May, J.
Terri Welbaum (“Grandmother”) appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to correct error following the dismissal for lack of standing of her petition for grandparent visitation with C.B. (“Child”). Grandmother argues she had standing to pursue grandparent visitation based on the plain language of Indiana Code chapter 31-17-5, otherwise known as the Grandparent Visitation Act (“GVA”). We reverse and remand.
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We recently examined this issue in Stoner v. Stoner, 223 N.E.3d 278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). In that case, the grandfather sought to establish grandparent visitation with his grandson pursuant to the GVA. Id. at 279. The grandson’s parents shared physical and legal custody of him. Id. The trial court found, based on In re Matter of E.H., 121 N.E.3d 594 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), that the grandfather, as the parent of one of grandson’s custodial parents, did not have standing to pursue grandparent visitation. Id. at 280.
The grandfather appealed and argued In re Matter of E.H. relied upon case law decided prior to the 1993 amendment to the GVA, which removed language regarding the parent of the custodial parent’s inability to pursue grandparent visitation, and “‘[n]o longer does the GVA make any kind of distinction between custodial parent and noncustodial parent.” Id. at 280. We outlined the evolution of the GVA, including the 1993 amendment that “eliminat[ed] the language precluding a court from granting visitation to a grandparent who is the parent of a person who has been awarded custody of the grandchild.” Id. at 281. Based thereon, we concluded Indiana Code section 31-17-5-1, the current version of the GVA, “does not preclude a grandparent from seeking visitation with a child where the custodian of the child is the grandparent’s child.” Id. at 282.
Here, Grandmother is the parent of Mother, who is the custodial parent of Child. As stated in Stoner, Indiana Code section 31-17-5-1 does not preclude Grandmother from pursuing grandparent visitation with Child. Therefore, the trial court erred when it dismissed Grandmother’s petition for grandparent visitation with Child based on her alleged lack of standing. See, e.g., Moses v. Cober, 641 N.E.2d 668, 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (noting the 1993 amendment of the GVA “reflects [the legislature’s] purpose to protect a grandparent whose child, as the custodial parent, was denying visitation with a grandchild due to conflict between grandparent and child”) (abrogated on other grounds by Daugherty v. Ritter, 652 N.E.2d 502, 503 (Ind. 1995) (Moses determined merits of visitation claim by focusing on relationship between grandmother and granddaughter, while ignoring evidence of conflict between grandmother and her daughter, and Daugherty held trial courts should instead consider the totality of the circumstances between the grandparent, parent, and child when determining whether grandparent visitation is in child’s best interests).
Conclusion
Because Grandmother is not precluded by the GVA from seeking visitation with Child, the trial court erred when it dismissed Grandmother’s petition for grandparent visitation based on her alleged lack of standing. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Bailey, J., and Felix, J., concur.