Shepard, S.J.
In 2005, Indiana adopted a “Red Flag Law” authorizing the seizure of firearms from demonstrably dangerous individuals. It did so in response to the death of Indianapolis Officer Jack Laird the year before.
This case tests the level of evidence necessary to support such a seizure. The Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department (“MCSD”) seized firearms and ammunition from James Morgan while investigating a domestic dispute. Morgan appeals the trial court’s judgment ordering MCSD to retain the seized firearms and ammunition. Concluding the trial court did not err, we affirm.
Morgan raises two issues, which we restate as:
I. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence.
II. Whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the trial court’s judgment.
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I. Admission of Evidence
Morgan argues the trial court erred in allowing Deputy Curtis to testify about statements Brooke made to him, claiming the statements were inadmissible hearsay.
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Morgan argues the State failed to show Brooke was still under stress when she spoke with Deputy Curtis. In particular, he claims the deputy did not speak with Brooke until he had been at the home for fifteen minutes, implying any stress had dissipated by then. Morgan’s claim lacks evidentiary support because he cites a portion of the deputy’s body camera recording that was not played for the trial court during the evidentiary hearing. We will not reverse the court’s ruling via evidence not presented to the court. See Brendenwood Common v. Kahlenbeck, 421 N.E.2d 421, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (refusing to consider affidavit presented for the first time on appeal), on reh’g, trans. denied.
In any event, Deputy Curtis’s interaction with Brooke occurred shortly after Brooke had witnessed her fiancé angrily wielding a firearm while yelling at her daughter and her son’s girlfriend, followed swiftly by her fiancé having an armed confrontation with several officers, during which Brooke had told her fiancé to put down the handgun. Brooke appeared to be upset and cried as she spoke with the deputy. This evidence supports a conclusion Brooke was still under the stress of the event when she spoke with Deputy Curtis. See Holmes v. State, 480 N.E.2d 916, 918 (Ind. 1985) (no error in admission of officer’s description of witness’s statement; witness had seen a shooting several minutes prior and was still emotionally distraught).
Next, Morgan claims Brooke’s statements to the deputy did not relate to Morgan’s armed confrontations with her daughter and the police. We disagree. Brooke told the officers about Morgan’s mental health history, his refusal to take his medication, and his need for help. Brooke also said she was scared of Morgan. These statements related to Morgan’s recent frightening behavior while armed. See Stinson v. State, 126 N.E.3d 915, 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (no error in admitting witness’s descriptions of another person’s statements; the person had witnessed a stabbing, and the statements about who committed the stabbing related to the event). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Deputy Curtis’s testimony about Brooke’s statements to him.
II. Retention of Firearms and Ammunition
Morgan claims the trial court’s order directing the MCSD to retain the firearms and ammunition lacks sufficient evidentiary support. When “a law enforcement officer seizes a firearm from an individual whom the law enforcement officer believes to be dangerous” without first obtaining a warrant, the officer must submit an affidavit to a circuit or superior court describing why the officer believes the individual is dangerous. Ind. Code § 35-47-14-3(a) (2020). If the court finds probable cause exists to believe the individual is dangerous, the court shall order the law enforcement agency to retain the firearm. I.C. § 35-47-14-3(d). The court shall next conduct an evidentiary hearing. Ind. Code § 35-47-14-5(a) (2019). At the hearing, the State must prove “by clear and convincing evidence” material facts demonstrating the individual is dangerous. Ind. Code § 35-47-14-6(b) (2020).
“The clear and convincing evidence standard is an intermediate standard of proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence and less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” K.H. v. M.M., 151 N.E.3d 1259, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. “In order to be clear and convincing, the existence of a fact must be highly probable.” Commitment of B.J. v. Eskenazi Hosp./Midtown CMHC, 67 N.E.3d 1034, 1038 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
In the context of proceedings for the seizure and retention of firearms, the General Assembly has defined “dangerous” as follows:
(a) . . . an individual is ‘dangerous’ if:
(1) the individual presents an imminent risk of personal injury to the individual or to another individual; or
(2) It is probable that the individual will present a risk of personal injury to the individual or to another individual in the future and the individual:
(A) has a mental illness (as defined in IC 12-7-2-130) that may be controlled by medication, and has not demonstrated a pattern of voluntarily and consistently taking the individual’s medication while not under supervision; or
(B) is the subject of documented evidence that would give rise to a reasonable belief that the individual has a propensity for violent or suicidal conduct.
Ind. Code § 35-47-14-1 (2019).
We focus our analysis on subsection (a)(2) of the statute. Based on a plain reading of the text, the State must prove an individual “will present a risk of personal injury to the individual or to another individual in the future” and then also prove circumstances supporting either subsection (a)(2)(A) or subsection (a)(2)(B). Id.; see also West v. Off. of Ind. Sec’y of State, 54 N.E.3d 349, 353 (Ind. 2016) (courts “start with the plain language of the statute, giving its words their ordinary meaning and considering the structure of the statute as a whole”).
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Morgan argues he does not pose a probable future risk of harm to himself or others because Brooke, Benjamin, and Michael testified they trust him to not repeat his behavior. Morgan also notes Brooke said he is now taking his medication reliably. Finally, Morgan claims he allowed the officers to handcuff him and spoke with them in a “logical” manner, thus demonstrating some degree of reasonableness. Appellant’s Br. p. 15. These arguments amount to a request to reweigh the evidence, which our standard of review forbids. B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 288. The trial court could reasonably conclude the State established, by clear and convincing evidence, a probability Morgan will present a risk of personal injury to himself or to another individual in the future for purposes of Indiana Code section 35-47-14-1(a)(2).
We next consider whether there is clear and convincing evidence to show Morgan “is the subject of documented evidence that would give rise to a reasonable belief that the individual has a propensity for violent or suicidal conduct.” Ind. Code § 35-47-14-1(a)(2)(B). Morgan has a prior conviction of misdemeanor domestic violence against Brooke, the owner of the firearms and ammunition in question. Further, when Deputy Curtis told Morgan he did not want to see him get hurt, Morgan, who appeared to be unstable, said he did not care and asked the deputy to hurt him. We also note Brooke testified that Morgan’s refusal to take his medication, which led to his angry armed confrontation, was related to his ongoing “night terrors,” which she described as provoking a “manic episode.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 59. Brooke did not say Morgan’s night terrors and manic episodes had stopped, merely that he was taking his medication. This evidence demonstrates a high probability Morgan has a propensity for violent or suicidal conduct. See Redington v. State, 992 N.E.2d 823, 845 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (affirming order for police to retain Redington’s firearms; Redington was taking anti-psychotic medication at the time of the hearing, but he still experienced symptoms that could lead to potentially dangerous behavior), trans. denied.
Morgan argues the trial court should have released the firearms to a third party…But the proposed third party must express willingness to “enter into a written court agreement” to accept the firearm. Ind. Code § 35-47-14- 1.5(3) (2019). Here, Brooke stated her father-in-law could take possession of the firearms and ammunition, but he did not personally appear and state he would enter into a written agreement. Morgan’s third-party claim must fail because he did not comply with the plain language of Indiana Code section 35- 47-14-1.5(3).
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.