Goff, J.
The essential facts of this case are as follows: When Tonia Land first became a customer of IU Credit Union (IUCU), she received an account agreement, the terms of which were “subject to change at any time.” App. Vol. II, p. 43. When Land later registered for online banking, she received and accepted a second agreement, permitting IUCU to “modify the terms and conditions applicable to the Services from time to time.” Id. at 118. In 2019, IUCU sent to Land a proposed change to these agreements (the Addendum). The terms of the Addendum would have (1) permitted either party to require arbitration for resolving disputes and (2) prohibited Land from initiating or joining a class-action lawsuit. Id. at 127. Unless Land exercised her “right to opt out” of this arrangement within thirty days of receiving notice, the Addendum stated, its proposed terms would become binding. Id. Land, while never having exercised this right, later filed a class-action complaint against IUCU. Citing the Addendum, IUCU sought to compel arbitration.
On transfer, this Court held that, while IUCU provided Land with reasonable notice of its offer to amend the original agreements, Land’s subsequent silence and inaction did not—under Section 69 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts—result in her assent to that offer. Land v. IU Credit Union, 218 N.E.3d 1282, 1291 (Ind. 2023).
IUCU now petitions for rehearing, claiming that the Court failed to address certain legal authorities and arguments raised on appeal and in the transfer proceedings. We hereby grant the petition to address these claims. While we affirm our original opinion in full, we leave open the possibility, in some future case, of adopting a different standard governing the offer and acceptance of unilateral contracts between businesses and consumers.
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IUCU raises two principal claims on rehearing: (1) that the Court failed to consider “two directly applicable authorities” supporting its argument that Land “assented to arbitration by failing to opt out” and by continuing to use her accounts, and (2) that the Court failed to consider IUCU’s “alternative” argument that the agreements’ modification clauses precluded the need for Land’s assent to arbitration. Pet. for Reh’g at 5–6. We address these arguments in turn.
I. This Court did not improperly fail to address the supplemental authorities cited by IUCU.
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To be sure, Section 3 of the RCC may very well offer “an effective modification procedure that fairly balances the public policies of economic efficiency and consumer protection.” See Cornell, 524 P.3d at 1139. And we recognize the practical difficulties that businesses may face in securing affirmative consent to contract modifications from existing customers. For these reasons, we leave open the possibility of adopting Section 3 of the RCC in some future case. But, given IUCU’s arguments on appeal and on transfer, neither Section 3 of the RCC nor Cornell apply to this case. We thus did not improperly fail to consider those authorities.
II. This Court did not improperly fail to consider IUCU’s “alternative” argument on appeal.
IUCU also faults the Court for failing to consider its “alternative” argument that it “properly applied” the agreements’ modification clauses “when it added an additional forum of arbitration to an already existing term establishing a forum for resolving disputes.” Pet. for Reh’g at 16. Those clauses, IUCU insists, “allowed [it] to ‘unilaterally’ amend” the agreements’ existing terms “without the need to establish Land’s assent to the change.” Id. (citing Appellee’s Br. at 42, 47–48) (bold emphasis added, italics omitted).
We view this claim as nothing more than a variation of IUCU’s first argument, signaling a labored attempt to litigate theories that IUCU expressly rejected on direct appeal.
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Conclusion
We recognize the practical difficulties that businesses may face in securing affirmative consent to contract modifications from existing customers. And for that reason, we leave open the possibility of adopting, in some future case, a different standard governing the offer and acceptance of unilateral contracts between businesses and consumers. But given IUCU’s emphasis on the bilateral nature of the agreements here, and its persistent disavowal of authority to unilaterally impose the arbitration Addendum, we find no merit in IUCU’s arguments on rehearing. We thus affirm our original opinion in full.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Molter, JJ., concur.