Pyle, J.
Statement of the Case
In this medical malpractice case, Amanda Ping (“Ping”) appeals following a jury verdict in favor of Margaret Inman, M.D. (“Dr. Inman”). Ping challenges the trial court’s denial of her motion to correct error based on juror misconduct. Ping argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her request for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing on her juror misconduct claim. Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her request for an evidentiary hearing, we reverse and remand with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of juror misconduct.
We reverse and remand with instructions.
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“A [party] seeking a hearing on juror misconduct must first present some specific, substantial evidence showing a juror was possibly biased.” Lopez v. State, 527 N.E.2d 1119, 1130 (Ind. 1988) (citing Berkman v. State, 459 N.E.2d 44, 46 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)). See also Diehl, 12 N.E.3d at 296; Thompson v. Gerowitz, 944 N.E.2d 1, 8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. “‘[W]hen [the moving party] presents evidence that a juror was possibly biased, and concealed this bias on voir dire, the trial court generally must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the juror was in fact biased.’” Diehl, 12 N.E.3d at 296 (quoting Berkman, 459 N.E.2d at 46).
Here, our review of the record reveals that Juror 11 did not disclose her familiarity with Dr. Cheadle until after the jury had rendered its verdict. There was no opportunity for Ping, Dr. Inman, or the trial court to probe into Juror 11’s possible bias due to her familiarity with Dr. Cheadle.
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Here, the facts before us are similar to those of Barnes and Diehl. Our review of the record reveals that Juror 11 did not disclose during voir dire or the entirety of the trial that she knew Dr. Cheadle. After the jury entered a verdict in favor of Dr. Inman, Juror 11 disclosed that she had been familiar with Dr. Cheadle through her work but had never interacted with or worked with him. Further Juror 11 disclosed that “she found the testimony of Dr. []Cheadle to weigh more than the plaintiff’s experts.” (App. Vol. 2 at 37). Juror 11’s statements are the kind of “specific, substantial evidence” of possible bias that merit an evidentiary hearing. Lopez, 527 N.E.2d at 1130. See also Barnes, 330 N.E.2d at 747 (holding that a juror who did not disclose that he was a second cousin to a prosecutor’s staff required an evidentiary hearing to determine if the juror was aware of his relationship to the prosecutor’s staff); see also Diehl, 12 N.E.3d at 298 (holding that a juror in a vehicle collision damages case who had been a defendant in a vehicle collision case twelve years prior to his service as a juror required an evidentiary hearing to determine bias or prejudice).
Because the record shows that there was a possibility of juror bias, the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing. See Lopez, 527 N.E.2d at 1130. At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court can determine the extent of Juror 11’s knowledge of Dr. Cheadle and if it interfered with her ability to render a verdict solely on the evidence presented at trial. Much like we had previously held in Diehl, “the inquiry that should have occurred during voir dire must now occur in a post-trial evidentiary hearing.” Diehl, 12 N.E.3d at 298. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Juror 11 was actually biased or prejudiced against Ping due to her familiarity with Dr. Cheadle through her work as a medical device vendor.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.