Goff, J.
Landowners have a duty to exercise reasonable care for the protection of invitees on their premises. This duty generally requires the landowner to protect invitees against foreseeable risks of harm. Our foreseeability analysis varies, however, depending on whether a case involves a dangerous condition on the premises or whether it involves a dangerous activity. Today’s case, arising from an injury suffered by a swimmer who collided with the corner of a swimming-pool wall, implicates the pool’s allegedly dangerous condition. Finding some evidence that the risk of harm was foreseeable, we deem summary judgment for the pool operator unwarranted. However, we affirm summary judgment for the pool’s architects.
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I. All summary-judgment issues are available in this interlocutory appeal.
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Here, Beacon moved the trial court for “an order certifying for interlocutory appeal that part” of its summary-judgment order “denying Beacon’s motion for summary judgment.” Motion To Certify Order For Interlocutory Appeal, Pennington v. Mem’l Hosp., No. 71D04-1804-CT000160 (St. Joseph Sup. Ct. July 8, 2022). The Penningtons then filed a notice that they had no objection. The trial court granted Beacon’s motion, stating that it was certifying only that part of its order partially denying summary judgment to Beacon. Beacon then moved the Court of Appeals to accept jurisdiction of the same limited issue and that motion was granted.
This manner of proceeding improperly purported to certify a specific issue rather than the interlocutory order as a whole. The question arises, then, whether the entire order is now subject to our review or only the one issue. In Budden v. Board of School Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis, this Court faced a similar issue. See 698 N.E.2d 1157, 1165–66 & n.14 (Ind. 1998). In that case, the trial court certified its interlocutory order and five specific questions. Id. at 1165. We held that the “net effect” was simply to “identify the issue that constitutes a ‘substantial question of law’ presented by the order.” Id. at 1165–66 n.14 (quoting former App. R. 4(B)(6)). We reach the same result today and conclude that when a trial court purports to certify an “issue,” it implicitly certifies the entire order and merely identifies a “substantial question of law” that calls for “early determination.” See App. R. 14(B)(1)(c)(ii). The error is “inconsequential” so long as “it is clear what order is affected.” See Budden, 698 N.E.2d at 1166 n.14.
Applying this rule, we will address all the issues stemming from the trial court’s summary-judgment order and raised in these appeals: the Penningtons’ appeal from summary judgment for the pool’s architects, Spear and Panzica; Beacon’s appeal from partial denial of summary judgment as to their operation of the pool; and the Penningtons’ cross-appeal from partial summary judgment for Beacon as to its role in both operating and designing the pool.
II. The Penningtons designated no admissible evidence that Spear or Panzica breached their professional duty of care.
A plaintiff alleging negligence must prove (1) that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, (2) that the defendant breached this duty by allowing its conduct to “fall below the applicable standard of care,” and (3) that the breach “proximately caused” a “compensable injury.” Goodwin v. Yeakle’s Sports Bar & Grill, 62 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, the Penningtons alleged that Spear and Panzica were negligent in designing the swimming pool. In seeking summary judgment, Spear and Panzica designated the opinion of an expert swimming-pool designer and engineer, Matthew Reynolds, that it had met the standard of care in designing the pool. The Penningtons, in response, designated the opinion of Dr. Sawyer, a “Risk and Safety Management Consultant” with experience managing “aquatic facilities.” App. Vol. XII, p. 51. When questioned during a deposition, Dr. Sawyer affirmed that he had no experience, education, or training in “how to engineer the design of a swimming pool” and was “not qualified to give an opinion” on the “standard of care applicable to any architect” who may sign or stamp a design. App. Vol. III, p. 65. Based on this testimony, the trial court excluded Dr. Sawyer’s evidence to the extent that it bore on swimming-pool design.
We find no abuse of discretion in this ruling as far as Spear and Panzica are concerned. An architect or design professional has been negligent if they “breached a duty to exercise the degree of competence ordinarily exercised in like circumstances by reputable members of the profession.” Smith v. Walsh Const. Co. II, LLC, 95 N.E.3d 78, 89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A witness must have “familiarity with the standard of care” applicable to such trained professionals, otherwise they cannot “testify to the requisite standard of care” or any departure from that standard. Troutwine Estates Dev. Co. v. Comsub Design & Eng’g, Inc., 854 N.E.2d 890, 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (concerning engineers). Generally, this means the witness must be an expert. Id. Here, Dr. Sawyer admitted being unqualified to speak about an architect’s standard of care. The trial court reasonably concluded that he thereby excluded himself from rendering any opinion on Spear and Panzica’s conduct in designing the pool.
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III. Beacon was not entitled to summary judgment on the maintenance-and-operation claim.
We turn next to Beacon’s appeal from the partial denial of summary judgment on Count III as to its failure to provide warnings or instructions to swimmers. Resolution of this issue turns on whether undisputed evidence showed that the harm Dr. Pennington suffered was unforeseeable. To answer this question, we first clarify the distinction between the two tests used in premises-liability cases for the foreseeability of harm. Then, applying the test appropriate for analyzing conditions of the premises, we affirm the trial court’s decision to partially deny summary judgment. Furthermore, with the exception of one specific issue, we deem Count III triable as a whole.
A. Dr. Pennington’s injury implicates the condition of the swimming pool, not activities on the premises.
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In cases involving conditions on the land or premises, section 343’s foreseeability analysis focuses specifically on “the condition” that allegedly resulted in injury. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343. In Griffin v. Menard, Inc., for example, the plaintiff was injured when a sink fell onto him out of a cardboard box. 175 N.E.3d 811, 812 (Ind. 2021). We focused on whether Menard had any “actual or constructive knowledge that the box was defective.” Id. at 814 (emphasis added).
A different test applies in cases stemming from “activities on a landowner’s premises unrelated to the premises’ condition.” See Rogers, 63 N.E.3d at 323. In the companion cases of Rogers and Goodwin, we explained that, “in the duty arena,” foreseeability “involves an evaluation of (1) the broad type of plaintiff and (2) the broad type of harm.” Id. at 325; see Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 394 (restating the same). We consider the “general class of persons of which the plaintiff was a member and whether the harm suffered was of a kind normally to be expected— without addressing the specific facts of the occurrence.” Rogers, 63 N.E.3d at 325 (citing Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 388–89) (emphasis added). In Goodwin, for example, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant bar should have protected them against being shot by a patron. 62 N.E.3d at 385–86. We asked the general question whether “bar owners routinely contemplate that one bar patron might suddenly shoot another.” Id. at 393–94.
A critical difference thus exists between the foreseeability tests for conditions and activities. The Restatement test that we use for conditions looks at whether the danger posed by the specific condition involved was foreseeable. Whereas, the Rogers/Goodwin test that we use for activities looks at whether it was foreseeable that a general class of persons to which the plaintiff belonged might suffer the general type of harm involved. This distinction makes sense in that a landowner can know the precise physical condition of their premises, but only generally foresee what conduct or behavior will occur. In today’s case, it potentially makes a significant difference whether courts will consider the general foreseeability of a swimmer hitting a wall or the specific risk of injury posed by the particular wing-wall involved.
The Court of Appeals indicated that it applied the activities standard to the maintenance-and-operation claim here because “Beacon as landowner made the decisions as to what activities could be conducted within and in proximity to the gap and with what notifications,” such as whether to allow backstroke in the lane with the wing-walls. Pennington, 206 N.E.3d at 488. We find the appellate court’s framing of the Penningtons’ claims less convincing than the fact that Dr. Pennington injured her head on a physical object, the wing-wall, while engaged in what is ordinarily a reasonably safe activity. See Sturgis v. Silvers, 296 F. Supp. 3d 981, 991 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (holding that, although the plaintiff was attending a “social gathering” at the time she was injured, her injury stemmed from a “condition,” namely the “latent instability” of a “balcony railing” that collapsed).
To distinguish between condition claims and activity claims, we focus on the substance of the claims as reflected in the complaint, summary-judgment briefs, and designated evidence. Here, Count III alleges that Beacon failed to “remedy dangerous conditions” in the pool and specifically mentions “water levels,” “guidance aids,” and “safety features such as floating lines and adequate padding.” App. Vol. II, p. 194. The Penningtons’ summary-judgment brief argues that Beacon “owed a duty of care to protect a member of its fitness club from an injury resulting from an exposed wall during normal use of its lap pool” and “failed to take adequate measures to correct the dangerous condition.” App. Vol. III, p. 111. Although we can imagine circumstances where it might be difficult to disentangle conditions and activities on the land,3 we have little trouble identifying the Penningtons’ claim here as presupposing a duty to protect invitees against a dangerous physical condition. The unreasonable danger in which Dr. Pennington allegedly found herself was not merely swimming backstroke, but swimming backstroke next to the unpadded wing-wall. It was the placement and condition of this wing-wall that formed the basis for alleging a duty to protect. As the substance of the claim is that a condition of the premises caused an injury, the appropriate foreseeability analysis follows Restatement section 343.
We now apply the test for the foreseeability of dangerous conditions in reviewing the trial court’s decision to partially deny summary judgment to Beacon on Count III.
B. Fact issues exist as to whether Beacon owed a duty to protect invitees from striking the wing-wall.
Beacon offers two lines of argument that summary judgment on Count III was proper under Restatement section 343. First, Beacon argues that it had no actual or constructive knowledge of the wing-wall being dangerous. Indeed, it contends that, as there was no design flaw, there could be no duty to warn of a dangerous condition. Second, Beacon argues that it could have anticipated Dr. Pennington herself realizing any danger the wing-wall posed and protecting herself against it. For the reasons explained below, neither argument persuades us.
1. An issue of fact exists as to the foreseeability of the harm.
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2. An issue of fact exists as to whether the risk was known or obvious.
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IV. Beacon was not entitled to summary judgment on the design claim.
Finally, the Penningtons argued on cross-appeal that Dr. Sawyer’s opinion created a fact issue as to whether Beacon should have foreseen a risk while participating alongside Spear and Panzica in the design process itself. We agree that there is a triable issue of fact here.
Unlike Spear and Panzica, Beacon is not an architectural or engineering firm. So, the professional design standard of care discussed in Part II, above, is inapplicable. Rather, Beacon, as the landowner, was obligated to exercise reasonable care under Restatement section 343 in the “original construction of the premises.”….
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… Therefore, the evidence does not utterly foreclose the possibility that Beacon, in the exercise of reasonable care, should itself have discovered and remedied the allegedly dangerous condition during the design phase.
Conclusion
The trial court correctly entered summary judgment for Spear and Panzica. However, Beacon was not entitled to summary judgment on any count, except as to the single issue of the level of the water within Count III. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for trial of all the Penningtons’ claims against Beacon.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Molter, JJ., concur.