davis-Brumley appeals and argues: (1) the wrongful death action was timely filed because Davis-Brumley petitioned to be appointed as special administratrix of the Estate within the two-year filing period, and therefore, the trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss; and (2) the trial court erred by denying the motion to substitute because the trial court’s ruling thereon was based on its allegedly erroneous ruling on the motion to dismiss. We are not persuaded by these arguments. Accordingly, we affirm.
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Davis-Brumley argues that she timely filed the wrongful death action because she petitioned to be appointed as special administratrix within the two-year filing period, regardless of when that petition was ultimately granted. Our cases do not appear to have addressed this exact argument. We have, however, emphasized that, if the person filing the wrongful death action is not the personal representative of the decedent’s estate, the person must obtain “the legal status of personal representative . . . within the two-year timeframe” for the claim to be actionable. Brugh, 202 N.E.3d at 1097 (citing Rogers v. Grunden, 589 N.E.2d 248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992, trans. denied); Faris v. AC and S., Inc., 842 N.E.2d 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), reh’g denied). Davis-Brumley did not do so here.
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We are, therefore, constrained to follow the general rule that the two-year filing period for an action under the Wrongful Death Act cannot be tolled. Because Davis-Brumley did not file her wrongful death action as special administratrix or personal representative of the Estate within two years of Justin’s death, her complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by dismissing the wrongful death complaint or by denying the motion to substitute the Estate as the plaintiff in the action.
Conclusion
The trial court did not err by dismissing the wrongful death complaint, nor did it err by denying the motion to substitute. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Weissmann, J., concur