Massa, J.
The core issue here is whether Indiana’s summary-judgment standard requires a medical expert to expressly state the applicable standard of care in his affidavit. Two of our cases offer two possible answers: Oelling v. Rao, 593 N.E.2d 189 (Ind. 1992), says yes, but Jordan v. Deery, 609 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. 1993), says no and suggests the standard of care may be inferred from other content in the affidavit. For three decades, Oelling has been cited more often, but we hold that our precedents align more closely with Jordan. Today, we retire that part of the Oelling rule, which required affidavits to state the standard of care expressly, and embrace Jordan instead. Thus, the standard of care may be inferred from an affidavit.
Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and treated by two doctors at a hospital. She later sued both doctors, and the hospital, for medical malpractice. The trial court entered summary judgment for all three defendants, and the Court of Appeals, relying on Oelling, unanimously affirmed. Today, we summarily affirm the Court of Appeals opinion insofar as it concluded that Dr. Halperin and Memorial Hospital of South Bend are each entitled to summary judgment. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2); see also Martin v. Amoco Oil Co., 696 N.E.2d 383, 386 n.4 (Ind. 1998) (acknowledging we can “decline to review” portions of an appellate opinion and thus “partially deny transfer” on such issues). But applying a more refined distillation of our precedents to Dr. Messmer, we reach a different outcome and reverse the trial court’s decision as it relates to him.
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I. The applicable standard of care may be inferred.
To begin, we state our amended rule for medical malpractice affidavits in Indiana: the applicable standard of care may be inferred, provided the affidavit contains substantively sufficient information. See Jordan, 609 N.E.2d at 1110. But simply inferring the applicable standard of care is not enough under our rule: the affidavit must also include “a statement that the treatment . . . fell below” the standard of care, Oelling, 593 N.E.2d at190, to constitute an opinion that “takes on the character of an evidentiary fact” for summary judgment, Chi Yun Ho, 880 N.E.2d at 1201; see also T.R. 56(E) (stating a non-movant must “set forth specific facts”).
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And this is where the rubber meets the road. No doubt, tension exists between Oelling and Jordan. The panel here asked for guidance in resolving that tension. Korakis, 198 N.E.3d at 422 n.3. Just look at the intensified split from both case progenies. Compare Lusk, 753 N.E.2d at 753 (applying Oelling), with Jones, 697 N.E.2d at 500 (applying Jordan). Today, we alleviate that mounting pressure and hold that Oelling’s mandate that a medical expert affiant expressly “set out the applicable standard of care” is abrogated. 593 N.E.2d at 190. At the same time, we preserve Oelling’s directive that a medical expert affiant must include “a statement that the treatment . . . fell below” the standard of care. Id. Thus, the applicable standard of care may be inferred, provided the affidavit contains substantively sufficient information. See Jordan, 609 N.E.2d at 1110. The affidavit must also include “a statement that the treatment . . . fell below” the standard of care, Oelling, 593 N.E.2d at 190, to reflect “an evidentiary fact” for summary judgment, Chi Yun Ho, 880 N.E.2d at 1201.
II. Dr. Kemmler’s affidavit creates a genuine issue of material fact about Dr. Messmer’s alleged breach of the applicable standard of care.
Applying our test, we conclude that Dr. Kemmler’s affidavit creates a genuine issue of material fact about Dr. Messmer’s alleged breach of the standard of care. To begin, there is enough information in his affidavit to infer the applicable standard of care. Two reasons support that conclusion.
First, medical credentials. Like Jordan, where the expert testified that she had attended medical school, was licensed to practice medicine, and currently practiced medicine…
Second, medical judgment. Like Jordan, where the expert stated that she reviewed the pertinent medical records,…
For these reasons—the affidavit recites the affiant’s credentials and his detailed judgment about this case—we are satisfied that his affidavit contains enough information to enable the court to infer the standard of care without resorting to “undue speculation.” Overshiner v. Hendricks Reg’l Health, 119 N.E.3d 1124, 1133 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.
Under our test, the affidavit must still contain “a statement that the . . . treatment fell below” the standard of care. Oelling, 593 N.E.2d at 190; see also Jordan, 609 N.E.2d at 1111 (requiring a “conclusion” that treatment “violated the standard of care”). This opinion functions as an “evidentiary fact” for summary judgment. Chi Yun Ho, 880 N.E.2d at 1201. Otherwise, courts must speculate about breach. See Oelling, 593 N.E.2d at 190–91 (finding affidavit deficient, in part, because it stated only that the expert “would have treated” patient differently, not that the doctor’s treatment “fell below the applicable standard”). Here, Dr. Kemmler concluded: “[I]t is my opinion that Dr. Messmer [sic] treatment of Ms. Korakis[] fell below the standard of care.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 124. Thus, his affidavit passes our test and creates a genuine issue of material fact about Dr. Messmer’s alleged breach of the standard of care. See Jordan, 609 N.E.2d at 1110; Oelling, 593 N.E.2d at 190. Because there is a “conflict of evidence,” this issue “must be resolved by a trier of fact.” Siner, 51 N.E.3d at 1190. We therefore reverse summary judgment entered for Dr. Messmer.
Conclusion
We thus affirm in part and reverse in part.