Goff, J.
An inmate must rely entirely on prison authorities to see that his or her medical needs are met. If they aren’t, the route to relief runs through the courts, which must not prematurely close their doors to a potentially meritorious claim. The inmate here suffers from hypothyroidism. Prison doctors prescribed him medication, but he complained of side effects. This led him to make persistent requests for alternative medication over several years. Eventually, he filed this suit against three doctors and their employer, seeking damages and injunctive relief on claims of medical malpractice and deliberate indifference to serious medical need. The trial court awarded summary judgment to the defendants even though the inmate presented the affidavit of a physician deploring the defendants’ treatment decisions. Today, we clarify what makes a medical expert’s affidavit both admissible and substantively sufficient to create an issue of fact in a malpractice case. And, applying our well-established summary judgment standard, we find conflicts in the evidence that require us to reverse the trial court.
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We first address the award of summary judgment on Zaragoza’s medical-malpractice claims, determining that Dr. Schultheis’s affidavit was both admissible and sufficient to present triable issues of fact. We then address Zaragoza’s deliberate-indifference claims, finding some evidence that each doctor knowingly failed to offer him a potentially safer alternative medication for treatment of his condition. As a result, we conclude that summary judgment was not warranted on these claims.
I. Zaragoza’s expert affidavit defeats summary judgment on the malpractice claims.
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We disagree with the defendants’ argument that Dr. Schultheis’s affidavit is not reliable enough to be admissible. And we agree with Zaragoza that the affidavit meets the sufficiency requirements set out in our case-law.
A. The expert affidavit is admissible on summary judgment.
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The affidavit here describes, in considerable detail, Zaragoza’s medical history, the treatment each doctor provided, and Dr. Schultheis’s views on what they should have done differently to comply with the standard of care. His affidavit is no less detailed than those of the defendants. He notes, for example, that people with multiple allergies, like Zaragoza, “often react to acacia, an inactive ingredient” in medications such as Synthroid. App. Vol. II, p. 201. And he reasons that Zaragoza’s reactions were so severe, persistent, and closely connected with taking Synthroid that they could not be a mere “sensitivity.” Id. at 200–02. This inference, based on the medical records, supports Dr. Schultheis’s conclusion that Zaragoza should have been offered an alternative, non-allergenic medication. Such an opinion, delivered by a qualified physician, is not the kind of “junk science” or “bald conclusion” that warrants weeding out at the summary-judgment stage.
The defendants also argue that Dr. Schultheis’s opinion requires specialist expertise or experience with hypothyroidism or allergies. Indiana case-law has not demanded specialist medical qualifications from experts who possess demonstrable professional knowledge of the relevant medical matters. See Bennett v. Richmond, 960 N.E.2d 782, 789–90, 791 (Ind. 2012) (permitting a clinical psychologist to testify on the cause of a brain injury); McIntosh v. Cummins, 759 N.E.2d 1180, 1184–85 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Snyder v. Cobb, 638 N.E.2d 442, 446 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)) (permitting a family practitioner to testify on an orthopedic surgeon’s standard of care). Even if we were to assume that Dr. Schultheis’s conclusions did require specialist expertise, the same limitation applies to the defendants’ affidavits, which claim no greater specialist knowledge or experience than Dr. Schultheis’s affidavit does. This makes the defendants’ argument self-defeating. Indeed, one of the grounds for Dr. Schultheis’s criticism of the defendants is their failure to consult with a specialist.
For these reasons, we find Dr. Schultheis’s expert affidavit admissible under Evidence Rule 702.
B. The expert affidavit is sufficient to create triable issues of fact.
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Accordingly, the expert affidavit in this case is both admissible and sufficient for Zaragoza’s medical-malpractice claims to survive summary judgment.
II. Issues of fact exist on Zaragoza’s deliberate-indifference claims.
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment” by “prison officials.” Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 856–57 (7th Cir. 2011). This guarantee “safeguards the prisoner against a lack of medical care that may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose.” Id. at 857 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It applies to “prison doctors” just as much as to “prison guards.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
On this issue, Zaragoza again argues, not that the defendants failed to carry their initial summary-judgment burden but, rather, that his own evidence presents triable issues of fact. He claims there is evidence to show the doctors refused to prescribe and provide him a safe alternative to Synthroid despite knowing the harm it was causing. The doctors contend that they did not display the necessary level of deliberate indifference to Zaragoza’s medical needs. Rather, they argue, their care decisions reflected at least a minimal degree of medical judgment.
We first survey the applicable law. Then, taking each defendant doctor in turn, we again agree with Zaragoza that factual disputes remain.
A. The deliberate-indifference standard.
A plaintiff seeking relief on a deliberate-indifference claim must prove two elements. First is the objective element of a “sufficiently serious” medical need—one that “has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment” or one “so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor’s attention.” Elyea, 631 F.3d at 857 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A medical condition that “significantly affects an individual’s daily activities” or “the existence of chronic and substantial pain” qualify as sufficiently severe. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Second, a plaintiff must prove the subjective element of a “sufficiently culpable state of mind”—meaning “the defendants knew of a substantial risk of harm to the inmate and disregarded the risk.” Elyea, 631 F.3d at 857 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This is a high bar. Medical professionals are “entitled to deference in treatment decisions unless no minimally competent professional” would have done the same. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To violate the constitution, the decision must mark “such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Inmates are “not entitled to the best care possible.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 754 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). And “administrative convenience and cost” may be appropriately weighed—but not “to the exclusion of reasonable medical judgment about inmate health.” Elyea, 631 F.3d at 863 (citation omitted).
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B. There is some evidence of deliberate indifference by each doctor.
We now apply the law we have surveyed to the designated evidence in this case. We find disputes that preclude the award of summary judgment to any of the three doctors.
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There is some evidence that each doctor offered Synthroid as the only option for Zaragoza to treat his hypothyroidism, despite knowing of its adverse effects and potentially safer alternatives. This is not, therefore, a case like Zingg, where the medical director was unaware that a generally accepted mode of treatment was ineffective for the plaintiff. Nor can we feel assured, like the Pyles court, that the care given was appropriate in the circumstances. Rather, as in Greeno, a factfinder could interpret the evidence as showing an “obdurate refusal” to move on from a plainly inadequate medication, leaving Zaragoza to choose between the intolerable side effects of the drug and untreated hypothyroidism—a diagnosed condition that all three doctors evidently thought warranted treatment on prescription. And we are concerned that, as in Berry, an inmate may have been denied a basic standard of care that a civilian could expect to receive. Given this possibility, we are persuaded that Zaragoza has met his burden to show a genuine issue for trial.
Conclusion
Summary judgment is not a summary trial. Hence, we do not decide today whether the parties’ claims or defenses are persuasive. We hold, simply, that genuine issues of material fact remain to be determined. Zaragoza’s evidence raises questions that can only be answered by a factfinder after a trial. Accordingly, the summary judgment entered by the trial court is reversed.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Molter, JJ., concur.