Pyle, J.
The State of Indiana (“the State”) appeals the trial court’s order, which granted the trial court’s own motion to correct error, vacated Trisha Woodworth’s (“Woodworth”) conviction by jury for Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death, and granted Woodworth a new trial. The State argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted its own motion to correct error. On cross-appeal, Woodworth argues that there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction for Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death.
Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted its own motion to correct error, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and reinstate Woodworth’s conviction for Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death. Further, addressing Woodworth’s cross-appeal and concluding that there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction, we reverse Woodworth’s conviction for Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death.
We reverse.
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The State argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted its own motion to correct error. On cross-appeal, Woodworth argues that there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction of Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death. We address each of the parties’ contentions in turn.
The State argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted its own motion to correct error and granted Woodworth a new trial. We agree.
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Here, the trial court granted Woodworth a new trial for two reasons. Specifically, the trial court found that: (1) Woodworth’s counsel was ineffective; and (2) the jury’s verdict did not accord with the evidence because nine minutes was a reasonable amount of time for Woodworth to determine whether she should call 911. Neither reason supports the trial court’s grant of its own motion to correct error.
Regarding the trial court’s findings that Woodworth’s counsel was ineffective, we note that the trial court found that Woodworth’s counsel was ineffective because he failed to: (1) negotiate a plea agreement; (2) tender lesser-included offense instructions; and (3) argue the Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent count in his closing argument.
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As the trial court noted, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is typically raised in a post-conviction relief proceeding, where the post-conviction court may receive new evidence to develop facts beyond those contained in the record. See Jewell v. State, 887 N.E.2d 939, 941-42 (Ind 2008). For example, a trial counsel has the opportunity to testify as to his or her trial strategy. Here, the trial court essentially converted the motion to correct error hearing into a post-conviction hearing but did not offer Woodworth’s counsel the opportunity to testify regarding his trial strategy. As a result, the trial court ignored the presumption that counsel’s performance was effective. In addition, the trial court failed to ask Woodworth if she wanted to assert such a claim and use her one post-conviction opportunity. We caution trial courts against sua sponte making an ineffective assistance of counsel determination and conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted its own motion to correct error based on a finding that Woodworth’s counsel was ineffective.
Regarding the trial court’s finding that the jury’s verdict did not accord with the evidence, we note that although Trial Rule 59(B) authorizes a trial court to make its own motion to correct error, “[s]etting aside a jury’s verdict and granting a new trial is not to be done lightly[.]” Walker v. Pullen, 943 N.E.2d 349, 352 (Ind. 2011). “In all cases where relief is granted, the [trial] court is required to ‘specify the general reasons’ for granting relief.” Id.
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Our Indiana Supreme Court has “long held that strict compliance with the substantive and procedural requirements of Trial Rule 59(J) is of ‘paramount’ importance.” Walker, 943 N.E.2d at 352. Our supreme court has further explained that “[s]pecific findings are necessary to temper the use of the ‘extraordinary and extreme’ power to overturn the jury’s verdict by assuring that the decision is based on a complete analysis of the law and facts.” Id. In Weida, our Indiana Supreme Court also explained that the most important reason for Rule 59(J)’s “arduous and time-consuming requirements” is “to assure the public that the justice system is safe not only from capricious or malicious juries, but also from usurpation by unrestrained judges.” Weida, 849 N.E.2d at 1153 (cleaned up). “In other words, when a court overrides the jury in its special domain and substitutes its own verdict for theirs without a clear showing that the ends of justice required it, it is likely that they did not.” Walker, 943 N.E.2d at 352 (cleaned up). When a court grants a new trial without making the specific findings, the remedy on appeal is to reinstate the jury verdict. Weida, 849 N.E.2d at 1147.
Here, our review of the trial court’s order reveals that the trial court granted Woodworth a new trial because it believed that the jury’s verdict was not in accord with the evidence. However, the trial court did not state whether the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence or clearly erroneous. Rather, the trial court made only general findings and not the special findings required by Trial Rule 59(J). We, therefore, reinstate Woodworth’s conviction for Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death.
On cross-appeal, Woodworth argues that there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction of Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death. Because we have reinstated her conviction, we address this issue and agree that there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction.
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Indeed, when M.M. did not take her bottle at 1:15 p.m., Lori had initially believed that M.M., who had woken up fussy and whiny from her nap, was still just a little bit sleepy. However, when M.M. “didn’t look right[,]” Woodworth immediately texted Mother and asked her to call Woodworth. (Tr. Vol. 5 at 46). While Woodworth was attempting to contact Mother, Lori and Tasha tended to M.M. by placing a cold rag on M.M.’s head to help her wake up. When the cold rag had no effect, Lori and Tasha took M.M. outside to get some fresh air. When Mother telephoned Woodworth and learned that M.M. was having difficulty waking up from her nap, Mother directed Woodworth to call 911. Woodworth called 911 at 1:24 p.m., just nine minutes after she had noticed that M.M. “didn’t look right.” (Tr. Vol. 5 at 46).
Based on these facts and circumstances, we conclude that Woodworth’s actions were those of a reasonable caregiver who finds that a child in her care is having difficulty waking up from a nap and does not “look right.” (Tr. Vol. 5 at 46). Stated differently, we conclude that Woodworth’s nine-minute delay in calling 911 – while she contacted Mother and while her mother and sister simultaneously tended to M.M. by applying a cold rag to M.M.’s head and taking her outside to get some fresh air – was not a failure to provide immediate medical attention to M.M. Woodworth did not knowingly place M.M. in a situation that endangered M.M.’s life. Thus, the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support her conviction of Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death. Accordingly, we reverse Woodworth’s conviction.
Reversed.
Vaidik, J., and Mathias, J., concur.