Vaidik, J.
Case Summary
Fernando Marroquin was convicted of Class D felony sexual misconduct with a minor, which is not (and has never been) a crime that requires sex-offender registration in Indiana. However, he then moved to Virginia, where such a crime requires lifetime registration. When he later moved back to Indiana, he was told he must register for life because he had been required to do so in Virginia. The basis for this purported requirement is Indiana Code section 11-88-19(f), which provides, “A person who is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction shall register for the period required by the other jurisdiction or the period described in this section, whichever is longer.” Marroquin challenged the Indiana registration requirement, and the trial court ruled that Section 11-8-8-19(f) applies even when the only reason the offender would have to register in another jurisdiction is the existence of an Indiana conviction. We disagree and reverse.
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Again, Section 11-8-8-19(f) provides, “A person who is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction shall register for the period required by the other jurisdiction or the period described in this section, whichever is longer.” Marroquin contends this statute doesn’t apply when the requirement to register in another jurisdiction is based entirely on the existence of an Indiana conviction—that is, when there is no “independent requirement” to register in another jurisdiction. Appellant’s Br. p. 10. We agree.
….In other words, the purpose of Section 11-8-8-5(b)(1) is to ensure that a person who is required to register in another jurisdiction because of a sex offense in that jurisdiction cannot avoid registration by moving to Indiana. See id. at 95 (explaining that “Indiana is choosing to defer to offender status determinations made by other states”). And Section 11-8-8-19(f) simply establishes how long such out-of-state offenders must register in Indiana. Because Marroquin committed his sex offense in Indiana, he is not included in Section 11-8-8-5(b)(1) and is not subject to Section 11-8-8-19(f).
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Because Section 11-8-8-19(f) doesn’t apply to Marroquin, and because Indiana doesn’t require registration for Class D felony sexual misconduct with a minor, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the Commissioner and remand for the entry of summary judgment for Marroquin.
Reversed and remanded.
May, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.